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ABSTRACT
What are we?
The Ontology of Subjects of Experience
by
HUNG Jenny
Doctor of Philosophy

What am I? There are a number of possible answers: I am a person, a mind, a human
animal, a soul, part of a human being (e.g., a brain), I do not exist, and even more.
Philosophers have been asking this for thousands of years and were not satisfied.
In the contemporary analytic tradition, philosophers are attracted to a naturalistic,
scientific ontology hence a materialistic personal ontology that matches the huge
success in scientific discoveries. They think that we are material objects. However,
their views do not match our intuition about some cases regarding our survival. Also,
the possibility of an afterlife is eliminated. In my thesis, I explain the shortcomings of
current philosophical theories, and develop a better account.
I propose the Conscious Subject View, according to which (1) I am a subject of
experience, a mental entity whose essential property is to be conscious, and (2)
Subjects have haecceities, a property that makes an object a different object from other
objects even if they are qualitatively identical with it. I provide two arguments for the
claim that we are essentially subjects. The first is the Essentiality Argument. I first
define an egoistic concern as one such that necessarily, my concern about X can be
egoistic if and only if I exist and persist as X. Furthermore, I argue that necessarily, I
can be egoistically concerned with an entity E if and only if E is numerically identical
with my subject of experience. I then conclude that we are essentially subjects of
experience. My second argument, which I call the Argument of Persistence, is that we
have the intuition that we persist only when there is the gradual replacement of the
brain. I argue that the best candidate to explain this intuition is that we persist as
subjects of experience. I further offer a conceivability argument for the claim that
haecceity of the subject determines its persistence.
I defend a mentally-oriented proposal regarding our nature by examining the
essential properties of our existence. It solves most of the problems with the

materialistic personal ontology and shows the theoretical advantages of a longneglected approach.
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0.1

Introduction
Personal Ontology

This thesis is on our essential properties and our persistence conditions. The question
of the nature of the self is often expressed in the form “what I am.” Although there
have been plenty of discussions throughout the intellectual history, philosophers are
not satisfied. The problem of personal ontology is one concerning the metaphysics of
ourselves. There are three questions of personal ontology:

Personal Ontology
1. What are we?
2. What are our synchronic identity conditions?
3. What are our diachronic identity conditions?

There are a number of possible answers to the first question (1) in the contemporary
literature: I am a person, a mind, a human animal, a soul, part of a human being (e.g.,
a brain), a subject of experience, and even more.
Usually, when philosophers try to answer question 1, they aim to provide the
nature but not the accidental statuses of what we are. When philosophers make such
an inquiry about our nature, they usually aim to provide the essential properties of our
existence. I take the first question of personal ontology as the question of what our
essential properties are. Also, I understand the question of our nature as the question
of our essential properties. I understand the notion of essential property to be a modal
notion. The definition of essential property I adopt is such that an entity x has an
essential property F if and only if necessarily, when x exists, x has F.1 For instance, I
am a philosopher, but I am not essentially a philosopher because I may exist without
1

Kit Fine (1994) argues that such a modal definition of essential property is unsustainable. He also
proposes that this approach and the idea of metaphysics as a branch of modal logic should be
abandoned. In this thesis, I do not aim at arguing for a novel definition of essential property. What I
adopt is the classical, modal definition of essential property.
1

being a philosopher. In other words, “being a philosopher” is not my essential property.
I treat one’s nature as one’s essential properties. In asking for the nature of x, we ask
for the essential properties of x. I define also that if “being an X” is my essential
property, then I am essentially an X. In this thesis, I assume essentialism in general,
namely, the thesis that there are at least some objects with essential properties. I also
assume subject essentialism, the claim that subjects have essential properties. I define
the first question of personal ontology as what fills in F in this sentence: necessarily,
for any x, if x is among us, then necessarily, when x exists, x is an F (x has the essential
properties of F).
The question of “what we are” has been prevalent for more than two thousand
years. The famous ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates and Plato, proposed that we
are immaterial souls separable from the physical body. There is also the notorious
Cartesian dualism defended by René Descartes, according to which the thinking thing
is a mental substance distinct from the physical. In the contemporary analytic tradition,
philosophers are fond of the view that we are material objects. They are attracted to a
naturalistic, scientific ontology of the world hence also to a materialistic personal
ontology that matches the huge success in scientific discoveries.
The second question (2) of personal ontology concerns our synchronic identity
conditions. Many philosophers think that there are two kinds of identity relation – the
numerical identity relation and the qualitative identity relation. The former is a relation
that holds only between an object and itself as numerically the same thing. For instance,
Peter is numerically identical with himself but not to his twin brother. The latter
relation is one that holds between things of the same type, or of the same qualitative
properties. Peter and his twin brother can be said to be qualitatively identical in terms
of their genes; the many packs of cookies in the supermarket can also be regarded as
qualitatively identical in some other sense since there is no reason for us to pick one
2

pack of cookies but not the other, given that they look very much the same to us. Most
of the time, the questions of personal ontology concern our numerical identity, not
qualitative identity, at a time and over time.
There are two senses in which we can understand individuation. For the first sense
of individuation, the recognition that there is only one object but not two or more in
front of us is for us to identify an object from an epistemological or cognitive point of
view. For instance, when we perceive a monkey mother carrying her two babies, we
immediately perceive three entities there instead of one; but we perceive that there is
a fence but not separated pieces of wood. How are perceptions of these individuals
possible? This is the famous problem of perception of objective particulars. This
question is categorized as a historical debate in philosophy of perception, which is
itself a big question not directly related to the problem of personal ontology in the
metaphysical sense. I am not going to deal with it in this thesis.
There is also a metaphysical sense of individuation of objects. The facts about the
criteria of individuation of an object in a metaphysical sense would be facts
independent of our perception of the object, given that realism is true – physical objects
exist independent of our existence, and their individuation is also independent of our
psychological structure. Under this picture, necessarily, an entity E is a single thing if
and only if it fulfills certain requirements for being a single thing. The requirements
vary among different kinds of thing. Since discussions of personal ontology aim to be
metaphysical, the individuality of ourselves should be studied via the metaphysical
sense of individuation. That said, the second question of personal ontology is not just
a question regarding how we perceive our own individuality, but how we are
individuated ontologically.
The third question of personal ontology concerns with the persistence conditions
of ourselves. The answer to this question is what fills in the dots in this sentence:
3

necessarily, for any x and y and for any times t1 and t2 (t1ɽt2), if x and y are among us,
then x at t1 = y at t2 if and only if …. People usually ask questions such as “When did
I begin?” “What will happen to me when I die?” In fact, these questions can be reduced
to a more fundamental inquiry about the necessary and sufficient conditions for our
persistence: “in virtue of what we persist over time?” There are many answers to such
a question. For instance, some philosophers think that we persist if there is continuity
of memories, psychological traits, future goals, and aims. However, there is the famous
reduplication problem saying that these psychological properties are multiply
instantiable, thus should not be factors that determine personal identity, and there can
be two or more individuals that are psychologically continuous with you. Some
thinkers claim that the continuity of the same physical body or the brain determines
our persistence. There are still other philosophers who propose that all these are merely
evidence for, but not what determines, our persistence. Some would even claim that
the sameness of souls is what our persistence consists of.
As we will see, one’s idea of what we are will directly influence one’s choice
about theories of our persistence conditions, and vice versa. In other words, the
metaphysical fact regarding “what we essentially are” is directly related to the
metaphysical fact concerning “in virtue of what we persist.” For instance, one easy
observation is that if we are essentially X, then we cannot persist without being X.
Moreover, if necessarily, I persist if and only if I persist as X, then I am essentially X.
So long as we persist, the properties of X that ground X’s persistence and existence
will be present. In this case, the essential properties of X are also present when we
persist. In other words, necessarily, so long as we persist, we are X. That is tantamount
to saying that we are essentially X.

0.2

Personhood and Selfhood
4

When philosophers make an inquiry about our essential properties, they sometimes
interpret the question as asking for the essential properties of a person. This is correct
only if we are essentially persons. Indeed, some philosophers, such as the
Constitutionalists, think that we are essentially persons constituted by human animals.
However, it is noted that some thinkers, such as some versions of Animalism, think
that we are not essentially persons but human animals.
The idea of what makes an individual a person may vary among philosophers.
Derek Parfit (1984) adopts a Lockean definition of a person, according to which
necessarily, x is a person if and only if x is an entity that thinks, has the ability to think
of itself and itself, and can extend its consciousness to the past. Lynne Rudder Baker
(2013), on the other hand, proposes that necessarily, x is a person if and only if x has a
rudimentary first-person perspective and is capable of developing a robust first-person
perspective. Briefly speaking, the rudimentary first-person perspective is the ability to
perceive the world from a spatiotemporal perspective, and the robust first-person
perspective is the ability to think of oneself as oneself (and to use first-person
pronouns). Despite these variations, the term “person” generally refers to an entity that
can think and has certain psychological properties. In the current literature, the term
“person” usually refers to a being that has certain psychological properties such as
memories, dispositions, psychological traits, and cognitive capacities such as thinking
of itself as itself. Moreover, a person bears a certain moral and social responsibility. In
this thesis, I adopt the following definition of person: necessarily, for any x, x is a
person if and only if x has memories, psychological traits, certain personality, and the
capacity to think of itself as itself.
There are two different sets of questions for us:

Set A
5

1.

What properties do we have?

2.

What essential properties do we have?

3.

What are the persistence conditions of ourselves?

Set B
4.

What properties does a person have?

5.

What are the essential properties of being a person?

6.

What are the persistence conditions of a person?

The main project in this thesis is to answer question 2 (but not 5). I will touch on
question 1 (but not question 4) about the relation between the subject of experience
and its physical body and answer whether we are human animals. Moreover, I will also
answer the question of our persistence (question 3, but not question 6). We can see that
the two sets of questions become equivalent if we are essentially persons. On the other
hand, if we are not sure whether we are essentially persons, then we could not just
define the problem of our persistence as one of the persistence of persons, and vice
versa. Such an assumption would heavily undermine the original intention of asking
the questions of personal ontology.
There may not be fruitful practical guidance for our daily lives personal ontology
claims could provide. For instance, it is widely accepted that persons bear a moral
status and have moral and social responsibilities. In contrast, some human animals,
brains, or subjects of experience may not have moral status or social responsibilities
as high as that of persons. For instance, the subject of experience of a jellyfish has no
social responsibilities. A person is a being of a certain dignity, and “person” a term
with certain practical (such as legal) implications; a subject of experience may not. We
should distinguish the difference between the moral and social status of a person, a
6

human animal, and a subject of experience.
Take the subject of experience as an example. It is a sentient conscious being
capable of feeling pain and joy. If we admit that pain is undesirable, and joy is desirable,
then it is preferable to minimize pain for a subject and to maximize joy for it. In light
of this, the owner of these simple sensory and emotional experiences may carry certain,
yet limited, moral status. I hold the view that it is possible for there to be a subject of
experience of pure pain without being able to have moral thoughts or moral actions.
Patients in the late stage of Alzheimer’s disease are some examples. Also, there may
be a totally passive subject of experience that only feels without having volitions. For
instance, there are patients with lock-in syndrome who suffer from the inability to act
and interact with others. Since their ability to interact with the society is very limited,
they thus should not have as many social responsibilities as we do. I do not aim at
investigating the social and moral responsibilities of ourselves as subjects of
experience in this thesis, although it would certainly be an important concern for many
people in the stream of ethics.

0.2.1

Human Beings (Human Animals)

There is also the conception of human being or human animal, sometimes confused
with the idea of person in the contemporary literature. I take the term “human animal”
or “human being” to be referring to the kind of physical organism, or primate species,
Homo sapiens which we belong to, and which the Biologists study. I also define the
term “human body” as the physical body of the primate species Homo Sapiens that
persists after the human animal dies, so long as it retains a human shape. By the same
token, corpses are regarded as human bodies until it does not have a human shape
anymore. “Having a human shape” is vague. Sometimes it is indeterminate whether
one should treat an entity as a human body or not. For instance, if 70% of a human
7

body is eaten up by a lion, and the rest has severely deteriorated such that nobody
recognizes it as once being part of a human body, then one may doubt whether the
remaining 30% hunk of matter is a human body.
Some thinkers would believe that one is a person only if one is a human animal
since only human beings can be persons in the actual world. However, the claim
indicates that it is impossible that there is a person who is not a human being. I would
regard this understanding of personhood as too narrow. I would rather adopt a broader
conception of person such that if there is an entity, such as a chimp, a Martian, an angel,
or a spirit, that thinks and has psychological properties similar to that of a human
person, then this entity should be regarded as a non-human person.

0.2.2

The Self

There is yet another puzzling question regarding what the self is. Sydney Shoemaker
(2011) thinks that there is no difference between selves and persons, and he uses the
two terms interchangeably. Some philosophers such as Shaun Gallagher (2000),
however, choose to regard the self as the minimal subject of our experience and a
person as the subject of experience with certain psychological complexities such as
personality, long-term goals, and memories. Gallagher thinks that a minimal subject
of experience is a mental thing that has an immediate and non-reflective (nonconceptual) self-consciousness. This approach is taken by other thinkers such as Galen
Strawson (2011) who claims that the self is a minimal conscious mental entity which
does not necessarily have any personality, sense of agency, sense of persistence, or
memory of the past.
I do not presuppose any of these claims. I would rather take the position that
selves are what we genuinely refer to when we utter the term “I,” and our selves are
essentially of the most specific kind of thing that we belong to. For instance, suppose
8

I am essentially a concrete object, and also, I am essentially a subject of experience.
Since a subject of experience is a concrete object (the set of subjects is the subset of
the set of concrete objects), our selves are essentially of the most specific kind of thing
that we belong to, namely, the subjects of experience.
Some philosophers would like to differentiate between the nature of selves we
have and the essential properties of ourselves. For me, this is a confusion of terms –
there is no such thing as a self apart from myself, yourself, or himself. Our “selves”
just means ourselves. The question of “what we are” is one of our essential properties,
and also, the essential properties of ourselves, and thus the essential properties of our
“selves.” In other words, I presuppose that the term “I” refers to a certain self, and the
question of what we are is to provide an answer to what the essential properties of
selves are. More specifically, I regard the question of “what we are” as a question of
what the most specific kind of thing to which we (ourselves) belong.
I take the question of “what the essential properties of my ‘self’ are” as equivalent
to the one of “what I essentially am.” As my project aims to answer this question, I am
not going to define the essential properties of selves from the very beginning. For
instance, I do not assume that selves are essentially mental, or essentially mental
entities. I leave it open what the self is at the first place and go on to defend the view
that selves are subjects of experience, which are essentially conscious. This claim is
not an assumption I make – it is rather a conclusion at which I wish to arrive. To be
precise, I take it that the claim that “we are essentially subjects of experience” and the
claim that “our selves are essentially subjects of experience” as equivalent.

0.3

My Basic Claims

9

In this thesis, I argue that we are subjects of experience, whose essential property is to
be conscious, and subjects of experience have haecceities. I call my view the
Conscious Subject View. These are the basic claims of the Conscious Subject View:

The Conscious Subject View
1.

I am a subject of experience - I have the essential property of having conscious
experience. (Chapter 4)

2.

Necessarily, for any entity x, if x is a subject of experience, then x has haecceity.
(Chapter 5)

3.

Necessarily, for any subject of experience x, for any haecceity h, if h is x's haecceity,
then necessarily, x exists if and only if x has h. (Chapter 5)

I argue for my main claims in chapters 4 and 5. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 are discussions of
dominant views in the current literature.
I adopt the definition of subject of experience proposed by Galen Strawson (2011),
according to which necessarily, for any entity x, x is a subject of experience if and only
if x is a mental thing that has conscious experience. He uses SESMET to denote a
subject of experience, which is the abbreviation of “a subject of experience that is a
single mental thing.” A mental thing, for Strawson, is a thing that can undergo mental
processes and be in certain mental states. A thing, in general, is an owner of properties.
Sometimes, I would also state that the self is a thin subject of experience to indicate
that a subject of experience does not necessarily have personality, agency,
psychological traits, or memories.
I adopt the physical theory of human animal, according to which human animals
are physical (biological) organisms. I am inclined to substance dualism though I aim
not to discuss the mind-body problem in detail in this thesis. Under this construal, I

10

am inclined to the view that we are purely mental entities and are not human animals.2
I am also inclined to the claim that the human animal does not think; what thinks is the
subject of experience that has intimate causal relation with the human animal. I will
discuss the relation between substance dualism and personal ontology in chapters one
and four.
I argue in the final chapter that subjects of experience have haecceities. I define
haecceities as follows: necessarily, an object O has haecceity H if and only if H is what
makes O a different object from other objects even if they are qualitatively identical
with it. We are subjects, and subjects have haecceities; our persistence is determined
by the sameness of haecceity. There should not be any observable or verifiable
criterion for our persistence.
My views on personal ontology are most similar to that of Richard Swinburne
(2012). He proposes that we are essentially souls and that our persistence is the
persistence of souls, which is in principle unverifiable for us. Nevertheless, there is
one point that I disagree with Swinburne. I take a soul as what Swinburne defines it as
according to which a soul is a mental entity that is capable of being conscious but not
essentially conscious. One obvious difference between a subject and a soul is that the
Strawsonian subject of experience (which I adopt) is essentially conscious, but the
Swinburnean soul is not essentially conscious. Swinburne thinks that we are entities
that are capable of being conscious, and he thinks that we are not entities that are
essentially conscious. I disagree. I believe that we are entities that are essentially
conscious.

2

E. J. Lowe (2006) proposes a novel version of substance dualism. He thinks that we are psychological
substances, and we have physical properties. He writes: “ Accordingly, I am perfectly ready to allow
that psychological substances should possess material characteristics (that is, include physical states
amongst their modes).” (Lowe 2006, p. 33) In my thesis, I adopt a traditional (Cartesian) definition of
substance dualism, according to which a mental substance only has mental properties and a physical
substance only has physical properties.
11

0.4

Methodology

The methodology I have adopted in this thesis is to examine various approaches to
personal ontology and then provide my own approach. I first target Animalism, a
popular and controversial view in the contemporary analytic literature, that we are
numerically identical with the human animals. There are clear and straightforward
arguments for Animalism - one can understand the main debates of personal ontology
in a systematic way upon investigating them. I then go on to discuss the
Constitutionalist proposal, according to which we are persons constituted by the
human animals. Constitutionalists are fascinated by specific terminologies and
complicated metaphysical structures. In my opinion, these complications create new
problems. I further discuss the view that we are essentially physical and mental parts
of the human animals and raise several objections to the claims. I then argue that we
are subjects of experience, a purely mental entity that has the essential property of
being conscious.

0.4.1

Conceivability and Metaphysical Possibility

Some of my main arguments rely on thought experiments and on the idea that if X is
ideally positively conceivable, then X is metaphysically possible. Before I lay out my
arguments, I would like to talk a bit about the relationship between conceivability and
metaphysical possibility.
I assume, in this thesis, David Chalmers’s (2002) claim that situations that are
ideally positively conceivable are metaphysically possible. According to Chalmers,
there are different classifications of conceivability. He considers conceivability as a
property of propositions. There is prima facie and ideal conceivability and positive and
12

negative conceivability. Necessarily, the proposition P is prima facie conceivable for
a subject S if and only if P is conceivable for S on first appearances. Necessarily, P is
ideally conceivable for an ideal reasoner subject S if and only if careful reflection is
carried by S, and S detects no contradiction involved. Also, necessarily, x is an ideal
reasoner if and only if x does not have contingent cognitive limitations. Under this
construal, some prima facie conceivable situations are not ideally conceivable. They
can be undermined by further reflection.
There is also negative conceivability. According to Chalmers, P is negatively
conceivable only if P is not ruled out a priori. As mentioned, there are two scenarios
in which one finds a proposition P negatively conceivable. When a subject S cannot
rule out P at first glance, P is prima facie conceivable for S. However, if an ideal
reasoner S has reflected on P and still cannot discover any contradiction, then P is
ideally negatively conceivable for S. In contrast, to positively conceive of a situation
is to perceptually imagine an event with certain configuration of objects with their
corresponding properties. In other words, P is positively conceivable for a subject S if
S can perceptually imagine a situation in which P is true. For instance, we can
positively conceive of a dog playing the piano by perceptually imagining the visual
image of a dog playing the piano.
In philosophical discussions, it is positive conceivability that is adopted as the
ground for supporting theories such as mind-body dualism. As there is always
perceptual imagination when there is positive conceivability, sometimes philosophers
just use perceptual imagination to replace positive conceivability. In this thesis, I will
take the assumption that if one can perceptually imagine X, then one can positively
conceive of X.
Prima facie negative conceivability arguments have the weakest strength for
being evidence for metaphysical possibility because these arguments lack the concrete
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imagination of the scenario. Prima facie positive conceivability is stronger in terms of
its being evidence for metaphysical possibility, but there is no guarantee. Some
philosophers may think that we can prima facie perceptually imagine impossible
objects such as round square, but yet, the existence of such an object is metaphysically
impossible.
The strongest form of conceivability should be ideal positive conceivability. By
his definition, necessarily, P is ideally positively conceivable by an ideal reasoner S if
and only if (1) careful reflection is carried by S, and (2) S detects no contradiction
involved, and (3) S can imagine a situation in which P is true. For Chalmers, situations
that are ideally positively conceivable are metaphysically possible. Ideal positive
conceivability has this power mainly due to the perceptual imagination of the
corresponding scenario. For him, if an ideal reasoner has an imaginative scenario in
her mind, it is very unlikely that there are contradictions involved in such a scenario.
Conceivability arguments for haecceitism are arguments that aim to defend
haecceitism by assuming that if X is conceivable, then X is metaphysically possible.
Haecceitism is the view that the world could differ non-qualitatively without differing
qualitatively. In this thesis, I assume that situations that are ideally positively
conceivable are metaphysically possible. My argument for the claim that subjects of
experience have haecceities in chapter 5 can be classified as a version of the
conceivability argument for haecceitism.

0.5
0.5.1

Outline of the Thesis

Chapter One

This thesis has five chapters. In chapter one, I discuss Animalism, the view that I am
numerically identical with the animal. I investigate views such as Classical Animalism
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and weak Animalism. I further argue that if one is a substance dualist, the one will
reject either premise one or premise two of the Thinking Animal Argument.
Furthermore, I argue that we can adopt a phenomenal principle of unity of
consciousness which I modify from Tim Bayne’s (2012) theory, according to which a
subject of experience always has mental states that are phenomenally unified. This is
a useful principle for the individuation of ourselves without relying on Animalism.

0.5.2

Chapter Two

I examine Lynne Rudder Baker’s refined definition of Constitution, Derek Parfit’s
Embedded Person View, and Sydney Shoemaker’s Individuation of Persons. I argue
that all these views have drawbacks. Baker’s theory is problematic in the sense that it
denies that we can exist without having a first-person perspective. Moreover, I propose
that the rudimentary and robust first-person perspectives are distinct properties instead
of two stages of one single property, and none of them are essential properties of our
existence. In addition, I raise an objection to Parfit’s Embedded Person View. I argue
that the idea that the brain directly thinks is problematic because we find it hard to
clearly define what it means by saying that a physical part directly thinks. I also argue
that Shoemaker’s individuation of personhood is undesirable because his theory has
difficulties in explaining the individuation of persons during moments in which there
is representational disunity of mental states, such as the waterfall illusion. Second, the
claim that we are psychological functions has an undesirable consequence that I can
be multiply instantiated at the same time.

0.5.3

Chapter Three

I introduce in this chapter Jeff McMahan’s Embedded Mind View and Galen
Strawson’s Conscious Subject View. According to McMahan, we are minds embedded
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in physical bodies, and there is the same mind over time only if there is broad
psychological continuity. I object to his view by saying that if there is already the same
mind supported by sufficient amount of brain over time, as McMahan explicitly
endorses, then the broad psychological continuity criterion would be redundant. I also
discuss Strawson’s view, according to which we are essentially subjects of experience.
Moreover, the subject of experience is identical with its experience, and the content of
the experience, and the experiential processes it undergoes. I object to this view by
saying that there are real distinctions between a subject, its properties, its content, and
its process. I first provide a counterexample to the claim that if two things necessarily
coexist in every possible world, then they are identical. Second, I show that if a mental
thing as a process, some information such as essential properties of that object in
question would be lost.

0.5.4

Chapter Four

In chapter four, I argue for a Conscious Subject View, according to which we are
subjects of experience with the essential property of being conscious. This view is
different from both McMahan’s and Strawson’s views. First, I propose that any kind
of psychological continuity is not necessary for the persistence of the subject of
experience. Second, I argue that the subject of experience is not a process but a mental
entity that has persistence conditions and essential properties. I argue for the Conscious
Subject View via two arguments: the Essentiality Argument and the Argument of
Persistence. The Essentiality Argument is basically as follows. First, I define egoistic
concern such that necessarily, my concern about X can be egoistic if and only if I exist
and persist as X. Furthermore, I argue that necessarily, I can be egoistically concerned
with an entity E if and only if E is numerically identical with my subject of experience.
If we follow the common definition of essential properties according to which s is the
16

essential property of entity e if and only if e has s so long as e exists, then we are
essentially subjects of experience. I provide another argument, which I call the
Argument of Persistence, that we have the intuition that we persist only when there is
gradual replacement of the brain. The best candidate to explain this intuition is that we
persist as subjects of experience.
I also argue that there is a fundamental and unbridgeable difference between (1)
an egoistic concern that involves concern about one’s future experience from a firstperson perspective and (2) an egoistically oriented concern that does not involve the
fear of future pain or anticipation of future joy. I go on to show that one can only have
an egoistic concern that includes the fear of future pain from a first-person perspective
if one is numerically identical to the future entity.

0.5.5

Chapter Five

I investigate in chapter five various approaches to the haecceitism of persons. I argue
against Richard Swinburne’s haecceitism of souls by showing that “I” should not be
an informative designator if it refers to a soul. I also argue that Lynne Rudder Baker’s
haecceitism of the first-person perspective is flawed in the sense that a subject does
not necessarily have a unique spatiotemporal viewpoint. I propose that if it is possible
for (1) one single spatiotemporal location to be possessed by two or more perceivers
at the same time, and for (2) one perceiver to have two or more spatiotemporal
locations at the same time, it follows that the haecceitistic implications of a first-person
perspective are questionable. I then provide a thought experiment to argue that subjects
have haecceities. Suppose a great physicist suddenly announces that our actual world
is a symmetrical universe. There is another side of our world with exactly the same
number of mirror-persons living there enjoying exactly the same qualitative lives as
us. We can positively conceive of these situations: (1) I am at side A in this symmetrical
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universe, and (2) I am at side B in this symmetrical universe. Given that there are no
differences in qualitative, psychological, and physical properties between the two
individuals, and yet these are genuine possibilities directing to different facts regarding
my existence, the answer to the question “who am I?” is a non-qualitative further fact
over and above the qualitative properties and state of affairs in the world. Haecceities
of subjects of experience thus comes along.
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1

Animalism

Animalism is a prominent metaphysical view nowadays concerning our nature. It is
the view that I am numerically identical to a human animal, and am not a proper spatial
part of a human animal (such as the claim that I am a brain) or a proper temporal part
of the human animal (such as the claim that I am a thing that lasts temporally shorter
than an animal), nor am I constituted by a human animal (such as the claim that I am
numerically identical with a person that is constituted by a human animal). The term
“human animal” refers to a kind of biological (physical) organism which are members
of the primate species Homo sapiens.
One might think that it is obvious that we are numerically identical with the
human animals, or what else can we be? Some might even think that the question of
whether we are animals is as clear as that of whether our pets are animals. On the face
value, we are obviously human animals, and we are not pillows, cats, or ghosts.
However, ontologically speaking, things are not that easy. Many philosophers think
that we are not animals but are part of the animals, or that we are constituted by, but
not numerically identical with, the human animals due to various reasons. We will
come across these in the following chapters.
The discussions of Animalism have been evolving over time. There have been
three generations of contemporary analytic philosophers who propose various versions
of Animalism. The first generation of philosophers includes David Wiggins (1980),
Richard Wollheim (1984), and W. R. Carter (1984). There is the second generation of
animalists, with representational philosophers such as Peter van Inwagen (1990), Paul
Snowdon (1990, 2016), Michael Ayers (1991), and Eric Olson (1997, 2003, 2007,
2015). In recent years, younger philosophers such as Stephan Blatti (2006, 2007, 2012),
Andrew M. Bailey (2014, 2015), Eric Yang (2015), Joshua Watson (2016), and Andrea
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Sauchelli (2017) have been discussing how Animalism can be revised to solve existing
problems. I will discuss in detail the arguments of some of these philosophers.
I first introduce Eric Olson’s (1997, 2003, 2007) Animalism, which I call
Classical Animalism and discuss Mark Johnston’s (2007) and Derek Parfit’s (2012)
major objections to it. I then introduce weak Animalism, a recent theory proposed by
Olson (2015), and explain my dissatisfaction with this claim.

1.1

Classical Animalism and Weak Animalism

I define Classical Animalism as the view that you are numerically identical with and
are essentially an animal. Also, your persistence conditions are the persistence
conditions of that animal. Third, you are identical to your embryo and the living animal
in different stages, such as the animal in the vegetative stage and the late stage of
Alzheimer’s disease. This view is proposed by Paul Snowdon (1990) and Eric Olson
(2007).3 Olson believes that these implications align well with our common sense. For
instance, when someone enters a permanent vegetative state condition, his relatives
and friends would concede that he has a deprived life. However, they do not presume
that he no longer exists, or that the living being lying on the hospital bed is a new entity,
numerically distinct with him.
Classical Animalism is incompatible with the psychological continuity criterion
of personal identity. According to Classical Animalism, the persistence conditions of
a human animal is independent of psychological continuity. Classical Animalism is the
view that our persistence conditions are the persistence conditions of the human
animals, and the persistence of human animals are determined by the sameness of life.

3

For instance, according to Olson: “ My own view, and that of most philosophers, animalists or not, is
that animals are animals essentially.” (Olson 2007, p. 27) However, arguments for the claim that we
are essentially animals are very few.
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Olson’s Classical Animalism denies that we persist as corpses. Death is the ending
point of an organism; only a lump of stuff remains after an animal dies. For him, we
were once embryos and fetuses, and we persist when we fall into the vegetative stage.
However, none of us is psychologically continuous with a twelve-week-old fetus or a
person in the vegetative stage because they may not have any psychological features
at all.
For Classical Animalists, the concepts animal and person have different
extensions. Being an animal is compatible with being a person, but not all persons are
animals. Angels and Gods, if they exist at all, would be persons but not animals.
Similarly, not all human animals are persons. Examples are human embryos and
human beings in a vegetative state. They are not regarded as persons because they do
not have enough psychological complexity to be regarded as persons.4
In this chapter, I focus on Eric Olson’s (2003) version of Classical Animalism,
who is one of the representative animalists in the heated debate of Animalism. My
objections to his Classical Animalism can hopefully be applied to other versions of
Animalism in the vicinity.

The Thinking Animal Argument
The main argument for Classical Animalism is as follows:

1.

There is a human animal sitting in your chair, and it is thinking.

2.

There is one and only one thinking being sitting in your chair.

3.

You are thinking in that chair.

_______
C.

4
5

You are numerically identical with the thinking human animal in your chair.5

For the definition of person, see section 0.3 of introduction, “Personhood and Selfhood.”
The argument is adopted from (Joshua 2016, p. 324 - 325)
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This famous argument is sometimes called the “Thinking Animal Argument.” It
concludes that you are numerically identical with a human animal. Classical
Animalism presupposes that the numerical identity relation implies identity in all
possible worlds. Also, they believe that animals are physical entities. If you are
numerically identical with a physical entity, then it is metaphysically impossible that
you are not that physical entity.
Olson points out that one might attempt to deny premise two and admit that the
case involves two or more thinking individuals. Assume that you are not the thinking
animal sitting in the chair. When you are thinking, there is at the same time a thinking
human animal having the same phenomenal qualities you experience and the same
thought you have. Philosophers who deny premise two, such as the Constitutionalists
and Embedded Part Theorists, would say that the thoughts the animal has are exactly
the same as the thoughts you have. For instance, the Constitutionalists maintain that
the person non-derivatively thinks, and its animal derivatively thinks; the Embedded
Part Theorists commonly believe that we are directly thinking parts of the animals, and
the animals indirectly think in virtue of having those directly thinking parts. Both agree
that your animal thinks the same thoughts as you do because the animal thinks in virtue
of your thinking.
Olson thinks that this option is unsatisfactory in several ways. First, there is an
overcrowding of entities. When you see your friend, there are actually at least two
things in front of her – you and your animal. More significantly, if we assume that
there are two or more beings, namely, you and the thinking animal, who are thinking
your thoughts, you do not know which one you actually are. The human animal also
thinks that it is the only thinking thing on the chair. As it thinks exactly the same
thoughts as you, you can be either of them. It is impossible for you to know which one
you are.
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Olson is aware that mereological nihilists would reject premise one, the claim that
there is an animal sitting in your chair, and it is thinking. According to mereological
nihilism (or compositional nihilism) in general, there are no composite material objects
at all. There are only mereological simples, such as fundamental particles, and these
simples do not compose any complex material objects. According to this view, no
human animals are sitting in your chair; for there are no human animals in the first
place. Peter Unger (1979), for instance, defends mereological nihilism, according to
which there are no objects with proper parts in a metaphysical viewpoint.
Ontologically speaking, there are only indivisible simple substances such as basic
atoms described in contemporary physics. This view denies the existence of all
physical organisms including human beings and all other macroscopic material objects.
According to the nihilists, our belief that persons and human animals exist is illusory.
Under this picture, premise one is incorrect.
Olson holds that nihilism is advantageous in the sense that it dissolves many
metaphysical problems such as personal ontology by saying that there is no material
entity at all. The situation is similar to that of atheism, which dissolves many problems
in philosophy of religion such as the nature of God by asserting that there is no God at
all. However, for Olson, this solution is not without problems. He insists that pain
without a subject who owns the pain is difficult to understand. He claims that it is
impossible for things to cooperate and to produce thought without there being a subject
of that thought. Therefore, we should acknowledge our existence as thinking things.

1.1.1

Objections to Classical Animalism

In what follows, I introduce Mark Johnston’s (2007) and Fred Feldman’s (1992, 2000)
objections to Olson’s Classical Animalism.
Mark Johnston (2007) thinks that Olson’s Thinking Animal Argument is valid
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and sound, and he agrees with Olson that we are animals. However, he thinks that we
are not essentially animals. We can exist and persist without being animals. According
to Johnston, the two claims below are independent of each other:

1. We are animals, members of the species Homo sapiens.
2. We are essentially animals, such that we are animals in every possible situation in
which we survive.

Johnston accepts the first claim but not the second. He thinks that the Thinking Animal
Argument only supports the first claim. To show this, he offers the famous Remnant
Person Problem: suppose your brain is removed and is kept in a vat with nutrients such
that the brain retains its normal functions. Meanwhile, your physical body without the
brain is provided with nutrients to keep functioning. This operation results in an
individual that thinks with the severed brain and nothing else (call it the brainindividual), and a physical organism with its brain removed but is kept functioning. In
this situation, Classical Animalism denies that the brain-individual in the vat is you.
According to Classical Animalism, you exist and persist as the human animal that is
left alive after the operation. For the animalists, such an operation does not move a
physical organism from one head to another but only moves an organ from one animal
to another. The situation is analogous to that of a lung transplant or heart transplant. If
one agrees with the animalists’s construal, the brain-individual would be a new person
(or a remnant person) who comes into existence after the operation. The question is,
where does this brain-individual in a vat, or this remnant person, come from?
Johnston thinks one should not want to admit that this remnant person exists
before the operation, for there would be two individuals that exist simultaneously
before the operation – the remnant person and the human being. An alternative is that
the operation brings the remnant person into existence, and this person is not you. It is
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another individual that is numerically distinct from you, who is newly produced by the
operation. Still, it is implausible because the surgeon merely moves an organ from one
physical body to a vat with fluid nutrients. How could removing an organ creates a
new individual?
Johnston follows his intuition and claim that our identity goes along with the brain
instead - we become the brain-individual after the operation. He believes that it is also
the intuition of many others. For him, this remnant person is not a human animal. That
said, you persist as the remnant person, which is not an animal. Mark Johnston thus
concludes that the property “being an animal” is not essential for our existence - we
are not essentially human beings. The argument can be formulated as follows:

1.

If you are essentially an animal, then it is impossible for you to exist without
being a human animal. (Assumption)

2.

After the brain transplant operation, you persist as a remnant person, which is
not a human animal.

3.

It is possible for you to exist without being a human animal. (2)

_______________

C.

You are not essentially a human animal. (1, 3)

Johnston re-introduces concepts such as phase-sortal and substance-sortal first
discussed by David Wiggins (1967, 2001) to explain his view that you are not
essentially an animal. He thinks that “animal” is a phase-sortal. For Wiggins, a sortal
is a concept that delivers principles of individuation and identity. For example, to
answer the question “how many?” we need to specify how many of what; and to
examine whether a thing remains the same over time, we need to specify “the same
what.” A phase-sortal is a kind which applies temporarily to things that they classify.
For instance, “student” is a phase sortal because this term temporarily applies to human
animals. A human animal can be a student in a certain period of time, and the human
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animal can persist without being a student. In contrast, a substance-sortal classifies and
individuate things by their essential properties. If A is X, and X is a substance-sortal,
then A has the essential property of “being an X,” and A is categorized as the kind X
in virtue of having X’s essential properties as its own essential properties. It is
impossible for A to exist without being an X.
According to Johnston, the animalists wrongly assume that “human animal” is a
substance-sortal. Recall the case of brain transplant. Before the transplant, the original
person P was a human animal, but during and after the transplant, P is not. If it is the
case that P was a human animal and P now exists without being an animal, then this
entails that “animal” is not a substance-sortal; it is temporally applied to certain entities.
There could be entities that are contingently animals. Johnston concludes that human
animal is not a substance-sortal but a crypto-phase-sortal, which he defines as a sortal
that is not an obvious phase-sortal like “student” or “bachelor,” but can be shown to
be a phase-sortal via careful philosophical reflections.
Another problem mentioned by the anti-animalists is the problem of the Corpse
proposed by Fred Feldman (1992, 2000). Animalism fails to provide an explanation
for where a corpse comes from. Given that I am essentially a living organism, I do not
survive as a corpse. The corpse is something that does not exist before I die, and it
comes into existence at the moment when I die. If we regard the corpse as an existing,
physical entity, we should explain how it comes into existence. One might be inclined
to think that an animal’s death causes the corpse to come into existence. However, we
have a strong intuition that the death of an animal does not generate a new entity out
of its body.6

1.1.2
6

Weak Animalism

For more variations of the argument of the corpse, see David Hershenov (2005).
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In reply to the Remnant Person Problem, Eric Olson (2015) modifies Classical
Animalism. He proposes “Weak Animalism,” a doctrine which is neutral to the
question of whether we are essentially animals. Weak Animalism does not state (1) our
essential properties, or (2) whether it is necessarily that for any human animal x, x is
essentially a human animal, or (3) what the identity and persistence conditions of
human animals are. I now introduce weak Animalism – a new version of Animalism
proposed by Olson.
Olson first describes several varieties of Animalism. They are classified
according to their degree of acceptance of these further claims:

1.

Necessarily, for any entity x that is among us, x is a human animal. (or “We are
human animals.”)

2.

Necessarily, for any human animal x, x is essentially a human animal.

3.

Our persistence conditions are the persistence conditions of the human animals.

4.

It is not the case that “Necessarily, for any human animal x and any future entity y,
x persists as y if and only if y is psychologically continuous with x.”

5.

Necessarily, for any human animal x and any future human animal y, x persists as
y if and only if y is physically continuous with x.

6.

Necessarily, for any human animal x, it is possible that x is not a person (in the
Lockean sense).7

According to Olson, weak Animalism is the view that accepts only the first claim (1)
that we are animals. It is neutral to other claims. Strong Animalism, on the other hand,
accepts the conjunction of (1) with all the other claims (2) to (6). There are of course
intermediate versions incorporating some but not all of the further claims.
The claim that (2) necessarily, for any human animal x, x is essentially a human
animal, together with the claim that (1) we are human animals, indicates that we could
not exist without being human animals. Olson is neutral to claim (2). For Olson, I am
7

This formulation is modified from (Olson 2015, p. 12). For the definition of a Lockean person, see
page 6 of the thesis.
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a human animal in exactly the same sense that I am a philosopher, a student, and a
bachelor. I am a human animal contingently if I can possibly exist in other ways
without being a human animal. Let me elaborate more. The opposite concept of
essential properties is contingent properties. An object O has a contingent property C
if and only if (1) O has C as a property, and (2) it is metaphysically possible that O
exists without instantiating property C. For instance, suppose you are now sitting on
the chair, but you could have existed without sitting on this chair. Since being an F is
logically equivalent to being numerically identical with an F, one must admit that we
are numerically identical with the human animals. However, we could be human
animals whether or not we are essentially human animals. He further claims that I am
also numerically identical with a student, a philosopher, and a scholar, in addition to
being an animal, with all these being my accidental properties.
Olson asserts that Weak Animalism is compatible with the claims that (1) we are
not essentially human animals and that (2) our persistence conditions are not the
persistence conditions of the human animals. According to Olson, there are two kinds
of identity relations. The first one is called “is of identity.” It can only occur between
two singular terms (proper names), such as ‘Superman is Clark Kent” or “Water is
H2O.” The second is the “is of predication” which features in the sentence “Olson is
standing.” According to Olson, sentences like “Olson is a parent” does not employ the
“is of identity” but the “is of predication.” Similarly, “Olson is an animal” is another
instinct of “is of predication” rather than “is of identity.” A precise description to
express the idea of “is of predication” is that “nothing could be an F without being
identical to an F, or be identical to an F without being an F” (Olson 2015, p. 8). The
corresponding logical formulation should be x[FxÙƎy(Fy&x=y)].
In his view, Weak Animalism answers the question “What we are” whereas the
psychological continuity criterion of personal identity (the so-called Lockeanism)
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answers the question “What does it take for us to persist through time.” They ask
different questions, the answers of which are independent of each other. Under this
picture, the animalists are not responsible for affirming or denying the statement
“human animals do not persist by virtue of psychological continuity.” Olson further
points out that there is no inference of “what we are” from Lockeanism, and that
Lockeanism does not rule out our being animals. In his modified version of Animalism,
Olson withdraws from being a rival with Lockeanism.
In proposing Weak Animalism, Olson thinks that he has asserted an important
view which pleases everyone. Weak Animalism has all the virtues of Classical
Animalism without its drawbacks; it lacks the implications the opponents object to.
For example, the opponents falsely assume that Animalism implies that one should not
go with his transplanted brain. This assumption is based on the view that our
persistence conditions are that of the human animals. Nevertheless, Weak Animalism
does not make this assumption.
Weak Animalism has important philosophical implications that exclude
suspicious metaphysical view regarding our nature. Olson maintains that Animalism
is contrasted with (1) Constitutionalism proposed by Lynne Rudder Baker (2007) et
al., (2) theories of embodiment – theories saying that we are parts of animals (such as
brains) by Derek Parfit (2012) and Jeff McMahan (2002), (3) substance dualism (such
as theories of souls) proposed by Roderick Chisholm (1991) and Richard Swinburne
(2003), and (4) persistence theory of time (such that we are temporal parts of animals)
by David Lewis (1976). On these views, each of us is numerically distinct from the
corresponding animal.

1.2

A Dualist’s Objection to Animalism
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Weak Animalism does not provide the information about our essential properties. As a
philosophical question, I regard the question of personal ontology as expecting
something more fundamental than a normal question of “what you are” when one
communicates with one’s neighbors and expects one’s neighbor to answer, “I am a
lawyer” or “I am a teacher.” When philosophers make such an inquiry about personal
ontology, they aim to provide the essential but not the accidental properties of
ourselves.
Weak Animalism is a view that the statement “I am a human animal” has no
difference in kind from the statement that “I am a teacher.” Both statements do not
denote an essential property of ourselves. To recall, it is commonly agreed that an
object x has an essential property e if and only if necessarily, x exists only when it has
e. One might agree that we are animals and at the same time deny that “being an animal”
is our essential property. I believe that Weak Animalism is too weak since it does not
provide an answer to the essential properties of ourselves. Furthermore, Weak
Animalism does not provide an answer to our persistence conditions either. This is not
what I want as an answer to a fundamental philosophical question of “what we are.”
Moreover, the Thinking Animal Argument that intends to support both Weak
Animalism and Classical Animalism may not be sound if one takes a standard
(Cartesian) substance dualist position. Either premise 1 or premise 2 of the thinking
animal argument would be dubious.
To elaborate on this idea, I now introduce some terminologies. I define an entity,
an object, a substance, or a thing as an individual that has properties. I assume here
that the terms “substance,” “entity,” “object” and “thing” are equivalent. Let me
assume that standard (Cartesian) substance dualism maintains the following claims: (1)
necessarily, for any property x, x is a mental property if and only if x is a what it’s
likeness characteristic. In other words, necessarily, for any entity x, x has a mental
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property at time t if and only if x is phenomenally conscious at t. Also, (2) necessarily,
for any property y, y is a physical property if and only if y is a property defined in terms
of basic physical, mathematical, and logical vocabulary. Furthermore, (3) necessarily,
for any entity x, x is a physical entity if and only if x has at least one physical property,
and (4) necessarily, for any entity y, y is a mental entity if and only if y has at least one
mental property. According to Cartesian substance dualism, mental substances and
physical substances are two kinds of fundamental substance, not reducible to each
other. Mental substances only have mental properties, and physical substances only
have physical properties.
I define a subject as follows: necessarily, for any x, x is a subject of experience if
and only if x has conscious experience. Under Cartesian substance dualism, a subject
of experience is a mental entity, whose essential property is to be conscious. If we
assume that I am a subject of experience, which is a mental entity, then I am not a
physical entity according to Cartesian substance dualism.
Let us go back to the Thinking Animal Argument. I take it that the Classical
Animalists assume that the physical theory of human animal is the correct theory,
according to which the term “human animal” refers to a particular type of physical
entity (physical organism), the persistence of which is determined by the sameness of
life. When one adopts the physical theory of human animal, then if there were zombies
in our world whose physical organization is indistinguishable from us and yet they do
not have phenomenal consciousness, they should also be categorized as human animals
under the physical theory of human animal.
If substance dualism is true, and if I am a subject of experience, which is a purely
mental entity, then I am not a physical entity. If the animalists assume the physical
theory of human animal, then the substance dualists would say that premise one of the
thinking animal argument that “there is a human animal sitting there, thinking” is false.
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For the substance dualists, the physical entity does not think; only the mental entity
thinks. If the human animal is a physical organism (entity), then it follows that the
human animal does not think. What thinks is the mental entity that presumably has
certain intimate causal relation with the human animal. The substance dualists would
reject premise one.
On the other hand, a hybrid theory of human animal states that the term “human
animal” here refers to the sum of the mental entity plus the physical entity.
Philosophers who hold this theory would think that when people are talking about the
human animal, they are talking about a composite object that has two components: the
mental part and the physical part. Under substance dualism, the two components are
themselves substances. When there is a human animal, there are two substances: one
mental substance and one physical substance, in intimate causal relation to each other.
If one holds the view that the human animal thinks, then it follows that the hybrid
entity thinks. Furthermore, if one holds the view that I am a subject of experience,
which is a mental substance, then I am not numerically identical with the hybrid human
animal; I am just the mental part of the animal. One may need to say that there are two
thinkers, one being the subject of experience which is part of the human animal, and
the other being the human animal as a whole.
I call the view that we are the thinking part of the human animals “the
mereological view.” The mereological view is held by philosophers such as Jeff
McMahan (2002), Derek Parfit (2012), and Galen Strawson (2011). For them, the
human animal thinks in virtue of having a thinking part that thinks. The defenders of
the mereological view usually deny that there is only one thinker. There are two
thinkers – the thinking part and the whole human animal. The proponents of this view
would have to say that premise two of the Thinking Animal Argument that “There is
one and only one thinking being sitting in your chair” is false. The human animal has
32

psychological properties and can be regarded as conscious in virtue of having the
conscious mind as a part that thinks.
Some people would then be worried that it would be ontologically expensive if
there are two conscious entities that think when I think. Both McMahan and Parfit bite
the bullet and insist that there are indeed two conscious entities that think. However,
they don’t think it is problematic to say that there are two thinking beings in the chair.
Both of them believe that this phenomenon can be explained in a benign way.
McMahan uses a tree as an analogy. Suppose there is a tree with two major branches.
One of them grows, and the other stay unchanged. We are willing to say that the tree
grows because part of it grows. Even if there is another part, such as the other branch,
that does not grow at all; we still regard the tree as growing because the tree grows in
virtue of the growth of one of its main branches. There are two growing entities,
namely, the branch and the whole tree. This approach is commonsensical even if it is
ontologically expensive. Similarly, it does not seem problematic to say that there are
two thinkers - both the mind and the whole organism thinks.
In summary, if one holds both the hybrid theory of human animal and substance
dualism, one would firmly deny premise two of the Thinking Animal Argument and
regard the argument as unsound.

1.3

Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness

There is yet another approach to defending Animalism. There is the question of the
individuation principles of ourselves - what makes it the case that there is one self but
not many? If we are subjects of experience, then the individual principle of ourselves
would be the individuation principle of subjects. The prominent individuation
principle of subjects is the representational unity theory of consciousness, according
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to which the individuation of subjects is determined by representational unity. For
these theorists, necessarily, for any subject x and mental states M1 and M2, x has M1
and M2 only if M1 and M2 are representationally unified. Necessarily, for any mental
states M1 and M2, M1 and M2 are representationally unified if and only if (1) the
representational (propositional) contents of M1 and M2 do not involve logical
contradictions, and (2) the representational (propositional) contents of M1 and M2 are
“integrated with each other.” (Bayne 2012, p. 10)
Paul Snowdon (2016) thinks that there is not any satisfactory functional unity
theory of consciousness. He uses the term “functional unity” to mean the
representational and behavioral unity of the subject. For him, there is no satisfactory
individuation principle of subjects. On the other hand, Animalists aim at identifying
us with a certain type of physical organism, namely, human animals. Snowdon thinks
that it is one advantage of Animalism. Based on this, he thinks that we better say that
we are human animals, and individuate ourselves by the individuation principle of
human animals instead of individuating ourselves by any unity theory of consciousness.
According to Snowdon, Animalism implies that every one of us is one and only
one human animal. If every one of us is one and only one subject of experience, then
every human animal is one and only one subject. 8 In other words, if you are an
animalist, then you do not need to develop any psychological or phenomenal principle
for the individuation of ourselves since our individuation principle is just the
individuation principle of human animals.
To explain this idea, Snowdon discusses the case of commissurotomy introduced
by Roger W. Sperry (1974) in which the patient’s corpus callosum (the link between
the two hemispheres of the cerebral cortex) was severed. The patients do not have
detectable abnormalities in their daily lives; abnormalities are generated during
8

Snowdon (2016) assumes that every single token experience can have only one subject.
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experimental conditions. In the experiment, the word “key” is projected onto the right
side of each retina, and the word “ring” is projected onto the left half. They are flashed
for one-tenth of a second in front of the patient to prevent her from moving her eyes.
The setup is thus launched because the left half of the retina feeds to the left
hemisphere and right to the right hemisphere. According to the neuroscientists, the left
hemisphere controls speech and the right one controls the left hand. If the patient was
told to point with her left hand to the thing the word of which she saw, she pointed to
a key but not a ring. However, if she was asked to verbally report what word she has
seen, she said she saw the word “ring.” According to Snowdon, it is straightforward
for the neuroscientists to interpret the data as that the left hemisphere “saw” one thing
and the right another. Some may say that there are two subjects of experience located
in one brain.9
Snowdon calls the proposal that there is one patient who “has” two subjects in
the above experiments “the pluralizing approach.” He calls the proposal that there is
one patient who “has” one subject “the singularist approach.” For Snowdon, the
Animalists should take the singularist approach. They should hold that (1) every one
of us is numerically identical with one and only one human animal, (2) every one of
us is numerically identical with one and only one subject of experience, and that (3)
the human animal persists as one single human animal after its corpus callosum is
severed. It follows that (4) there should only be one single subject involved after the
operation. To demonstrate this, let us assume that the subject, call it S, is numerically

9

Some may be interested in what the patient would say if she is asked to explain her behavior. There
is no test in this very experiment about the patients’s verbal report of their own behaviors. However,
in one similar experiment in which an image of a naked man is shown to the right hemisphere of a
female split-brain patient, she began to laugh, but she could not explain why she was laughing. In
another trial, the left hemisphere of a split-brain patient read the word “apple” at the same time her
right hemisphere was shown a nude picture. The patient still laughed, but she reported that she
laughed because she likes apple. This result suggests that the left hemisphere which is responsible for
language and verbal report does not have access to the information to the right hemisphere. In many
cases, the left hemisphere tries its best to provide language-based explanations for one’s behaviors.
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identical with the human animal A, then if the animal A persists after the operation, so
does S. If A experiences after the operation, so does S. Since there is only one animal
A, S should be the only one subject involved. An animalist, therefore, should be a
singularist.
Snowdon examines several principles of function unity of conscious experience
that take the pluralist approach for the above case. For the pluralists, the mental states
of the patient cannot be ascribed to one single subject of experience. He argues that
versions of the functional unity theory of consciousness that take the pluralist approach
are all flawed – they cannot explain the behaviors of the split-brain patient. He is thus
skeptical about the idea that there are principles of unity of conscious mental states
that challenges a singularist account for the split-brain experiment. He concludes that
the animalist-singularist approach remains undefeated and is on the right track.

1.4

My Objections to Snowdon’s Theory

I disagree with Snowdon’s attempt to withdraw from any principle of unity of
consciousness. My objection to Snowdon is basically two-fold. My first observation
is that only the Classical Animalists, but not Weak Animalists, are subject to the
restriction that there should be a one-to-one correspondence between the number of
animals and the number of subjects of experience.
To recall, Classical Animalism holds the views that (1) we are numerically
identical with the human animals, (2) we are essentially human animals, and (3) our
persistence is that of the human animals. As discussed, for Classical Animalists, if I
am a subject S, and also, am numerically identical the human animal A (A=S), then it
follows that insofar as I persist as the animal A, the subject S also persists. However,
Weak Animalism does not require that I am essentially a human animal, nor that my
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persistence conditions are that of an animal. Moreover, it allows that I go with part of
the brain, part of the animal, or whatever, after the split-brain operation. In the above
experiment, a Weak Animalist can admit that the human animal “has” two subjects
after the operation, and I persist without being a human animal. For instance, one can
say that I become the left hemisphere, and I am one of the two subjects, after the
operation.
My second objection is that Snowdon’s proposed unity principles are constructed
under the idea that conscious mental states belong to one single subject of experience
only when there is functional (representational and behavioral) unity between the
mental states. This is a very limited view. There are many versions of the Unity Thesis
of consciousness available in the contemporary literature. One may not need to endorse
the view that a subject of experience can only have mental states that are
representationally unified at the same time.
In what follows, I introduce the Phenomenal Unity Thesis of Consciousness
proposed by Tim Bayne (2010). I believe that a modified version of Bayne’s view can
provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness raised by
Snowdon. There is at least one cogent way to individuate subjects, and there is no need
for us to adopt an animalist approach for individuating ourselves.

1.5

Phenomenal Unity and Individuation of Subjects

In his book “The Unity of Consciousness,” Tim Bayne (2010) opts for a phenomenal
construal of the Unity Thesis, a doctrine saying that “for any conscious subject of
experience S and any time t, the simultaneous conscious states that S has at t will
necessarily be subsumed under a single conscious state.” (Bayne 2010, p. 16) He gives
the following example. Suppose that there is something it is like to hear the flute (E1)
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and something it is like to see a person playing the flute (E2). The two experiences are
phenomenally unified if there is something it is like to hear the flute while seeing the
person playing the flute (E1&E2). Bayne also claims that necessarily, a subject s at time
t has a “fully unified consciousness if and only if every one of s’s conscious mental
states at t is phenomenally unified with every other conscious mental state had by s at
t.” (Bayne 2010, p. 15)
Bayne argues that the representational unity theory of consciousness cannot be
the individuation principle of consciousness. He maintains that the fact that some
mental states are representationally unified is only at best a necessary condition for
their belonging to the same subject. For example, there are many consistent and
coherent mental states in the world, but we don’t regard them as belonging to the same
subject. Furthermore, Bayne proposes that the view that a subject always has
representationally unified mental states faces tough challenges from contemporary
psychology; representational unity often breaks down in various normal and
pathological cases. There are many situations in which a subject exhibits very little
representational integration, and yet we have reasons to believe that one’s mental states
are phenomenally unified and are had by one single subject.
Bayne discusses various everyday forms of conscious experience and some
clinical disorders in which the representational unity of mental states of a person fall
apart in fundamental ways. Examples of everyday dis-unified experience are MüllerLyer Illusion and Waterfall Illusion. Take the Waterfall Illusion first described by
Aristotle and further discussed by John Frisby (1979), Tim Crane (1988), and more
recently, Michael Tye (2003). It is one famous illusion produced by looking at a
waterfall for a period and then observing a stationary object afterward. In this case, we
are simultaneously conscious of the target object as both moving and not moving. One
can say that one perceives the target object as both moving and not moving, and thus
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there is representational disunity within our perceptual content. This well-known
illusion is an example that aims to show that the representations of the mental states
of a normal person are not necessarily representationally unified. Moreover, every one
of us has the first-person experience of having the illusion. Therefore, Bayne thinks
that there are reasons for us to believe that there is one single subject having the illusion
and the representationally disunified mental states.
Apart from cases that occur for normal healthy people, there are plenty of
representational disunities of mental states found in patients with split-brain, dementia,
schizophrenia, and various kinds of dissociative disorders. There are kinds of
dissociative identity disorders in which the patients manifest multiple conscious selves,
or lose the sense of owning their conscious states, or possess two streams of
consciousness with representationally disunified mental states respectively at the same
time - a “central” stream responsible for the patient’s overt report and a “hidden”
stream responsible for one’s covert report. 10 Bayne’s replies that representational
disunity is not sufficient to show that the two mental states are phenomenally disunified. He provides reasons from the first-person perspective to suspect that patients
retain a more primitive form of conscious unity – phenomenal unity, despite having
representational disunity. Although the argument from introspection is not decisive, it
does provide us with respectable evidence for the unity thesis.11
I believe that Bayne’s phenomenal unity theory of consciousness is a satisfactory

10

For more discussions of dissociative identity disorder, see David et al. (1996) and Ellenberger (1970).
Snowdon (2016) has also briefly discussed the phenomenal unity theory of consciousness. He thinks
that there is no reason to support the claim that the patient has phenomenal unified mental states.
He writes: “There is nothing it is like to have a split brain, and for some pairs of experiences enjoyed
by a split-brain patient there is nothing it is like to conjointly have them. It is, therefore, akin to begging
the question simply to affirm that the simultaneous experiences of a single subject must be something
it is like to undergo as a whole. We are still without a reason to accept that principle.” I disagree. First,
I agree with Bayne that we have first-person experience of having representationally dis-unified mental
states. Second, I suggest that we can understand the split-brain patient as not being able to express
her experience of phenomenal unity, instead of saying that she does not have the “what it’s likeness”
of the phenomenally unified experience.
39

11

solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness proposed by Snowdon. I suggest
that we can hold that necessarily, mental states are had by the same subject if and only
if they are phenomenally unified. I call this claim “the Phenomenal Unity Thesis of
consciousness.” This thesis can provide a clear explanation of how the singularist
approach – that there is one single subject of experience that has representationally
disunified mental states is feasible. Also, the case of conscious mental states had by a
split-brain patient at a certain time discussed by Snowdon can thus be explained as
follows: there is one single subject with mental states that are phenomenally unified
and representationally disunified.
In summary, we can be a singularist even if we find no satisfactory functional
(representational and behavioral) unity theory of consciousness. Also, we do not need
to be an Animalist in order to be a singularist. We have some other choices; we can
adopt the Phenomenal Unity Theory of Consciousness.
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2

Constitutionalism

One of the direct opponents of Animalism is Constitutionalism. Constitutionalists
think that loosely speaking, we can still say that we are human animals. Under
thorough investigations, however, one discovers that the terms “is/are” here are used
in the sense of “being constituted by.” Constitutionalists believe that we are essentially
persons, and persons are constituted by human animals. One early defender of the
thesis is Kevin Joseph Corcoran (1999, 2001, 2006). There is also Lynne Rudder Baker
(2007, 2012, 2013), a representative Constitutionalist who clearly defines the
conception of constitution. In addition, there are various approaches to
Constitutionalism proposed by philosophers such as Sydney Shoemaker (1984, 1996,
1999, 2016) and Mark Johnston (2007). In what follows, I will discuss different
versions of Constitutionalism and point out the problems of each of them. My basic
stance is that the constitutional approach, in general, is problematic. I will also argue
that my Conscious Subject View does not suffer from the same problems.

2.1

Constitutionalism and First-Person Perspective

Constitutionalism of persons is a view saying that you are not numerically identical
with a human animal but are constituted by a human animal. The situation is like a
clay statue and the lump of clay out of which the statue was formed. In most cases,
when talking about constitution, we automatically think of total constitution because
this is what we are most concerned with in metaphysical discussions. For a total
constitution, the lump of clay is all the substance that is needed for the statue to exist.
When we declare a total constitution relation between the two, it is generally assumed
that there is not any other substance or stuff that constitutes the statue - the statue is
constituted by the lump of clay and by nothing else. I thereby use “constitution” and
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“total constitution” interchangeably to refrain from lengthy expressions.
Generally speaking, constitution implies distinctness. Although the lump of clay
is all the material needed for the existence of the statue, there is a set of penetrating
differences between the statue and the lump of clay. First, constituted objects usually
have different persistence conditions than their constituents. For instance, a river R at
any moment is constituted by an aggregate of water molecules - call the aggregate A.
The persistence conditions of R and A are different. If A had been scattered all over
the universe at a certain time, A would still be there, but R would not exist anymore.
Second, and relatedly, constituted objects have different essential properties from their
lower-level constituents. A statue, for example, is essentially in a certain shape, but the
lump of clay that constitutes the statue is not essentially in that shape. Instead, the
essential properties of the clay are its material composition and its property of being a
kind of heavy, sticky earth that becomes hard when it is baked. A Classical identity
relation between A and B (an identity relation that satisfies Leibniz’s law), in contrast,
implies that it is impossible for A and B to have different persistence conditions or
essential properties.
There is another important modal difference between constitution and identity.
The correlation between a constituted object and its constituents is contingent. If A is
identical with B, then given that A exists, A is necessarily B. However, the fact that A
constitutes B leaves room for the possibility that B exists without being constituted by
A. For example, the river R is constituted by the aggregate of water molecules A. It is
always a contingent relation that R is constituted by A since R may have been
constituted by a totally different aggregate of water molecules Ac. The contingent
relation is usually manifested such that if A constitutes R, it is possible that R is
constituted by A during t1 - t2, but R may not be constituted by A after t2. This also
renders constitution relation a temporal relation. Using the old example, river R at t1
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is constituted by an aggregate of water molecules A, but R can be constituted by a
totally different aggregate of water molecules Ac at t2. One can consequently arrive at
several widely agreed logical features of constitution. First, constitution is
asymmetrical – declaring A constitutes B automatically entails the claim that B does
not constitute A. Second, constitution is irreflexive as there is nothing that constitutes
itself. Third, constitution is a transitive relation. If A constitutes B, and B constitutes
C, then A also constitutes C.

2.1.1

Baker’s Constitutionalism of Persons

In the early 00’s, Constitutionalists such as Corcoran did not face an urge to provide
us with a clear definition of constitution in general. Discussions regarding what a
constitution relation exactly is has become a heated debate in the next decade. Lynne
Rudder Baker is one of the representative philosophers who come up with a clear
definition of the conception of “constitution.” In what follows, I introduce Baker’s
Constitutionalism of Persons. What makes Baker’s Constitution view special are two
notions – (1) primary kind and (2) K-favorable circumstances.
According to Baker, an entity x has a primary kind P if and only if necessarily,
when x exists, x belongs to the kind P. Every object is of a certain primary kind
essentially, where it has its persistence conditions in virtue of its primary kind. Baker
thinks that a cat is a primary kind – when one ceases to be a cat, it also ceases to exist.
A student is not a primary kind; one ceases to be a student when one graduates, but it
doesn’t mean that one ceases to exist. For Baker, constitution is a relation among things
of different primary kinds.12 For the case of the statue and clay, the statue falls under
the primary kind ‘statue” and the clay “clay.” In saying this, Baker assumes that

12

It is noted that Baker’s idea of constitution is different from the common notion of composition. For
composition, it is totally fine for an entity to be composed of other entities of the same kind.
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constitution means total constitution, such that there is not any other substance or stuff
that constitutes the statue - the statue is constituted by the lump of clay and by nothing
else.
Baker also introduces the conception of “K-favorable circumstances.” She states
that “K-favorable circumstances entail instantiation of every property, except for
primary-kind properties, that must be exemplified for something to be a K. For any
particular place and time, the presence of K-favorable circumstances is a necessary,
but not a sufficient, condition for the property K to be instantiated then and there. The
presence of something of a suitable primary kind in K-favorable circumstances is
sufficient for K to be instantiated then and there.” (Baker 2000, p. 42) For instance,
the lump of clay has statue favorable circumstances because it has sufficiently many
properties that are possessed by the statue, such as acquiring a statuesque shape, having
a particular location, being intended to be a work of art, etc. The property it lacks for
being a statue, for example, is that the lump of clay has the primary kind property of
being a lump of clay but not that of the statue.
Baker’s definition of constitution involves several criteria. First, some
abbreviations:

F and G are distinct kinds.
F* designates being essentially F
G* designates being essentially G.
D designates G favorable circumstances.

Baker’s definition of constitution relation is as follows. X constitutes y at t1 if and only
if:

1.

X spatially coincides with y at t1

2.

X has F* and y has G*
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3.

X is in D at t,

4.

It is necessary that, for any object z and for any time t*, if z has F* and z is in D at
t*, then there is some object u such that u has G* and u coincides with z at t*

5.

It is possible that: there is some time t* such that x exists at t* and there is no object
w such that w has G* and w coincides with x at t*.13

Baker assumes that two distinct entities can be spatially coincident. She proposes that
spatial coincidence as one of the criteria of constitution and restricts the constitution
relation to be applied only to physical objects. In other words, it is necessary that for
A to constitute B, A must spatially overlap with B. For instance, given that the lump
and the statue share the same matter and same physical parts, there is spatial
coincidence between the two.
Baker’s reasons for proposing that we are essentially persons, not human animals
are briefly that persons are essentially able to think, feel, and experience, but animals
think only in certain stages. For instance, a fetus does not think; a human animal in a
vegetable state does not think. However, they can all be regarded as animals under a
certain sense. For Baker, we simply shouldn’t identify ourselves with these
unconscious physical organisms – we should be something more. Furthermore,
persons can survive events such as brain transplant, whereas the corresponding
organisms cannot. The persistence conditions of persons are thus different from that of
the human animal. Third, Baker believes that by the gradual replacement of parts, some
persons might one day come to coincide with a wholly inorganic machine. In this case,
we may persist without being an animal or any kind of physical organism at all. This
case shows that being a particular human animal is only a contingent feature of us.

2.1.2

13

The First-person Perspective

This definition is adopted and modified from Gallois 2017, pp. 75-76.
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What, then, are persons? What are the essential properties of being a person? Baker
maintains that a person is a material object essentially having a first-person perspective.
A first-person perspective is a dispositional property exemplified in two stages – the
rudimentary and robust stages. A rudimentary first-person perspective is the first stage
of a dispositional property that carries two important features. First, it is a disposition
to be disposed to perceive the external world from a spatiotemporal location. Second,
it is the default location of the conscious subject, the origin of one’s perceptual field,
and the location from which one perceives the environment that one interacts with.
The existence of a rudimentary first-person perspective is independent of any linguistic
or conceptual abilities. An infant who does not have any language skills or conceptions
can still have a rudimentary first-person perspective.

2.1.3

The Robust First-person Perspective

There is also the robust stage of the first-person perspective, which is a conceptual
ability to conceive of oneself as oneself as the subject of one’s own thoughts from the
first-person point of view. Those who have a robust first-person perspective also can
use first-person pronouns such as “I,” “me,” and “mine” effectively. Baker provides
an example to illustrate how a person with a robust-person perspective uses language.
When her niece discovered that her friend Donald took her toys, she cried out, “Donald,
mine!” And this, according to Baker, is a clear manifestation of a robust first-person
perspective. Nevertheless, it does not require an extra ability to describe oneself with
an objective viewpoint. A person may wake up in the hospital with amnesia asking,
“who I am” and “where I am.” She loses the information on her objective identity such
as her name, her past, and her present situation, etc. Nevertheless, she can still
successfully refer to herself from a first-person perspective. Under Baker’s picture, she
still has a robust first-person perspective.
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Baker thinks that this ability is uniquely human. It is the criterion of how we
distinguish ourselves from other animals. Human animals are distinguished from other
animals by virtue of the fact that nonhuman animals never develop a robust first-person
perspective - they can only have rudimentary first-person perspective. Therefore, only
human animals are persons in the actual world. When our biological ancestors
developed a robust first-person perspective, entities of a new kind – person – came
into being. For Baker, this is not a modal claim but an empirical fact about the actual
world. It is metaphysically possible for there to be nonhumans that are persons, but
there are no nonhuman animals that are persons in the actual world. Here is Baker’s
articulation:

[A] human infant, a person, is of a kind that develops robust first-person perspectives;
an animal with a rudimentary first-person perspective is of a kind that does not. For
animals, there is only the first stage of a first-person perspective; an animal may have
only a rudimentary first-person perspective, and that’s it. (Ibid., p. 44)

2.2

Objections to Constitutionalism

There are several objections to Constitutionalism in the current literature. In the
following, I discuss four – the problem of Many Thinkers, the Problem of Constitution
Inducing, and the Problem of the Boundary of a Person.

2.2.1

The Problem of the Many Thinkers

The main problem of a constitutional view is that it claims that we are not numerically
identical with the physical organism. If we admit that the physical organism could
think and could have conscious experience, then there would be two things having
conscious thoughts – one is the physical organism, and the other is you. The argument
is usually called “the Problem of Many Thinkers,” which is proposed by Paul Snowdon
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(1990) and Eric Olson (1997, 2007). The structure of the argument is outlined as
follows:

1.

The animal is sitting there, and it thinks.

2.

You are sitting there thinking, and you are not the animal.

_____________
C.

There are at least two thinkers sitting there, thinking.

Andrew M. Bailey (2016) has a modified version of the Problem of Many Thinkers.
According to the Constitutionalist, there are two ways for an entity to have a property
– to have it derivatively or to have it non-derivatively. Also, I am either an animal
derivatively or an animal non-derivatively. If I am an animal derivatively, then there
would be two human animals sitting in the chair - the derivative animal and the nonderivative animal. However, we would typically think that there is only one animal in
the chair. Therefore, he concludes that I am an animal non-derivatively. He formulates
his argument in the below formula:

(1) ANIMALITY. I am, in some sense or other, an animal.
(2) TWO WAYS. If I am, in some sense or other, an animal, then either I am an animal
in the derivative sense or I am an animal in the non-derivative sense.
(3) PLURALITY. If I am an animal in the derivative sense, then there are two human
animals in my immediate vicinity.
(4) ONE ANIMAL. But there are not two human animals in my immediate vicinity.
(5) Therefore, I am not an animal in the derivative sense (from PLURALITY and ONE
ANIMAL).
(6) Therefore, if I am an animal, then I am an animal in the non-derivative sense (from
TWO WAYS and 5).
(7) Therefore, I am an animal in the non-derivative sense (from ANIMALITY and 6).
(Bailey 2016, p. 207 - 208)

Bailey calls this “The Animality Argument.” As we can see, it adopts the notion of
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derivativeness proposed by the Constitutionalists to argue that there would be two
animals sitting in the chair. Since we do not want to accept this disastrous result, we
should either say that we are numerically identical with the human animals, or that we
are human animals non-derivatively.

2.2.2

The Problem of Constitution-inducing

In addition, Eric Olson (2007) objects to Constitutionalism by questioning which
properties should be regarded as “constitution-inducing,” and what the underlying
criteria are there for them to be constitution inducing. According to the opponents of
Constitutionalism, a property P is constitution-inducing if and only if necessarily,
whenever an individual possesses P, it constitutes a new entity that essentially has
property Q, which is a constitutional correlate of P. If a thing’s having property P is
sufficient for it to constitute another object that essentially has a property Q, then P is
constitution inducing, and also, P and Q are constitutional correlates. Olson thinks that
if Constitutionalism is true, there must be answers to the question of what makes it the
case that first-person perspective is constitution-inducing. Upon reviewing some
possible solutions, Olson declares that none of them is satisfactory.
His discusses the generous view, according to which all properties are
constitution-inducing. We are reluctant to accept the generous view since it implies
that there is a new being every other moment by your having a new thought. It
contradicts our common sense that there are not many but one thinking being
throughout the whole period of continuous thought. Suppose I begin to think about
Plato. The generous view implies that I come to constitute a new being that thinks
about Plato essentially. She is not me because I do not think about Plato essentially. It
follows that whenever I think about Plato, I would become are one of at least two
beings thinking about Plato. For Olson, this is problematic because I could never know
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who I am. I can either be the one who essentially thinks of Plato, or I can be the
persisting person who thinks of Plato occasionally. Olson thinks that since both are
thinking the same thoughts, one can never tell which me is. Moreover, Olson points
out that many mental properties appear to be intrinsic. This alternative fails to solve
the above problems since it also suggests that you coincide with at least one, or even
more, mental being(s) at any moment.
Olson is suspicious of what makes the first-person perspective particularly
constitution-inducing among various mental properties. The capacity for sense
experience and the ability to breathe are vital for us too. Baker should at least give
some reasons to demonstrate how a first-person perspective is such a prestigious
property that becomes the essential property of personhood.
For Baker, it is a primitive fact that a human animal must have the essential
properties it has. Asking why a person essentially has a first-person perspective is like
asking why a proton is positively charged. Since this description concerns the basic
level of properties, there is no further explanation underlying it. Olson thinks that it is
problematic to assert that the modal properties of things are primitive.
Suppose every individual located in the Rocky Mountain National Park coincides
materially with a being that is essentially in the Rocky Mountain National Park - call
them “essential parkers.” If you were to cross the border of the park, the essential
parker coinciding with you would necessarily perish. If modal properties of objects are
primitive, your essential parker’s not being able to exist outside the Rocky Mountain
National Park would be an unexplainable, brute, yet essential property of her. If one
agrees that the idea of an essential parker is silly, and that of an essential thinker is not,
there should be a reason for us to discriminate between the two cases. The
Constitutionalists are expected to give an answer to this question. Baker’s proposal,
nonetheless, lacks this explanation.
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2.2.3

The Problem of the Boundary of Person

Both the Animalists and the Constitutionalists have to answer the question of why the
boundary of this animal is also my physical boundary. In the third objection, Olson
thinks that Constitutionalism fails to provide satisfactory answers to the above
question.
One might adopt Locke’s theory of the extended consciousness. Locke suggests
that a being extends spatially as far as one’s consciousness extends. According to
Locke, our bodily parts are “vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that
we feel when they are touch”d, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that
happens to them, are a part of our selves” (Locke 1975, p. 336). In other words, my
being able to feel my feet explains why my feet are parts of me.
Olson’s criticizes Locke’s suggestion. He thinks that Locke’s theory implies that
a limb of you that is entirely numb fails to be a part of you. Moreover, Locke’s proposal
would have to admit that the blood and fluid in your body are not part of you since you
cannot directly feel their existence.14 There are so many bodily parts that you cannot
feel. If you are in total sensory deprivation, Locke’s theory will imply that you do not
consist of any physical parts at all. But then this conclusion sounds very counterintuitive to us.
According to Baker’s view, although we are constituted by a human being, there
is nothing substantial that exists over and above the human being. We are wholly
physical. According to Baker’s definition of constitution, x constitutes y if and only if
x and y spatially coincide. If x is a physical part of y, and y constitutes z, then x is also

14

Olson’s interpretation of Locke’s idea that the parts of ourselves should be parts that we are
conscious of good or harm that happens to them is controversial. Surely we are affected by, and can
experience the good or harm that happens to my blood in my body. However, I cannot directly
experience my blood - I cannot feel my blood when it is touched.
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a physical part of z. For her, persons are constituted by human animals, and any
physical part that belongs to the human animal should also belong to the person. Under
this physicalist picture, a person constituted by a human animal should have the
physical boundary of a human animal. However, if one adopts Locke’s criterion of the
boundary, a person constituted by a human animal with total sensory deprivation does
not have any physical parts. There is an apparent inconsistency in Baker’s theory.
A possible reply is that whenever one thing constitutes another, the two things,
by definition, share their boundaries and their parts. Given that the animal constitutes
the person, they should have the same boundary regardless of whether the person has
bodily experience. In reply to this, Olson returns to the original question of what makes
it the case that animals constitute us, and why not things a bit larger or smaller than
animals.

2.3
2.3.1

My Reply to the Objections

My Reply to Olson’s Objections

In my opinion, Olson’s first objection of “why some entities are constitution inducers,
and some are not” can be answered by Baker’s theory. Baker proposes that there is a
property-constitution-relation which holds between property-instances at different
levels. She thinks that there are higher-level constituted events that are irreducible to
lower-level events. Also, higher-level properties have causal powers that cannot be
accounted for by or reduced to that of their constituents. According to Baker, “An
irreducible higher-level property-instance (x’s having F at t) has independent causal
efficacy if and only if

(1) x’s having F at t has an effect e, and
(2) x’s having F at t would have had the effect e even if its constituting property-instance
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had been different, and
(3) x’s having F at t confers causal powers that could not have been conferred by its
constituting property-instance alone.” (Baker 2013, p. 216)

Let us investigate whether the property instance “being in the Rocky Mountain
National Park” is constitution inducing. First, one can easily think of x’s being in the
Rocky Mountain National Park as having an effect, such as that of being happy. We
can suppose that x is happy every time she is in the park. The first criterion is fulfilled.
Second, we should examine whether x’s being in the Rocky Mountain National Park
would be happy even if the constituting property-instance had been different. Suppose
x is now having a walk in the park and being there makes her happy. The many possible
constituting property-instance are such as x’s dancing in the park, x’s sleeping there,
eating ice-cream there, swimming there, etc. All these properties are constituting
property-instances which constitute that property instance “being in the Rocky
Mountain National Park.” Even if the constituting property-instance had been different,
x’s being in the Rocky Mountain National Park at t would have had the effect of
making x happy – as assumed, x is happy if she is in the park. In other words, there is
no such thing as x’s being in the Rocky Mountain National Park at t confers causal
powers that could not have been conferred by its constituting property-instance alone.
Criterion three, therefore, cannot be fulfilled. Following this, the property “being in
the Rocky Mountain National Park” is not an irreducible higher-level propertyinstance which has independent causal efficacy. Given that a property is constitutioninducing if and only if it induces new causal contribution, then it is clear that “being in
the Rocky Mountain National Park” has no new causal contribution and thus is not a
constitution inducing property.
Moreover, if Baker’s proposal that first-person perspectives have haecceities
were successful, the problem of essential parkers would also be resolved. In any sense,
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essential parkers are of course different from persons. Baker thinks that persons are
haecceitistic, and their persistent conditions should be determined by haecceities;
whereas essential parkers are not haecceitistic. By definition, their persistence is much
shorter than that of the subject, and their persistence conditions should be different
from that of the person – their persistence is not determined by haecceities of the firstperson perspective. I will discuss the conception of “haecceity” later in this thesis, and
I will not discuss this idea in detail here.
Baker proposes that persons have haecceitistic implications because persons
essentially have first-person perspectives, and first-person perspectives have
haecceities. Persons, therefore, are ontologically not reducible to their lower-level
constituents such as the human animal. The property of “having a first-person
perspective” is constitution inducing because necessarily, whenever a physical
organism acquires a first-person perspective, it constitutes a new object, namely, a
person. Baker asserts that x is constituted by y if and only if y is at an ontologically
higher level than x, and y has novel causal powers that x does not have. There are new
causal powers once a constituted object comes into being. An example given by Baker
is a fire escape. She thinks that the fire escape has novel causal powers that the sum of
particles that constitute the fire escape does not have. More specifically, the fire escape
has the power to save a life non-derivatively whereas the sum of the particles that
constitute the fire escape has the power derivatively in virtue of that fact that the sum
constitutes a fire escape. However, the sum of the particle may not constitute the fire
engine and thus may not have the causal power it has. The fire escape has the power
to save a life in virtue of its function but not in virtue of its material constituents.
For Baker, persons are agents that can bring out intentional actions, and thus are
things that confer causal powers that could not have been conferred by their
constituting property-instances alone. Olson’s first objection can be answered in this
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way: there is enough evidence to show that persons are ontologically significant and
are discriminated from the other things.

2.3.2

My Reply to Olson’s Second Objection

I cannot address Olson’s question of “what makes it the case that animals, but not
something smaller or bigger, constitute us.” This is an intriguing question, and I don’t
think there is an easy answer to it. Nevertheless, I aim to show that the problem of
determining our physical boundary is a threat to Classical Animalism rather than to the
Constitutionalism of persons.
Constitutionalism suggests a flexible boundary for a person, but Animalism does
not. Constitutionalism allows that the constituted object may not have been constituted
by the constituent. It is possible that our boundary is larger than, or less than, that of
an animal. If a person is not constituted by an animal anymore at a certain time, it can
be constituted by other things else. For instance, a person may persist throughout a
gradual replacement of bodily cells such that she is totally silicon-based one day.
We don’t necessarily have the physical boundary of the human animals since the
property of having such a boundary is merely a contingent fact. One may have a much
larger boundary in future if the technology is enhanced, and our physical boundary
may not be that of the physical organism at all. For instance, we may have artificial
complementary wings and tails. It is also possible that one possesses a much smaller
boundary – consider our brain being fully supported by nutrient fluids in a vat one day,
or that our minds are uploaded to a computer server. The brain or the computer server
is certainly not at all an animal, but in this case, we may concede that our boundary is
that of our brain or that of the computer.
The idea of an extended bodily boundary can also be understood via the Extended
Mind View proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998). They argue that
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external objects can be regarded as parts of the mind when our cognitive processing is
improved, and when those external objects have the same purpose as the internal
process of cognitive processing. More specifically, when the external object is coupled
with the mind to form one single working system, the mind should no longer be
regarded as bounded within the skull. For instance, if one’s cognitive processes are
greatly improved by one’s smartphone in the above way, then one’s mind should be
regarded as extended to the smartphone.
By contrast, the problem of determining our physical boundary should instead be
a disadvantage for Classical Animalism. Since Classical Animalism is the view that
we are numerically identical with the human animals and are essentially human
animals, then our boundary is also necessarily the boundary of the animal. Our
physical boundaries may be ill-defined when new technologies are launched.
Technologies such as brain transplants, uploading, and silicon brain replacement are
all threats to Classical Animalism. For instance, if one’s brain is removed and placed
in vats, one no longer considers the bodily boundary of the animal as one’s boundary
anymore. Similarly, if one’s body and the brain is gradually replaced by silicon chips,
then one no longer has a bodily boundary of a physical organism afterward. These
strongly suggest that we do not essentially have the physical boundary of an animal.
In sum, I would say that the problem of determining our physical boundary threatens
Classical Animalism without harming Constitutionalism.
So far, I have argued that the problem of our physical boundary poses a threat to
Classical Animalism rather than to the Constitutionalism of persons. Constitutionalism
allows for flexible bodily boundaries of persons, but Animalism does not.

2.3.3

My Reply to the Problem of Many Thinkers

I believe that the most powerful argument against Constitutionalism of Persons is the
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Problem of Many Thinkers. Even if Baker argues that the person thinks nonderivatively and the human animal thinks derivatively, there are still two distinct
thinking entities in the chair. It is difficult to avoid committing to the view that there
are more than one thinkers in the chair. Constitutionalists may argue that the human
animal thinks in virtue of the thinking activity of the person. However, given that they
both think that same thought, it is difficult for us to determine which one I am. As
argued by Olson, I may be the human animal or the person because they have exactly
the same thoughts.
I suggest one possible way out for the Constitutionalists. The Constitutionalists
could answer this question of “which one I am” via modal notions. Since the
persistence conditions of the person are different from that of the human animal, and
it is possible that I persist as a person but not as an animal, I should be the person but
not the human animal. This reply, however, presupposes that the persistence of human
animal is determined by the sameness of life.
Although this is a cogent reply to the question of whether I am the person or the
animal which thinks, it does not give an answer to the problem of the Many Thinkers.
The Constitutionalists still have to admit that there are at least two thinkers.
In contrast, Cartesian substance dualism does not imply that there is more than
one thinker. This view is theoretically more advantageous than the Constitutionalism
in the sense that the Problem of Many Thinkers does not arise. According to Cartesian
substance dualism, there is only one thinker because there is only one subject of
experience. The subject of experience thinks, whereas the human animal, as a physical
entity, does not think. For substance dualism, I am a purely mental entity, and I am
causally intimately related to a particular human animal. The human animal is a purely
physical entity that does not think. If there is only one single thinker sitting in the chair,
then there is no problem in finding out who we are – I am the subjects of experience.
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Some people would think that there is also the human body, the mere hunk of
matter, and the human body minus its left hand, etc. There are many candidates for the
owner of thoughts. How can Cartesian substance dualism avoid the Problem of Many
Thinkers? My answer is that all these physical entities described above do not think.
They have intimate causal relations with the same subject of experience, and only the
subject of experience thinks. The subject of experience S1 which possesses the human
body (in a causal sense of possession) is numerically identical with the subject of
experience S2 which possesses the mere hunk of matter, which is also numerically
identical with the subject of experience S3 which possesses the human body minus its
left hand, etc. As S1 = S2 = S3 =…= Sn, there is only one subject of experience that
thinks, but not many. That is how the Cartesian substance dualism replies to the
Problem of Many Thinkers.

2.4

The De-person Objection

In what follows, I propose an objection to Baker’s Constitutionalism of persons. My
argument has a structure as follows. First, (1) the rudimentary and the robust firstperson perspectives are not two stages of one single property but are two different
properties; (2) we do not necessarily have a rudimentary first-person perspective; and
(3) we do not necessarily have a robust first-person perspective. The conclusion is that
it is not the case that we are essentially persons with first-person perspectives. To begin,
let us reveal how Baker defines the essential properties of a person:

[A]ny being that has a first-person perspective (rudimentary or robust) essentially is a
person. (Baker 2013, p. 40)
[A]lthough what is distinctive about human persons is their robust first-person
perspectives, the property in virtue of which they are persons—a property that they have
essentially—is a first-person perspective, rudimentary or robust. (Ibid.)
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From the above quotations, it is clear that Baker thinks that persons essentially have
first-person perspectives, rudimentary or robust. According to Baker, the rudimentary
and the robust first-person perspectives are two stages of the same property. I aim to
show that one can have a robust first-person perspective without having a rudimentary
first-person perspective, and vice versa. Therefore, they are not different stages of the
same property but are totally different properties. If this is true, then Baker is vague in
defining the essential properties of a person. In other words, she is not clear in stating
which is(are) the essential properties in virtue of which I exist. One can further
question the significance of rudimentary and robust first-person perspectives for my
existence.
Let me illustrate what it usually means to say that one property has two stages. If
one describes a property with a rudimentary stage and a robust stage, the following
features should necessarily be involved - when the robust stage is achieved, the
characteristics which at the rudimentary stage still retain. An example will clarify.
Suppose I am now learning Japanese in an institution that provides two tests for foreign
learners at different stages. The first test is for learners at the rudimentary stage. It
requires that one be able to use Japanese to introduce oneself and to write a short essay
in a hundred words. There is another exam for advanced students during which one
would need to participate in a short conversation and to write a formal letter. When I
pass the second test, it is assumed that the abilities that I have at the rudimentary stage
are still there. Upon reaching the robust stage, I gain more skills and become more
sophisticated in handling the language. The basic creed here is that necessarily, if a
property x has two stages, then given that an entity that acquires the property x with
its being at the robust stage, it also possesses the property x with its being at the
rudimentary stage.
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It seems that the rudimentary and the robust stages of first-person perspectives do
not work like that. According to many philosophers, one can have a robust first-person
perspective without having a rudimentary first-person perspective, and vice versa. It is
dubious that the existence of a robust first-person perspective requires the existence of
a rudimentary first-person perspective. First, there can be a being that thinks of itself
as itself, and possess this cognitive ability of self-referencing, without having the
disposition to perceive the world from a spatiotemporal perspective. One example is a
person in the sensory deprivation tank proposed by G. E. M. Anscombe (1975).
Suppose that there is an individual in the tank who lacks the five senses. She does not
have bodily perceptions nor the experience of perceiving the world from a particular
spatiotemporal perspective. We can go on to assume that the individual in the sensory
deprivation tank has permanently lost the rudimentary first-person perspective – the
ability to perceive the world from a spatiotemporal perspective. According to
Anscombe, this person can still think “What happens to me? I cannot figure out where
I am. That is terrible!” Since she is able to think of herself as herself, it is clear that her
capacity for perceiving herself as herself remains intact. The robust first-person
perspective is still there. This is an example of an individual who has a robust, but not
a rudimentary, first-person perspective.
More examples can be found in the recent literature of philosophy of mind. There
is the famous argument for the irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness to
psychological functions by David Chalmers (1996). According to Chalmers, the
existence of zombies is conceivable and metaphysically possible. Chalmers defines
zombies as beings that have psychological functions such as self-referencing
mechanisms, speech, and behaviors resembling that of a normal person, but without
phenomenal consciousness. These beings have robust first-person perspectives
because they are able to refer to themselves using first-person pronouns. However,
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they do not have rudimentary first-person perspectives because they never experience
and perceive the external world from a spatiotemporal location. If we follow the
common understanding that perceptions are conscious, phenomenal experiences, then
zombies have robust but not rudimentary first-person perspectives.15 Furthermore, in
Barry Dainton’s (2016) essay “I – The Sense of Self,” he puts forward the idea of a
conscious experience without the spatiotemporal location from which it perceives the
world. He provides an example of a conscious computer with a self-referencing
function that has thoughts such as “I am now talking to X” and “I know that 1+1=2”
without perceiving the external world with a spatiotemporal perspective. Dainton
writes:

Since she [the computer] has no body — or at least no bodily experience — as far as I
can see, her remaining experience would be entirely non-presentational and nonperspectival in character. Moreover, since she has no sense of subjective location, it
would not seem to her that her thinking was taking place at any particular place. (Dainton
2016, p. 137)

All these are examples in which one has a robust first-person perspective without
having a rudimentary first-person perspective.
We find plenty of evidence showing that there can be a being who has a
rudimentary first-person perspective without a robust first-person perspective. A worm,
an ant, and many other lower animals do have rudimentary first-person perspectives.
However, they do not have robust first-person perspectives throughout their lives.
Adding the two claims together, the conclusion is that the presence of a rudimentary
15
The claim that zombies do not have perceptions is controversial, and it depends on how we define
perceptions. Since we assume that zombies are able to do all the things that we do, and we can do
things that require perceptions (e.g. taking a drink from a fridge), some scholars such as Daniel Dennett
(1991) would think that we should also regard zombies who are able to do the same things as having
perceptions. Here I take phenomenal consciousness as “what it’s likeness” and perceptions as a kind
of conscious, phenomenal experience. For me, even if zombies can do what we can, they do not have
perceptions.
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first-person perspective is independent of the presence of a robust first-person
perspective, and vice versa. These two dispositional properties do not necessarily coexist. An individual can have one kind of the first-person perspective without having
the other. If the presence of a robust first-person perspective does not guarantee the
presence of a rudimentary first-person perspective, and vice versa, then the two
perspectives are two distinct properties instead of two stages of the same property.
Below is my formulation:

1.

Necessarily, if a property x has two stages, then given that an entity which acquires
the property x with its being at the robust stage, it also possesses the property x with
its being at the rudimentary stage.

2.

One can have a robust first-person perspective without having a rudimentary firstperson perspective, and vice versa.

__________________
C. The rudimentary and the robust first-person perspective are not two stages of the
same property.

One might argue against my proposal by saying that there are two kinds of dependence
relations: the (1) ontological dependence and (2) developmental dependence relations.
Although the two stages of the first-person perspective do not necessarily coexist, a
rudimentary first-person perspective is developmentally necessary for the existence of
a robust first-person perspective. We can try the following construal: A is
developmentally necessary for B if and only if A is nomologically necessary for the
development of B. By this definition, B can exist at time t1 without the existence of A
at t1. For instance, sunlight is nomologically necessary for the formation of fruits, but
the existence of a particular fruit on a tree at t1 does not require sunlight to be there at
t1. In this sense, can we say that the rudimentary first-person perspective is
developmentally necessary for the robust first-person perspective?
Maybe. In the actual world, nomologically speaking, we do find strong evidence
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for the claim that an individual would need to have a rudimentary first-person
perspective before acquiring a robust first-person perspective. That said, it is quite
plausible that the robust first-person perspective needs the rudimentary first-person
perspective as the necessary condition for its development. However, this idea is not
without its problems. First, there are so many things, besides the rudimentary firstperson perspective, that are developmentally necessary for a robust first-person
perspective. For instance, some philosophers believe the experience of the presence of
other conscious entities is probably one of the developmentally necessary conditions
for the establishment of a robust first-person perspective. If we admit that all the
properties that are developmentally necessary for a robust first-person perspective are
essential for a person’s existence, it sounds really weird. Indeed, many of the properties
that are developmentally necessary for my existence are metaphysically not necessary
for my existence. The presence of other conscious entities is one example – we
certainly exist and can think of ourselves as ourselves even if we are on an isolated
island. Even if the presence of other conscious entities is plausibly one of the
developmentally necessary conditions for us to have robust first-person perspectives,
it is definitely not metaphysically necessary for our existence. The conception of
“developmental necessity” is too weak for our discussion of the essential properties of
a person.
In a nutshell, I have argued that the two stages of first-person perspectives are
different properties that can exist independently. Even though it may be the case in the
actual world that the rudimentary first-person perspective is developmentally
necessary for the robust first-person perspective, the relation is too feeble for us to
consider the two stages of the first-person perspective as one single essential property
of the existence of a person. Baker thus owes us a clear picture in defining the essential
properties of a person. Her proposal leaves open a question of the significance of each
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of the stages of the first-person perspective for my own existence.
I now propose that I still exist even if I do not have a rudimentary first-person
perspective. To illustrate this, one can adopt the thought experiments discussed
previously – Anscombe’s sensory deprivation tank is an example that I can “wake up”
in such a tank asking myself “where am I” and “what happened?” As I do not have a
spatiotemporal perspective from which I perceive that world when I am in the sensory
deprivation tank, I do not have a rudimentary first-person perspective. However, I still
have conscious thoughts, and I certainly exist at that moment. Again, one can also use
Barry Dainton’s idea of “conscious computer” to illustrate this: the conscious
computer does not have a spatiotemporal viewpoint to perceive the external world, and
it can never be regarded as having a rudimentary first-person perspective. If it is
possible that our minds are uploaded to a computer server, such that I can think and
can communicate with others via connecting to other computer servers, I can be
regarded as persisting as a non-human person after uploading. I never acquire a
rudimentary first-person perspective anymore, but I still exist. My conclusion is simply
that I can exist without having a rudimentary first-person perspective.
I will argue in the final chapter of this thesis that I can have zero, one, or more
than one spatiotemporal perspectives from which I perceive the world. In other words,
the presence of a rudimentary first-person perspective is not the essential property of
my existence. For one thing, even if it is true that my essential property is having a
rudimentary first-person perspective, this fact does not make us special – we all know
that many other conscious beings such as cats, dogs, rats, and primates all have
rudimentary first-person perspectives. A cat’s subject of experience also has the ability
to perceive the external world from a spatiotemporal perspective. That is not what
Baker wishes – she definitely wants to distinguish ourselves from other animals.
Now I further argue that my essential property is not having a robust first-person
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perspective. It is possible that I exist even if I do not have a robust first-person
perspective. Suppose there is a kind of human beings, called “de-persons,” which is
genetically modified. There is no difference between a person and a de-person before
they reach the age of 40. However, de-persons are automatically “de-personalized”
from 40. At the date of birth at 40, a de-person suddenly has a rapid deterioration of
mental complexity and becomes a being that is capable of being conscious but can
never exhibit a robust first-person perspective. A de-person lives a deprived life
afterward, not being able to refer to herself as herself. Unfortunately, there is 50% of
the whole population nowadays suffering from this disease, and there is no current
technology that can tell whether one is a person or a de-person when one is under 40.
Suppose I am wondering whether I am a person or a de-person. According to
Baker, there is a person before 40, and the person does not exist anymore after that.
Since Baker thinks that I am essentially a person, I should no longer exist after 40
(there is not any person anymore after the individual reaches 40.) However, the more
intuitive postulation for me is that I will survive let alone in bad condition. Admittedly,
I will have much less meaningful experience because the variety of experience will be
severely declined. The situation of being a de-person is like having an unfortunate
accident that destroys my nervous system and causes me to lose a lot of abilities. In
this situation, however, I will still be able to feel pain and enjoy eating, sleeping, and
many other basic activities. I can still run in the grass, swim in the pool, dream of
dancing in the sun, and play simple games with my fellow de-persons, just like what
the dogs do with their mates. I am similar to a dog in the sense that I would have a
rudimentary first-person perspective but can never have a robust one anymore - I can
never regain the capacity to think about myself as myself.
I do exist even if I permanently lose the capacity to develop a robust first-person
perspective. If I belong to the kind “de-person,” and that I may exist without having
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the capacity to develop a robust first-person perspective, then I am not an entity that
essentially has the capacity of developing a robust first-person perspective. I can
totally lose the capacity of developing the robust first-person perspective at the age of
40 but would still continue to exist afterward. My existence does not require any
exemplification of a robust first-person perspective. The essential property of my
existence, hence, should be something other than the capacity of developing a robust
first-person perspective.
Some people would have an intuition that in the absence of most of what makes
you a person, a de-person is not the same person as you were. They would think that
Baker is right in saying that the de-person after 40 is not the same person as the one
before 40. I totally agree with this claim. I believe, however, that there is an important
difference between a person’s persistence and my persistence.

If one adopts Baker’s

definition of personhood, it is quite reasonable to think that the de-person after 40 is
not the same person as the individual before 40. However, it seems intuitive and
plausible to me that I can survive without being the same person throughout my
lifetime. I persist throughout the rapid deterioration of my mental life, and I now exist
as an unfortunate de-person (who should not be regarded as a person according to
Baker’s definition. It is merely a mind / subject with minimal experience). It would
still be me who suffers from the disease and has those miserable experience afterward.
In this case, my persistence conditions and essential properties are different from that
of a person.
So far, I have introduced Baker’s Constitutionalism of persons and delineated
four main objections to Baker’s Constitutionalism. I comment on Olson’s arguments
and provide my objection to Baker’s theory. My argument consists of three
independent claims. First, I propose that the rudimentary and the robust first-person
perspectives are not two stages of the same property but are two distinct properties that
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can exist independently of each other. Baker’s Constitutionalism of persons thus fails
to provide a clear picture of the essential properties of our existence. Second, I argue
that it is possible for me to exist without a rudimentary first-person perspective. Third,
I show that one can permanently lose the robust first-person perspective but go on to
exist. Adding these together, the result is that since neither the robust nor the
rudimentary first-person perspective is necessarily there when I exist - none of them
are essential for my existence.

2.5

Functionalism and Constitutionalism

A contemporary analytic philosopher, Sydney Shoemaker (2011, 2016), proposes a
constitutional view that presupposes a functional interpretation of personhood.
Shoemaker thinks that human animals cannot think. He believes that persons and
animals are different entities because they have different persistence conditions. Yet,
they share some properties with each other. His theory entails that there can be distinct
entities that spatiotemporally coincide and are made up of the same matter.
Shoemaker proposes the representational unity theory of consciousness which
can be applied to the individuation of personhood. According to his theory, two mental
states are owned by the same person if and only if (1) “they are linked by a chain of
stages such that each member of the series is directly connected psychologically to the
consecutive preceding members,” (Shoemaker 1984, pp. 95 - 96) and (2) no such chain
of stages that link them diverges to two branches. For Shoemaker, mental states are
functional states with sensory inputs and behavioral outputs, which bear intimate
relations to other functional mental states as well. A mental state can be identified by
its place in a causal network of functional mental states. For example, there is a belief
that it is rainy outside. Together with some sensory experiences, desires, and beliefs
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such as “I want to keep dry” and “an umbrella can keep off rain,” a person tends to
take the action of bringing an umbrella with her. Furthermore, the belief in such
examples is also connected to many other beliefs, such as that the floor outside is wet,
that there will be fewer people on the street, etc.
For Shoemaker, the individuation of persons at a time is determined by the
synchronic unity of the causal network of mental functions. Also, the diachronic unity
relation of a person holds when the property instances at various times are causally
related. The nodes in the network jointly cause actions; only when one’s beliefs and
desires are unified could one perform an action. The diachronic identity of a person is
determined by the causal relation between the psychological properties. Moreover, one
can determine an entity’s synchronic unity relation by the same causal means. For
instance, there is one single person having the desire to eat an apple and the belief that
some actions would result in the eating action. If the desires and beliefs are causally
related and thus synchronically unified, they jointly result in the consequential actions,
such as the person’s hand grasping the apple and putting it into her mouth. Moreover,
the action of the person would become diachronically unified with the former desires
and beliefs. The memories, beliefs, and desires of a person are causally and
counterfactually dependent on her past life. If there are causal relations between some
properties such that they jointly produce, or are apt to produce some effect, then those
properties are synchronically and diachronically unified. He writes:

[For] what is involved in the possession of certain mental properties, it seems central to
their causal profiles that their instantiation causes or contributes to causing successor
states of certain sorts in the future career of the same person. It is characteristic of many
mental states that they leave memories of themselves. Beliefs give rise, in reasoning, to
other beliefs to which they give deductive or inductive support. Beliefs and desires give
rise to intentions, and intentions give rise to decision and actions. In all these cases the
successor states belong to the same subject as the states that give rise to them, and it
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seems central to the concepts of these states that this should be so. (Shoemaker 2009, p.
359)

Shoemaker claims that mental states are functional states that need not be conscious.
For instance, one’s memories of the old school days are mental states that exist in one’s
mind even if one is having a deep unconscious sleep. The unconscious psychological
dispositions are also classified as mental states. His view is based on the idea that all
properties are individuated by causal profiles. Properties are individuated and
classified in the sense that properties having the same causal profile are identical with
each other. For him, properties of an entity are synchronically unified only if they
jointly produce certain effects under certain circumstances. If the properties of an
entity jointly produce certain effects under some circumstances, these properties are
said to be synchronically unified. The property instances are synchronically unified
only if the co-instantiation of those properties produces an effect of a kind that belongs
to the causal profiles of the instantiated properties. For example, if an instance of
hardness, sharpness and that of a certain mass jointly produces the effect of a piece of
wood being cut when pressure is applied to it, these property instances all belong to a
single entity, say, a knife.
Shoemaker introduces the conceptions of thin and thick properties to show that a
person and the human animal with the same physical body can carry different
properties. According to Shoemaker, the existence of a persisting entity is constituted
by a set of property instances united by relations of synchronic and diachronic unity.
The term “thin properties” refer to those properties that are shared by different kinds
of things with different persistence conditions. Some typical examples of thin
properties are size, shape, and mass. Thick properties, on the other hand, are properties
that are only instantiated in things of a certain kind. Moreover, the causal profiles of
these thick properties are such that their continuous instantiations determine the
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sameness of the entity through time. For instance, the persistence of a tree is
determined by the causal profiles of its (thick) biological properties. Even if the tree is
struck by lightning such that there are drastic changes in those of its thin physical
properties, such as its size and shape, it still persists by virtue of the continuity of the
instantiations of its thick biological properties, such as its genetical makeup.
Shoemaker proposes that we are essentially persons. We have psychological
properties as our thick properties, and our persistence is determined by psychological
continuity. If a belief and a desire jointly give rise to an action, then these property
instances are owned by the same person. The continuous instantiations of the thick
mental properties cause the future mental and physical properties of the persisting
person. For instance, beliefs and desires cause the intentions of a person, which further
give rise to her mental and bodily actions. If there is a set of mental properties with
synchronic and diachronic unity, then this set constitutes a history of a single persistent
person.
For Shoemaker, the person, her animal, and her body are not identical but are
spatiotemporally coincident. He regards a body as the physical entity owned by a
person in virtue of which one perceives and interacts with the external world. The body
continues to exist as a corpse after death. Moreover, he defines a human animal as a
biological organism, the continuity of which is determined by the continuity of life.
The human animal does not exist anymore after the organism dies.
According to Shoemaker, these three coincident entities (the person, her animal,
and her body) share only some but not all properties. The person, the animal, and the
body share some physical properties. Nevertheless, mental properties are only had by
the person but not the animal nor the body. My physical body and my human animal
share all of my thin properties but not my thick properties and persistence conditions,
and thus I can come apart from them. For Shoemaker, my body’s having certain
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physical properties and the environment together determines that something else,
namely, me (the person), who has certain mental properties. On the other hand, animals
have biological properties as thick properties, but our persistence conditions are not
determined by those properties.
Certain microphysical states of affairs are realizers of thick mental and physical
properties for the person. However, this microphysical state occurs in the person and
also its animal and body. For Shoemaker, we can say that the microphysical state of
affairs is weakly embedded in both the human body and the human animal, but is
strongly embedded in the person. There are different thick biological properties that
are responsible for the synchronic and diachronic identity of the body and the animal
respectively. The microphysical state of affairs weakly embedded in the body and the
animal only instantiate thick biological properties for them, but not thick mental
properties for the person.
Since the causal profile of the person, the animal, and the body is different, they
have different thick properties and persistence conditions. One example is the brain
transplant, in which the person is separated from both the body and the animal. In this
case, we normally think that your identity goes with the person with the original brain,
whereas the organism with an empty skull is not you. The physical property “is
immune to smallpox” can be applied to both the person and its animal before the
operation. However, after the person’s brain is transplanted to another human body
whose owner has not been vaccinated for smallpox, the resulting entity no longer
possesses the physical property “is immune to smallpox.” On the other hand, the
human animal with an empty skull that keeps functioning is still immune to smallpox.
This example shows that the physical property “is immune to smallpox” is a thick
property for the animal but a thin property for the person. The reason is that this
physical property is necessary for, and contributes to, the sameness of the human
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animal over time, but it is not necessary for and does not contribute to the sameness of
person over time.
Apart from mental properties, persons also have thick physical properties which
instantiate the mental properties. These microphysical realizers also have a kind of
unity the constitutes the synchronic and diachronic unity of the person. These thick
physical properties, in turn, are supported by some other thin physical properties such
as mass and density. Therefore, persons also have thick and thin physical properties.
Although we essentially have some physical properties, most of the physical
properties we have are not our thick properties. We have mental properties, whereas
those mental properties are realized by some physical properties. In saying that, he
assumes that mental properties always have their physical realizers. Since the mental
states of a person are caused by sensory inputs to the sense organs of the physical body
and the bodily actions performed by a person are caused by her volitional states, there
is an intimate relation between the physical states of the body and the mental states of
a person. However, it should be noted that those physical realizer properties will be
neural properties whose nature are mystical to us. These physical properties are not
what we normally ascribe to a person in our daily lives, such as height, weight, etc.
According to Shoemaker, if my volitional states are physically realized, the property
instances of their physical realizers stand in relations of synchronic unity to instances
of other physical, bodily property instances, such as those of the muscular and nervous
system. These physical properties, in turn, are synchronically united with property
instances such as mass and shape.
Shoemaker believes that one can use the conceptions of thin and thick properties
to solve the Problem of Many Thinkers. He claims that the Thinking Animal Argument
is incorrect in the sense that it assumes that the human animal thinks. For him, the
animal does not think. Shoemaker proposes that the person and the human animal only
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share all the thin physical properties but not the thick physical properties. Those thick
physical properties that realize mental states and the mental properties belong only to
the person, but not to the coincident biological animal or the human body.

2.5.1

My Objections to Shoemaker’s Constitutionalism

Shoemaker’s theory of personal identity is problematic in several ways. First, I argue
that Shoemaker’s individuation of persons is problematic. Second, I propose that it is
quite plausible that we can persist in two or more distinct and discontinuous personphases. If this is true, then we are not essentially persons with functional unification.
Third, I aim to show that we can exist as a subject of experience of pain without the
psychological complexity of being a person. I now discuss these three objections.
For Shoemaker, we have psychological properties as our thick properties, and our
persistence is determined by psychological continuity. The continuous instantiations
of the thick mental properties cause the future mental and physical properties of the
persisting person. I argue that this picture is incorrect – we have a strong intuition for
our persistence in cases in which there is no psychological continuity. I now provide a
thought experiment to show that I can persist as two totally distinct persons. If it is the
case, I am not numerically identical with a person, and my persistence is determined
by something else rather than that of a person.
Suppose I had an accident and became totally unconscious for a hundred years.
My family does not allow the hospital to remove the machine that helps my body
survive, and they are rich enough to pay for all the medical expenses for a hundred
years. After those many years, a genius scientist manages to do an operation to wake
me up. Unfortunately, since my brain has not been working (e.g., to produce conscious
thoughts) for such a long time, all memories of the past are gone. I have to learn how
to speak, walk, and eat from the very beginning. The worse thing is that all my relatives
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that I knew before have passed away. My case is then referred to the Social Welfare
Department, and I am eventually adopted by a kind and rich couple from Africa. I learn
to speak Afroasiatic languages and various skills such as building roundhouses. I now
enjoy my life in Africa and do not have any memory of what has happened to me 100
years ago.
I have two life experiences. One is a philosopher in Hong Kong; another one has
a life in Africa. The two life experiences are discontinuous, but yet, it is still me who
has both phases of experiences. I believe that most of us do have the same intuition as
me. It is still me after the operation. In this case, I have been two distinct persons, and
the latter person is not psychologically continuous with the former at all. Yet,
according to Shoemaker’s Embedded Person View, I am essentially and fundamentally
a person who has certain psychological complexity, and my mental states are unified.
I can only be one of the two persons. Since the two are numerically different persons,
it would be impossible for me to be numerically identical with the latter person if I am
the former person. This sounds weird to me.
My second objection to Shoemaker’s theory is that it is possible for me to exist
without having the psychological complexity enough to be regarded as a person.
Suppose I now have an experience of pain without remembering myself as a person in
any objective sense. I do not remember who I am or what I have done in my life. If
such a scenario is possible, then it is questionable for us to say that we are persons that
have certain psychological complexity with a certain long-enough duration. Similarly,
some philosophers such as Galen Strawson (2011) propose the existence of transient
selves, according to which the subjects of experience only last for less than a second.
Moreover, Hud Hudson (2012) uses a thought experiment of the morphing block to
illustrate that any psychological criterion of personal identity that presupposes that we
necessarily are things with a causal history fails when there are holes in the growing
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block of time. He concludes that our persistence should be an unanalyzable fact.
Shoemaker’s Constitutionalism obviously does not allow us to be minimal
subjects of experience - it presupposes that we are entities with a relatively long
duration. He understands a person as an entity of psychological complexity that
contains certain memories of the past, psychological traits, and anticipation of the
future. If we are persons, we cannot exist as a subject of experience of pain and nothing
else for this moment, and this violates our intuition.
Another pitfall for Shoemaker’s theory is that there are lots of cases in which one
experiences representational disunity from a first-person perspective. I have already
discussed in the first chapter how Paul Snowdon (2012) delineates that any
representational unity theory of consciousness does not seem to be an effective way to
individuate consciousness in the case of brain-splitting. Shoemaker’s functional
account of individuation of persons implies that there would be many persons
throughout an individual human being’s lifetime. When I experience the waterfall
illusion, two persons will arise at the same time, one with the representational content
that the object is moving, and the other with the representational content that the object
is not. However, intuitively, I should be perceiving both perceptions, for if I am only
one of them, it won’t be the case that I am the individual who has the waterfall illusion.
However, Shoemaker’s theory does not allow that I am both because there is
representational disunity between the two mental states. His theory thus has difficulties
in explaining the individuation of ourselves during the waterfall illusion.
Shoemaker explicitly claims that mental states need not be conscious because
they are functional states. Mental states are functional states with sensory inputs and
behavioral outputs and that bear intimate relations to other functional mental states as
well. In my opinion, his theory does not place any importance on phenomenal
consciousness – such a functional theory of mental states is even compatible with the
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claim that we are all zombies. This sounds very dubious to me. Taking my own
existence for example. If none of the mental states instantiated by, say, my physical
organism, were conscious at all since birth, then I would be suspicious of my existence
in this scenario. It seems that there should be something more, such as my phenomenal
consciousness, or the “what is it likeness of being me,” that supports my existence
apart from those functional aspects of my psychology. Shoemaker’s theory of the
individuation of persons is counterintuitive in the sense that the phenomenal aspects
of our lives are totally neglected.
I also object to Shoemaker’s idea that properties are individuated and classified
in the sense that properties having the same causal profile are identical with each other.
He defines that for any property x, x should have a certain causal profile as an essential
element. In my opinion, this classification misses out the possibility that there can be
a subject that observes the flow of its mental states without remembering any one of
them or taking any actions. We can even conceive of a subject of experience having
various experiences at different times that are not causally linked together by any
means. For instance, we can imagine a patient with lock-in syndrome who cannot act,
talk, or even move her eyeballs. At some moment, she is lying on the bed peacefully,
letting her thoughts flow. From t1 to t2, she suddenly remembers something that
happens to her many years ago, and during t2 to t3 she starts to think about a
mathematical proof. These thoughts, however, are very chaotic that there is no causal
link between them. It seems that this scenario is highly plausible.
We sometimes have disorganized thoughts in a dream. But yet, we still believe
that there is one single subject of experience which has all these disorganized thoughts.
I can dream of being a butterfly from t1 to t2, and dream of being a lion from t2 to t3.
Suppose that there are no causal connections between the behaviors in being a butterfly
in the first dream and the behaviors in being a lion in the second dream. It seems that
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Shoemaker would have to admit that the person having the butterfly dream is different
from that of the lion dream. The description that “this person had two separate dreams
last night” would simply be wrong. However, psychologists told us that it is quite
normal for a person to have several dreams with disconnected contents during one
single night. 16 Something must be wrong here - either Shoemaker’s definition of
personhood is not applicable to our daily lives, or the psychologists have
misunderstandings about what a person is. My stance is that if Shoemaker’s theory of
personhood does not fit into our common understanding of the conception of person,
his functional individuation of personhood may not be a good choice.

2.5.2

Person as Functional

As we have noted, Shoemaker believes that mental states are functional states and
persons are individuated in terms of functional, psychological unity. Some people may
then be inclined to think that persons are wholly functional, and we are functions. In
what follows, I propose that the assertion “a person is functional” is problematic.
Admittedly, this approach is appealing in several ways. First, it avoids the
vagueness of derivativeness - we do not need to find a criterion to determine which
physical part thinks non-derivatively, and which parts do not. Second, the idea that we
are psychological functions of the brain avoids the problem raised by Eric Olson (2003)
that there may be a non-functioning brain of a human animal, being removed from the
skull, and being placed in a jar. According to the Derek Parfit’s (2012) Embedded
Person View, if we are the physical parts of human animals responsible for thinking,
then one would need to admit that after Parfit’s brain is removed from the skull and
put in the jar, Parfit is now in the jar. A functional view, on the other hand, avoids the
pitfall of declaring we are non-functioning brains.
16

Empson (2002) claims that we usually have three to five dreams per night.
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Albeit having these advantages, I propose that the view that we are functions does
not work. To say that we are functions is to say that we are the kind of things that are
multiply instantiable. Suppose you are a complex psychological function. In thought
experiments of tele-transportation, as extensively discussed by Sydney Shoemaker
(1984) and Derek Parfit (1984), the tele-transporter produces two resultant entities on
Mars, each having the same psychological function with the original person. There can
be more than one instantiation of the same set of psychological functions at a time, and
the claim that we are psychological functions would imply admitting that you can be
instantiated more than twice simultaneously, and so can I, and all other people. This is
not a consequence we desire to have – we normally think that in cases of teletransportation, the two resultant entities are two different persons with the same
psychology, and you just cannot be both.
Correspondingly, there is the famous reduplication problem raised by Bernard
Williams (1973). He describes a case in which a person called Charles claims himself
to be the reincarnation of Guy Fawkes:

All the events he claims to have witnessed and all the actions he claims to have done
point unanimously to the life of some one person in the past…Guy Fawkes. Not only do
all Charles’ memory-claims that can be checked fit the pattern of Fawkes’ life as known
by historians, but others that cannot be checked are plausible, provide explanations of
unknown facts and so on. (Williams 1976, p. 332)

Williams argues that the evidence for supporting a case of reincarnation is the memory.
However, continuity of memory (which is a psychological function) cannot be the
criterion for determining the sameness of person over time because there can be
another person, say, Charles’s brother, Robert, who also remembers being Guy Fawkes.
But since two people cannot be one person, at least one of them has false beliefs. If the
reduplication case shows that the continuity of psychological functions cannot
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determine the sameness of person over time, in the original case where no
reduplication exists, one still cannot use the continuity of psychological functions as
the criterion to determine the sameness of person over time.
For Williams, the presence of Robert should not affect the intrinsic relations
between Charles and Guy Fawkes. Whether an identity relation obtains should be a
fact independent of what happened to other people. This is a thought experiment
originally intended to overturn the psychological criterion of personal identity. The
idea is now adopted to show that we cannot identify ourselves with a psychological
function because functions can be reduplicated many times simultaneously, but you
cannot be all of them. Intuitively, if your psychological function is reduplicated and
reproduced on Mars and the original person remains intact on Earth, the person on
Mars is another being; it is not you.
Williams concedes that the defenders of hylomorphism, a view saying that we are
forms of particular beings, might enable the soul “to transcend its adjectival status”
(Williams 1986, p. 197) by conceiving of it as a form of individuated mental
organization that could be realized in a physical body the configuration of which is
capable of accommodation. However, as conceived in this way, one single soul could
in principle be multiply instantiated. Moreover, my existence would have to be that of
a type of thing rather than that of a single entity. Williams thinks that it is problematic
and thus opposed to hylomorphism.
In summary, the functional criterion for the individuation and personal identity is
the culprit for Shoemaker’s theory. Functions are things that are multiply instantiable.
Since we are not multiply instantiable, we should not be functions. I suggest that we
withdraw from functional considerations regarding our existence and persistence.
3

The Embedded Part Views
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Now we have come to conclude that we are not persons that are constituted by human
animals. What, then, are we? There are still some alternatives, such as the claim that
we are parts of the human animals. There are claims saying that we are physical parts
of the human animals, and some philosophers also think that we are mental parts of
the human animals. In what follows, I investigate each of the views and study the pros
and cons of these views.

3.1

The Embedded Physical Part Views

We will now take a look at Derek Parfit’s Embedded Person View. In his recent paper
“we are not human beings,” Parfit (2012) proposes that we are not human beings but
parts of them. He proposes the view that we are the controlling parts of the human
animals. He calls his view an “Embodied Person View.” He writes:

I hope to show that we are not human beings, or animals, but are the conscious, thinking,
controlling parts of these animals. (Parfit 2012, p. 21)
The animal’s thinking is done for it by something else, the part whose physical
basis is the cerebrum. This human animal could not think on its own, since without this
part it could not think at all. But the conscious thinking part can think on its own, as it
would do in some of the imagined cases that we have been considering. (Parfit 2012, p.
15)

For Parfit, a human being thinks consciously by virtue of a smaller part – the person.
He adopts an analogy to illustrate the mereological relation between ourselves and the
human animals. A locomotive is powerful by virtue of having a powerful engine within.
Similarly, a human being thinks consciously by virtue of the brain, a smaller part of
the human animal.
Parfit thinks that there are two ways to understand what it means to say that an
entity derivatively thinks. The first is a weak claim saying that “we are merely thinking
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again what someone else thoughts first, and led us to think.” (Parfit 2012, p. 22) For
instance, if I think of Zeno’s Paradox derivatively in the weak sense, I think of it
because a professor whose class I am attending has just thought of, and has talked
about, Zeno’s Paradox. Her discussions of Zeno’s Paradox influences what the
students think. Parfit also provides an example of the moon shining at night
derivatively in this weak sense that the reflecting light comes not from itself but the
Sun. However, for the claim that an animal thinks derivatively, we should not
understand the word “derivatively” in the weak sense. Instead, the derivativeness here
should be in a strong sense. A being thinks in a strong non-derivative sense only if all
of its parts are directly involved in its thinking. Furthermore, the thing that thinks on
its own in a non-derivative sense is a person. Parfit proposes:

We can then truly claim that we are not human beings in the sense that refers to human
animals, but are the most important parts of these animals, the parts that do all the things
that are most distinctive of these human animals, as conscious, thinking, rational beings.
(Parfit 2012, p. 22)

3.1.1

The Inner-I and Outer-I

Discussions in mereology usually assume no ontological restriction on the field of
parthood. Abstract entities like properties and universals can also be parts. Moreover,
some concrete things have part-whole relations. One can say that “emotions are part
of our psychology,” and “p” is part of the word “part.” By virtue of what can we regard
the person as part of an animal? One may challenge Parfit’s view by saying that the
claim that we are the thinking part of an animal does not match descriptions in our
daily life with the assumption that I extend to the whole body. For instance, we would
say “I am six feet tall,” “I have two hands,” etc. How should the Parfit’s view explain
this phenomenon?
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Parfit admits that we sometimes use “I” and “me” more widely rather than merely
our physical bodies. To explain the relation between the thinking part and other parts
of a human animal, Parfit suggests that one can use the phrase “Inner-I” to refer to the
Lockean person in mental terms, and “Outer-I” to refer to the human animal. The
Inner-I is part of the Outer-I, and the Outer-I thinks indirectly, or derivatively, in virtue
of having the Inner-I as part of it. He defines the two notions as follows:

(A) Inner-I am the person, the conscious, thinking, controlling part of this animal, which
is directly thinking this thought;
(B) Outer-I am the animal that is indirectly thinking this thought, by having a part, InnerI, that does the thinking. (Parfit 2012, p. 21).

As illustrated by Parfit, sometimes, we refer to the “Inner-I,” the Lockean person,
whereas other times we use the same word “I” to refer to the “Outer-I,” the human
animal. 17 When the Inner-I (the person) thinks, the Outer-I (the animal) which
contains a thinking part thinks derivatively (in the strong sense). The thinking activity
of the person does not rely on any external agent; it thinks in itself. We may also say,
the Inner-I directly thinks these thoughts and the Outer-I thinks the thoughts indirectly.
There are also similar uses for terms such as “me,” “you,” “he,” “she,” “we,” etc. Parfit
is explicit in saying this:

The animal is a person only in the derivative sense of having a Lockean person as a part,
there are not too many persons here. (Parfit 2012, p. 21)
We are each part of a human animal, and we make this animal able, in a derivative
way, to understand and respond to reasons. Outer-We are, in that sense, rational animals,
because Inner-We are rational persons. (Ibid., p. 23)

An animal thinks only in a derivative sense as there are many redundant parts involved.
17

See p. 6 of the thesis for the Lockean definition of a person.
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Your hands, heart, and lungs do not directly contribute to your mental activities. Since
the Inner-I is a non-derivative thinker, strictly speaking, my lungs and heart are not
parts of the Inner-I.
Parfit further defends the Narrow Brain-Based Psychological Criterion, a theory
saying that for there to be the same person over time, there should be enough of the
same brain that supports unique psychological continuity. He asserts:

If some future person would be uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am
now, and this continuity would have its normal cause, enough of the same brain, this
person would be me. (Parfit 2012, pp. 5-6)

According to this view, the replica newly produced by the tele-transporter in the
thought experiment will never be identical to the original person because the resultant
entities do not have the same brain as the original person. Nevertheless, Parfit (1984)
declares that identity is not what matters. Even if there is not identity, given that there
are psychological connections and continuity between the two, the situation would be
as good as ordinary survival.
According to Parfit, the Embodied Person View is a feasible alternative to
Animalism. Animals have many parts; if one regards the person as part of the human
being, then there is only one thinker (the person) but not many who think nonderivatively. The animal thinks only derivatively by virtue of having a smaller part,
the person, that does the thinking. Moreover, even if there are still lots of parts of the
human animal that thinks, as some philosophers may assert, all these parts of the
human animal, if they think, only think derivatively. There is only one single entity
that thinks derivatively, namely, the person. This is a solution to the Problem of Many
Thinkers because there is only one entity that thinks non-derivatively.
It is noted, however, that his view is compatible with the idea that there is more
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than one thing that thinks non-derivatively. Again, if a physical organism is a vague
object, and there are many equally good candidates for being the human animal, then
there may well be many entities that think derivatively.
Second, Parfit claims that the Embedded Person View gives a satisfactory answer
to the Problem of Many Thinkers. 18 To restate the problem, if the animal thinks
derivatively and the person thinks non-derivatively. Whenever you think about Plato,
there are at least two beings thinking about Plato, and you are one of them. This is
problematic because when you think you could never know who you are. Parfit
proposes that there will not be the problem of an animal believing falsely that it is the
person. Instead, the animal believes in both claims, “I am a person” and “I am the
human animal” by having a part that does the thinking and judgments. The animal
correctly believes that it is a person in virtue of having a thinking part – a person that
thinks that it is a person.

3.2

My Objections to the Embedded Physical Part Views

Parfit’s view is not without problems. According to Parfit’s Embedded Person View,
we are essentially persons that are parts of human animals. There are several versions
of the Embedded Person View. One version of this view is simply that the thinking
thing is the brain. I call it the Embedded Brain View. Parfit believes that this version
is cogent and feasible. He says,

Olson rejects this view because he assumes that an animal’s thinking part would have to
be claimed to be its brain. (Parfit 2012, p. 15)
What Olson calls the brain view is, however, only one version of the Embodied Part
View. This version is not, I believe, absurd. (Ibid.)

18

This is one of the objections to Constitutionalism of Persons by Olson. See my thesis p. 21.
84

Parfit claims that there is another version of the Embedded Person View which is
preferable to the Embedded Brain View. He suggests that we may regard the relation
between the person and the brain as one similar to that between the animal and its
physical body:

The thinking part of a human animal, we could say, is related to this animal’s cerebrum
or upper brain in a way that is roughly similar to that in which this animal is related to
its whole body. … (Parfit 2012, p. 15)

There is yet a third version of the Embedded Person View, according to which we are
essentially persons in the Lockean sense, and the person is part of the human animal.
Parfit thinks that this version is the best among the various versions of the Embedded
Part Views. Although he thinks that the first two versions of the Embedded Person
Views are less preferred, he nevertheless thinks that all these versions are feasible:

No one, we should agree, thinks that we are just heads. But we might be embodied heads.
And most of us would believe that, for us to survive, it would be enough that our head
survives, and continues to be the head of a conscious being. The body below the neck is
not an essential part of us. (Ibid., p. 17)

The three versions of the Embedded Person Views are all possible for Parfit. In my
opinion, it is because Parfit’s claim that we are thinking parts of the human animals
does not say anything about what exactly we are. More specifically, he does not
address the question of whether we are the physical parts or the mental parts of the
human animals. The vagueness in the definition of our fundamental nature may lead
to a disastrous consequence. In particular, it is hard to define which part thinks directly,
and which part thinks indirectly.
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Let me first analyze the Embedded Brain View. Many people would be tempted
to think that the animal thinks only derivatively by virtue of having a smaller part, the
brain, that non-derivatively does the thinking. The situation is analogous to the
situation for other functional parts of the human animal. Parfit adopts eating as an
example - the stomach is a part responsible for digestion, and the nose is a part that
does the sneezing. The animal sneezes by having a nose that does the sneezing, and
there is only one single sneezing action involved. The brain, in turn, is a part, that does
the thinking. That said, we are brains, and are physical parts of the human animals.
Philosophers such as Thomas Nagel (1986), and more recently, Barry Dainton (2008),
explicitly endorse the view that we are essentially brains capable of thinking.
The Embedded Brain View, prima facie, has some advantages over other views.
It resolves the famous puzzle of the Remnant Person Problem19 by admitting that you
go with the brain, not the animal. In the case of brain transplant, the conscious being
can be regarded as existing first as the thinking part of a human animal and then for a
while on its own during the operation. After that, it exists as the controlling part of a
different human animal. In addition, such a view gives a satisfactory answer to the
hard case of conjoined twins raised by Jeff McMahan (2002) in which a single human
being has two heads and two brains. It is enticing for us to believe that there are two
people. The Embedded Brain View successfully admits that there are two people in the
situation where there are two brains.
Baker defines non-derivativeness as: y instantiates F non-derivatively only if
there exists an entity x, where x ɽy and x constitutes y, and x would fail to instantiate
F if x did not constitute y. 20 For instance, the statue instantiates the property of
“representing Alexander the Great” non-derivatively because the lump of clay that

19

See Johnston (2007).
This definition is adopted from Blatti 2016. See (Baker 2000, p. 46–58; 2007, p. 38-40, p. 166–69)
for more details.
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constitutes the statue would fail to instantiate the property of “representing Alexander
the Great” if the lump of clay did not constitute the statue. Furthermore, one may want
to adopt the idea of partial constitution, according to which there is some additional
stuff C2 that constitute A together with C1. For instance, part of the lump of clay, call
it C1, together with the other parts of the lump of clay, call it C2, constitutes a statue S.
In this case, it is reasonable for one to assert that C1 partially constitutes S. In this
construal, a partial constitution relation may well be a cogent metaphysical notion for
explaining similar situations. Based on the idea of a partial constitution, there can be a
formulation according to which we are brains that thinks non-derivatively. There
would be part of the brain C1, which partly constitutes the brain together with another
part C2. If the brain thinks directly or non-derivatively, that means both parts are
essential in instantiating thinking – the idea is simply that if any of these parts does not
constitute the brain, then the brain cannot instantiate thinking. More specifically, “x”
would be referring to any part of the brain, say, a whole brain minus a brain cell C1.
Consequently, y should be the brain, and F the thinking activity instantiated by the
brain. One would thus formulate the idea of Embedded Brain View like this: brain
instantiates thinking non-derivatively if and only if the whole brain minus brain cell C1
fails to instantiate thinking if the brain does not have brain cell C1 to constitute the
brain.
Such an Embedded Brain View, in my opinion, is problematic. In particular, the
idea that we are the physical parts of human animals that think non-derivatively is
flawed. I now delineate my argument for this claim by using the above conception of
“non-derivativeness” in a partial constitution relation. In what follows, I explain the
problem step by step.
Let us first assume that I am the brain, the physical part that directly thinks.
Suppose a particular water molecule, M, partly constitutes a brain, B. As we all know,
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any brain would need some water molecules to sustain its function. Now we may ask
whether this particular water molecule, M, should be regarded as part of the nonderivative thinker. It seems not. The main reason is that even if M had been absent,
there would still have been another water molecule, N, that plays the role. Given that
M is not a part of the non-derivative thinker, under this picture, B thinks only
derivatively. Below is the argument:

Notations:
x

B is the brain,

x

M is a water molecule that partly constitutes B,

x

T is to a thought

Argument:
1.

B instantiates T derivatively if and only if “B-M” would instantiate T even if M did
not constitute B.

2.

“B-M” would instantiate T even if M does not partly constitute B.

_____________
C.

B instantiates T derivatively.

In the next step, I argue in a similar form that any cells in the brain are just like the
water molecule M. My argument is as follows. Suppose my brain is composed of brain
cells (A1 to An). Let us randomly pick one, say, A3, from the set, and call the reminding
set of brain cells B-. We observe that when one feels pain, the brain cell A3 is activated.
Now we are inclined to think that the brain cell, A3, is directly responsible for my
feeling of pain. Nevertheless, under the above definition of non-derivativeness, the
brain with cell A3 is not regarded as having pain in a non-derivative sense. The main
reason is that I can still feel pain without the brain cell A3. There could have been
another brain cell, A4, which can also produce the experience of pain. The other
possibility is that I may grow some brain cells, A5, that replaces A3, and performs the
same function.
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In the recent literature of brain science, researchers have found evidence that there
are still new brain cells being grown right before a person dies.21 Since any brain cell
fits well into this argument, the brain thinks only in a derivative sense. My argument
is as follows:

Notations:
x

B is the set of brain cells < A1 to An >.

x

B- is the set of brain cells < A1 to An > minus the brain cell A3.

x

T is a thought.

Argument:
1.

B instantiates T derivatively if and only if B- would instantiate T even if A3 did not
partly constitute B.

2.

B- would instantiate T even if A3 did not partly constitute B.

_____________
C.

Therefore, B instantiates T derivatively.

Since every brain cell fits into this argument, we come to conclude that the brain thinks
only derivatively. If any brain cell x that partly constitutes B results in the conclusion
that B thinks derivatively, then we cannot find a minimal brain such that all of its parts
are directly involved in its thinking.
I have so far argued that the brain, being composed of the brain cells, thinks only
derivatively. Strictly speaking, one simply cannot regard any physical part of an animal
that is non-derivatively thinking. A possible objection concerning this argument is to
say that one could understand “non-derivativeness” in a de dicto sense. For example,
one may say that there are certain water molecules supplying the operation of the brain,

21

In the paper “Neurogenesis in the adult human hippocampus,” researchers at the Salk Institute in
California studied the brains of five terminal cancer patients. The patients first received a chemical “tag”
that marks the newly-divided cells. After they died from cancer, their brain tissues were investigated.
New neurons were found, and these neurons should have been generated right before they died.
(Eriksson et al. 1998) In another study reported in a 2013 journal Cell, the brain still produces about
700 new neurons in the hippocampus per day. (Spalding et al. 2013)
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and they (in a de dicto sense) constitute a necessary part of the thinking activity.
Similarly, there are some brain cells that support the psychological functions, and they
form a necessary part for the mental activity. We can understand the notions “de re”
(which means concerning the thing) and “de dicto” (which means concerning the
datum/proposition) in the way that Quine introduces. Consider the two sentences:

(1) The thing Alice is thinking about is necessarily an odd number.

(2) Necessarily, the thing Alice is thinking about is an odd number.

These two sentences mean different things. The first sentence is an ascription of de re
modality, whereas the second sentence is an ascription of de dicto modality. (1) tells
us that a certain object is essentially an odd number. Since the number three is odd, (1)
is true. However, sentence (2) tells us that a certain proposition, namely, the
proposition that “the thing Alice is thinking about is an odd number” is necessarily
true. Since Alice may have thought about other things, such as the dinner yesterday,
(2) would have been false. Sentence (1) can be expressed as:

Notation:
Ox: x is an odd number
(1*) !x[(Alice is thinking about x) & (ˎOx)]

In this expression, the modal notion “ ˎ ” modifies only a narrow scope, which
modifies a thing within the scope of one’s propositional belief. Nevertheless, sentence
(2) should be expressed as:

(2*) !x{ˎx [(Alice is thinking about x)&(Ox )]}

The modal notion “ˎ” covers has a wide scope – it binds a variable that occurs freely
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within the whole sentence. Return to our own discussion of the idea that the brain
thinks non-derivatively. One could understand “non-derivativeness” in a de dicto sense.
For example, we can declare that necessarily, there are some water molecules that
supply the normal functioning of the brain. Hence, necessarily, these water molecules
(in a de dicto sense) are essential for instantiating the thinking activity, without which
we cannot think. Maybe this construal would avoid the pitfall of falsely proposing a
particular water molecule, M, without which we cannot think. Similarly, one can assert
that necessarily, there are some brain cells that support thinking. Necessarily, these
brain cells (in a de dicto sense) are essential for thinking. By saying this, one does not
make a mistake by saying that there is a particular brain cell A3, without which one
cannot think. Applying the de dicto modality, we may try this construal:

An ascription of de re modality:
(1) By saying that the brain thinks non-derivatively, I mean the set of brain cells < A1 to

An > thinks non-derivatively.
An ascription of de dicto modality:
(2) By saying that the brain thinks non-derivatively, I mean a set of brain cells, x, such
that necessarily, all cells in x are responsible for producing thoughts, and the set of
brain cells thinks non-derivatively. I do not mean it is essentially this fixed set of
brain cells < A1 to An > that thinks non-derivatively.

This project seems promising, but I found it too fast and easy. My observation is that
this modified definition of the brain, with the de dicto sense of necessity, would be
incomplete. One can do a little trick by first defining those water molecules in a de
dicto sense as those playing the functional role of producing the thoughts, then further
saying that they are necessary since they play this functional role. If necessity is
already presupposed in the de dicto definition, then the definition in (2) would not be
useful in defining derivativeness. More specifically, one cannot use this definition to
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discriminate things that think non-derivatively from those that think derivatively
because it is just to say that the set of cells that think non-derivatively are the cells that
are necessary for thinking. We make one further step by introducing another notion,
“necessary for thinking” without explaining what it means by saying that the cell is
necessary for thinking. The definition of non-derivativeness in a de dicto sense is thus
incomplete.
One might object by saying that one could also adopt Parfit’s definition of
derivativeness to devise an Embedded Part View such that the brain thinks nonderivatively only if all parts of a brain are directly involved in its thinking. 22 Since
such a definition of “non-derivativeness” does not involve counterfactual conditions,
it is a weaker definition which allows replacement of brain cells. Even if there can be
another brain cell A4 that can substitute A3 in the brain to produce thoughts, A3 can still
be regarded as directly thinking.
In replying to Parfit’s definition of “non-derivativeness,” I am with Eric Olson
(2015) that Parfit’s definition of direct involvement is still problematic. The main
reason is that one cannot clearly define which part of a human being is the directly
thinking part. Take walking as an example; it is not clear which part of the body is
directly involved in walking, and which is not. Normally, one regards her feet as
necessary for walking. Moreover, it seems that some water molecules have to be
directly involved in my walking because my feet would need some energy supply for
the movements. If we go on to think about the necessary ingredients for walking, the
list will be much longer.
On the other hand, it seems obvious that one’s toenails do not contribute to
walking although they are parts of the feet. There are also parts of my feet that hinder
my walking. For instance, I have excess water in my feet that makes me hard to walk.
22

For the ideas of derivativeness and directness, see please (Parfit 2012, p. 22-23).
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So, our list excludes some parts that we normally think as necessary. So now we come
to a question: is there a clear principle for us to determine which molecules are directly
involved in walking and which are not? The proponents of an Embedded (physical)
Part View thus owes us a clear picture of how to draw even a vague line between direct
and indirect involvements. The definition of “direct involvement” is, in this sense,
incomplete.
I have so far argued that the view that “we are thinking brains” faces difficulties.
Concepts such as “directness” and “derivativeness” are not helpful in explaining which
physical parts are essential for thinking. One cannot clearly define which physical part
of a human being is the non-derivatively thinking part. By a de re definition of
derivativeness, the brain thinks only derivatively: we cannot find a minimal brain such
that all of its parts are directly involved in its thinking. Moreover, a de dicto sense of
derivativeness is problematic in the sense that we are just making one further step by
introducing another notion, “necessary for thinking” without explaining what it means
to say that these cells are necessary for thinking.

3.3

The Embedded Mind Views

Another approach is to propose that we are essentially mental parts, but not physical
parts, of the human animals. We are minds, or subjects of experience, of the human
animals. In this section, I discuss the Embedded Mental Part Views advocated by Jeff
McMahan and Galen Strawson. The Embedded Mind Views have advantages over the
Embedded Brain Views, but they still face objections.
Jeff McMahan (2002) proposes the Embodied Mind Account, according to which
we are essentially embodied minds. This account has implications on the problem of
personal identity. It suggests that personal identity is determined by the functional
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continuity of the brain that supports consciousness with any degree of broad
psychological continuity.
McMahan argues for the Embodied Mind View by pointing out the counterintuitive consequences of Derek Parfit’s (1984) early view of personal identity. In
particular, he addresses Parfit’s Classical idea that (1) we are persons and that (2)
personal identity is determined by the unique psychological continuity over time.
McMahan rebuts the psychological continuity criterion of personal identity by
pointing out that this theory denies our existence in some situations in which we
intuitively think that we persist. In what follows, I briefly introduce Derek Parfit’s
(1984) early view regarding personal identity, in particular, his psychological
continuity criterion, and then present McMahan’s objections.
Parfit (1984) holds a radical reductionism of persons, a view according to which
“one could give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist.”
(Parfit 1984, p. 212) In this view, the problem of the exact time when a person comes
into existence is analogous to the problem of when a group of twenty philosophers
started to exist. For the latter case, Parfit maintains that different opinions are due to
different ways of how we use the term “group.” We are free to use the concept in a
different way because language is just a matter of convention. Moreover, it simply
does not matter when the group begins to exist because after-all we already know all
the relevant facts about the group of philosophers.
According to Parfit, there is psychological continuity if and only if there are more
than half of the psychological connections that hold over each day for an organism.
Psychological connection denotes the continuation of mental properties such as
psychological traits, memories, dispositions and long-term goals of a being. He
maintains that psychological continuity is a notion without vagueness. Either there is
psychological continuity, or there is not. This idea is thus defined to fit with our
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intuition that personal identity is an all-or-nothing notion. There is personal identity
only if there is non-branching psychological continuity. Otherwise, there is not.
McMahan’s criticism of Parfit’s theory is mainly of the conception of
psychological continuity. McMahan first illustrates that the conception of a person in
Parfit’s Embedded Person View refers to a being with a rich and complex mental life
with a high-order sophistication. Second, a person is an entity with a sufficiently rich
mental life such that there is strong psychological connectedness throughout her life.
Given that we are essentially persons, “person” should be a substance-sortal. If one
ceases to be a person, one also ceases to exist. Furthermore, the claim that we are
essentially persons implies that we would cease to exist when our psychological
continuity and complexity comes to an end. To say that we are essentially persons is
to say that we never existed as fetuses or infants. Many philosophers tend to think that
fetuses or infants should not be regarded as persons because they do not have selfconsciousness, long-term memories of the past, and many other psychological
complexities, but persons are beings that essentially have these psychological
complexities.
According to McMahan, the problem of Parfit’s Embedded Person View
originates from the fact that the psychological development of human beings is a
gradual process. For instance, one is typically not self-conscious in early infancy until
one reaches one year and a half. In addition, there is a period during which it is
indeterminate whether there is self-consciousness, memories, and personalities or not.
If we focus on the definition of personhood in terms of the ability of self-consciousness,
then according to the Parfit’s view, I do not exist before one and a half years old
because there is no self-consciousness. In addition, my existence is indeterminate
sometime in my life for a period during which it is indeterminate whether there is self-
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consciousness. However, intuitively, I certainly exist before two or even half a month.
There is thus a tension between our intuition and the Parfit’s personal ontology.
McMahan’s second objection is that the conception of personhood in Parfit’s
theory is problematic. McMahan argues that the idea of “person” should be a phasesortal rather than a substance-sortal. As discussed in chapter 1, the distinction between
substance-sortals and phase-sortals is that an entity necessarily falls under the former
for its whole existence, whereas an entity may not always fall under the latter.23
According to McMahan, if it is the organism that thinks and experiences, it should
be that the organism itself that gradually becomes a person through progressively
having a richer and more complex mental life. If the organism literally becomes a
person, then a person should be a phase in the lifetime of an organism. The phrase
“being a person” should be a description that applies to a certain stage or period of an
organism. However, if we are essentially persons, “person” becomes a substance-sortal.
Nevertheless, McMahan thinks that I may exist without being a person - to recall, one
is typically not self-conscious in early infancy until one reaches one year and a half. If
we admit that we exist at that moment without being persons, the concept of “person”
should be a phase-sortal instead. He writes:

“[P]erson,” as I understand the term, must be a phase-sortal. For it is clear that human
organisms begin to exist before they acquire a mental life sufficiently complex to allow
them to qualify as persons, and it is equally clear that they may lose the capacity for selfconsciousness, and therefore cease to be persons, and yet not only continue to exist but
also remain alive and conscious. (McMahan 2002, pp. 24-25)

McMahan thinks that the psychological account of egoistic concern suggests that the
person has no reason to be egoistically concerned about the post-person. McMahan

23

For the definitions and discussions of substance-sortal and phase-sortal, see chapter 1 of this thesis,
pp. 47-48, 57.
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adopts the definition of egoist concern proposed by Marya Schechtman (1996), who
says, “we all know the difference between fearing for our own pain and fearing for the
pain of someone else. The difference here consists not in degree—I may care more
about the pain of my beloved than about my own—but in kind.” (Schechtman 1996, p.
52) McMahan calls this special kind of concern about oneself in the future “an egoistic
concern.” The reason for proposing that one has no reason to be egoistically concerned
about the post-person is that there is no broad psychological continuity relation
between the person and the post-person. In contrast, McMahan believes that we have
the intuition that if you are in the early stage of the Alzheimer’s disease, you foresee
that the post-person in the later stage of the disease who is going to have excruciating
physical suffering being is you. You would fear it and would try your best to prevent
it from happening. We care about the future post-person in an egoistic way. The fear
and self-concern of the post-person stem from the belief that the person and the postperson are actually the same individual. For McMahan, the psychological account fails
to provide a ground for explaining our egoistic concern for the post-person.
According to McMahan, we should abandon the idea that “person” is a substancesortal because we can cease to be persons and yet continue to exist. He further proposes
an Embodied Mind View, according to which we are essentially minds but not persons.
Furthermore, I am not identical with a human animal, nor am I constituted by one. I
am in fact a mental part of an animal, a separable part that is capable of persisting on
its own without the support of the rest of the physical body. The rest of the body is not
my essential part. Also, he denies that we are human animals. The main reason is that
the capacity of being conscious is not an essential property of a human animal – there
can be a human animal that does not have conscious experience throughout its lifetime
– human infants born without cerebrums is one example. We are essentially minds,
and animals may not have minds.
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Furthermore, McMahan proposes the modified psychological account of personal
identity according to which minds persist with any degree of broad psychological
continuity. According to McMahan, there is broad psychological continuity if and only
if there are overlapping chains of psychological connectedness with any degree of
strength. Psychological continuity in any stronger sense is not necessary. He further
proposes that there is the same mind over time only if there is (1) psychological
connectedness and (2) broad psychological continuity. In addition, the egoistic concern
is proportional to the degree of broad psychological continuity. When there is stronger
continuity, one has reason to have a more egoistic concern. He writes:

Let us say that there is broad psychological continuity whenever there are overlapping
chains of psychological connectedness of any degree of strength. Broad psychological
continuity may be strong or weak. (McMahan 2002, p. 50)

McMahan maintains that you persist as the post-person in the late stage of the
Alzheimer’s disease and are justified for an egoistic concern with these beings. The
patient in the early stages of the disease is not psychologically continuous with the
post-person in the later stages for there would be fewer than half of the psychological
connections that hold over each day for such a patient. In this case, the proponents of
the view that we are essentially persons, such as Derek Parfit, would bite the bullet
and say that the patient in the later stages of the disease is not the same person with
that in the early stage. Even though you may be egoistically concerned with being in
the later stage of the disease, that would not be you. Under a Parfitian picture, in
particular, one could have an egoistic concern with entities that are not identical to
oneself, for identity is not what matters. On the other hand, McMahan argues that even
though the post-person is not psychologically continuous with the person, they still
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have overlapping chains of weak psychological connectedness, and this gives the
person a reason to be egoistically concerned about the post-person.
McMahan insists that we should provide a criterion of personal identity that is
closely aligned with the basis of our egoistic concern. For him, when we consider
personal identity, we also put ourselves into the scenario and think of the criterion for
re-identification of ourselves. Personal identity is a sufficient basis for justified
egoistic concern. McMahan thinks that it is common for us to have assumed that
personal identity is what matters, and this does not look like an accident. McMahan
proposes that considerations of egoistic concern constrain our idea of personal identity
since personal identity is commonly assumed to be the basis of egoistic concern. We
presuppose that when there is a ground for our egoistic concern, there is also personal
identity. For McMahan, this phenomenon sheds light on the significance of seeking a
maximum coherence between the justification of egoistic concern and personal
identity when choosing a theory of personal identity. His idea is different from that of
Parfit’s, according to which (1) there is never a deep and ontologically substantial fact
about personal identity, and that (2) disagreements about personal identity are merely
disagreements about how one can interpret the already known facts about our world.

3.4

My Objections to the Embedded Mind Views

McMahan’s theory has several advantages in the sense that (1) it provides a
satisfactory solution to most of the problems the animalists have, such as the Remnant
Person Problem and the Problem of the Corpse by claiming that our identity goes with
the mind, not the human body; and (2) it matches our intuition that we persist as the
post-person with Alzheimer’s disease. However, he does not explain why broad
psychological continuity justifies one’s egoistic concern. In what follows, I point out
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a drawback of McMahan’s theory and further propose that even broad psychological
continuity is not what grounds our egoistic concern.
The first challenge concerns the minimal degree of psychological continuity.
Suppose there is a post-person in the final stage of the disease who is merely a
conscious subject capable of being conscious and experiencing pain. Call this postperson the minimal subject. The minimal subject does not have any psychological
connectedness in any sense with the person in the earlier stage. According to
McMahan’s view, this post-person, being a minimal conscious subject, should not be
regarded as the same individual as the person who existed in the earlier stage of the
disease. However, most people would believe that the person in the early stage still has
some reason to be egoistically concerned about this minimal subject. McMahan’s reply
is that (1) we are not the minimal subject merely capable of being conscious and
experiencing pain and (2) the intuition that we have reason to egoistically concern with
this minimal subject is illusory. More specifically, the intuition is illusory because it
stems from our incorrect common beliefs that (1) we are the human animals and that
(2) there is still the same individual so long as the human animal is alive. He writes:

But it is possible that the cessation of psychological connectedness from day to day may
leave, for a short while, a conscious entity—a subject capable, for example, of
experiencing pain. Even on the revised Psychological Account, this conscious subject
would not be the same individual as the person who existed in the early stages of the
disease. …This residual commitment to the existence of a post-person seems a minor
embarrassment for the revised version of the Psychological Account. (McMahan 2002,
p. 54 - 55)
It…may instead be an inference drawn, perhaps unconsciously, from the
conjunction of the view that we are living organisms and the belief that identity is what
matters. (Ibid., p. 55)

100

McMahan’s main arguments are mostly based upon common intuitions. If his theory
is proposed to match our intuition, why not propose an even looser constraint, such
that we are justified to have an egoistic concern with the minimal subject, the postperson with the minimal experience? His theory would then be even more intuitive,
for it would then match our intuition that we survive as the post-person with minimal
experience.
The second challenge concerns the relation between the sameness of mind,
physical continuity, and psychological continuity. Let us look at McMahan’s very
definition of “mind”:

[A] particular field of consciousness at one time is the same consciousness as a certain
field of consciousness at another time if and only if all the various conscious states are
states of one and the same person. (McMahan 2002, p. 67)

McMahan thinks that there is the same consciousness if and only if the conscious
mental states belong to the same individual. There is more on the persistence of mind
by McMahan:

A mind, it seems, is individuated by reference to its physical embodiment, just as an
individual mental state is. (Ibid.)
What I think can be asserted with some confidence is that, if a single mind has
hitherto been realized in certain regions of a single brain, the undivided survival and
continued, self-sufficient, functional integrity of those specific regions is both a
necessary and sufficient condition of the continued existence of the same mind. (Ibid.
My Italics)

His stance becomes clearer as he writes that the individuation and persistence of mind
are determined by its physical embodiment. McMahan is concerned with the
possibility that a brain supports two different minds at the same time. Based on this,
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he thinks that physical embodiment is only a necessary condition of the persistence of
mind. However, if there is a one to one correlation between the brain and the mind,
then enough of the same single brain to support and retain the capacities for conscious
mental states would be necessary and sufficient for the persistence of mind.
My question for him is as follows. Suppose there is enough of the same brain is
already there that supports the sameness of mind, why do we still need the broad
psychological continuity criterion to determine our persistence? What is the use of
adding the broad psychological continuity to his theory? The claim that broad
psychological continuity determines the sameness of mind would then be redundant.
McMahan proposes that broad psychological continuity is determined by overlapping
chains of psychological connectedness of any degree of strength from day to day. He
also proposes that broad psychological continuity is supported by a sufficient amount
of the same brain:

Usually the functional continuity of these areas of the brain involves broad psychological
continuity, but in the very earliest phases of an individual’s life and in some instances
near the end, the same mind or consciousness persists in the absence of any degree of
psychological connectedness from day to day. (McMahan 2002, p. 67 - 68)

McMahan wants to put forward the idea that broad psychological continuity is the
necessary and sufficient condition of our persistence. He has been explicit in claiming
that (1) our persistence is determined by sufficient amount of the same brain that
sustains the capability of consciousness, and (2) there is broad psychological
continuity only if there is sufficient amount of the same brain. However, there may not
be broad psychological continuity even if there is the sufficient amount of the same
brain. The sufficient amount of the same brain is just the necessary condition for broad
psychological continuity, but not sufficient for it. To conclude, McMahan fails to
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provide a ground for the claim that broad psychological continuity is necessary for the
persistence of the individual.
The problem of McMahan’s argument is revealed by the fact that the definition
of broad psychological continuity presupposes that there is sufficient amount of the
same brain over time, and that already supports the persistence of mind. McMahan’s
argument thus has no explanatory power over why the persistence of the individual is
determined by the broad psychological continuity.
I suggest that McMahan revise his theory. For instance, he could assert a weaker
claim that broad psychological continuity is not necessary for our persistence and that
it is our egoistic concern that has a positive correlation with broad psychological
continuity. This claim succeeds in underlying our intuitions that (1) we persist as postpersons with minimal conscious experience and (2) our egoistic concern is grounded
in broad psychological continuity. In this picture, we are essentially minimal conscious
beings, subjects of experience capable of experiencing pain and joy. However, this
theory would be a view saying that egoistic concern is not necessarily aligned with our
persistence.
Another option for McMahan is to totally eliminate the conception of broad
psychological continuity and to claim that our persistence and our egoistic concern is
determined and justified by the sameness of mind, which is supported by the sufficient
amount of the same brain. In this view, you persist so long as your (minimal conscious)
mind persists. By my lights, the second alternative is preferable to the first one. The
latter view is advantageous in the sense that it explains why we naturally have egoist
concerns with the post-person who only has minimal conscious experience.
I believe that it is not a problem for a philosopher to explicitly acknowledge the
fact that sometimes we just cannot provide any explanation of an intuition. One may
further question by virtue of what the sufficient amount of brain guarantees the
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sameness of the conscious being. Maybe we would have to admit that the first premise
remains unexplained. However, it is not disastrous at all to bite the bullet and declare
that this is our limit – sometimes this is just what we can do and ought to do as a
philosopher. To disclose a primitive intuition openly is better than to disguise it as a
fact that can be further explained by yet another fact, whereas it turns out it is not.
Michael Lockwood (1985, 1988) proposes a similar stance to what I have just
proposed. He thinks that we are not essentially entities constituted by any kind of
psychological continuity but are entities the existence of which grounds psychological
continuity and explains the presence of that continuity. More specifically, we are
essentially entities of which these higher-level continuities manifests. He says,

“[W]hat underlies the discernible continuities of memory and personality is a continuity
of physical organization within some part or parts of a living human brain persisting
through time.” (Lockwood 1985, pp. 22–23.)

Lockwood’s idea is that we should not focus on psychological continuity but should
investigate what sustains them. He thinks that there may always be a certain structural,
physical continuity when there is the same individual over time, but these physical or
structural continuities may not be what we are really concerned with as the ground for
egoistic concern. In my opinion, McMahan may instead propose that the structural,
physical continuity and nothing else supports that sameness of conscious being over
time. Although structural, physical continuity is not what we are concerned with; we
are justified to be egoistically concerned with a future individual that is structurally
physically continuous with me since the continuity of physical structure grounds the
same consciousness over time.
McMahan is aware of the fact that his theory of broad psychological continuity
cannot justify our intuition that we can persist as post-persons with minimal experience.
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In my opinion, the problem with his theory is that he proposes that any degree of broad
psychological continuity is necessary for the sameness of individuals without a
justification. I have shown that broad psychological continuity is redundant in
determining our persistence, and it renders his theory counter-intuitive. If he states
instead that the sameness of a conscious mind is determined by a sufficient amount of
the same brain that supports the capacity of conscious experience, then his theory
would be reasonable and feasible. It matches the intuition that (1) we persist as postpersons with minimal experience, and (2) we are justified to have egoistic concerns
with such a post-person. In summary, what I suggest is to loosen the appeal to any
requirement for psychological continuity, including McMahan’s broad psychological
continuity.
Furthermore, any part-whole relation between ourselves and the human animal
would be committed to the claim that there are two thinkers, the mental part of the
human animal and the whole human animal. As a result, one who claims that we are
parts of the human animal would have to say that there is more than one thinker. Apart
from being ontologically extravagant, the theory may need to answer the question of
how one knows which entity one is, given that they have the same thoughts at the same
time.
McMahan uses a tree as an analogy to illustrate that it is benign to say that there
are two thinkers, and I have talked about this in chapter 1. In the analogy, the tree has
two branches, and one of them grows while the other does not. Overall, the tree grows
in virtue of the growth of one of its branches. As a result, there are two growing things
– the branch and the whole tree. The tree grows in virtue of having a branch that grows.
Similarly, the whole human animal thinks in virtue of having a mental part that thinks.
For McMahan, although this requires an expensive ontology, it is necessary, and it
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does not involve inconsistency. McMahan thus concludes that an Embedded Part View
is benign.
In my opinion, the Embedded Part View does not provide a satisfactory solution
to the problem of how we know whether we are human animals or minds. Given that
there are two thinkers, namely, the mind and the whole human animal, why are we
sure that we are the mind but not the whole human animal? I believe that the
mereological theorist such as McMahan would answer this question in this way via
some modal notions. The persistence conditions of the mind are different from that of
the human animal. Since it is possible that we persist as minds but not as animals, we
should be the mind but not the animal that thinks. This reply presupposes that the
persistence of human animal is determined by the continuity of the physical
organization. I am happy with this modal solution to the problem of the many Thinkers.
I think this is a successful reply to the question of whether I am the mind or the animal
which thinks. However, this reply does not address the problem of the Many Thinkers
at all. The Embedded Mind Theorists still have to admit that there are two thinkers.
As discussed, I believe that we can have a simpler solution to the Problem of
Many Thinkers. I believe that Cartesian Substance Dualism provides a neat and tidy
solution to the Problem of Many Thinkers. In my view, the subject of experience is
not part of the human animal. The subject is a mental entity, and the human animal is
a physical entity – they are distinct entities. As a result, there are not two thinkers –
there is only one. The subject of experience that possesses (in a causal way) a human
body thinks. Cartesian Substance Dualism also avoids the problem of “derivativeness”
and “directness” I raised in the preceding section. According to my view, there are not
two entities that think – there is only one. The subject of experience thinks. It is not
the case that the subject non-derivatively thinks and the human animal derivatively
thinks. The human animal just does not think.
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3.5

Strawson’s Conscious Subject View

In what follows, I introduce Galen Strawson’s (1999, 2011) theory of subjects of
experience. He proposes that we are essentially subjects of experience, which he calls
SESMETs. He also believes that SESMETS are parts of the human animals. In this
picture, we can regard Strawson’s view as an Embedded Part View. I briefly delineate
Strawson’s ontology of subject of experience and raise several objections to his view.
For Strawson, a subject of experience is a mental thing that exists whenever there
is experience. He proposes that subjects of experience exist. He calls a subject of
experience a SESMET, an abbreviation of “a subject of experience that is a single
mental thing.” (Strawson 2011, p. 4) For him, a subject of experience is an owner of
conscious experience, which is a mental thing, a single unified object at any given time.
It is a thing (object or entity) because it is something that can undergo mental processes
and be in some mental states. Moreover, it is concrete; for Strawson, an object is
concrete if and only if it is something in time and is a unified thing. He also calls them
“thin subjects of experience.” He proposes that the subject of experience can be very
thin; it does not necessarily have a certain personality or agency, possess psychological
traits, or memories.24 The main reason for his claim that a subject does not necessarily
have the above qualities is that one can have a minimal form of experiences, such as
an experience of redness or experience of pain, without having the above abilities and
complexities. He writes:

[T]he minimal form of self-experience has four fundamental structural elements:
SUBJECT, THING, MENTAL, SINGLE (synchronically). At the very least, SELF24

For Strawson, a subject x has agency only if it has the capacity to carry out bodily actions. Also, one
has the sense, or the experience, of being an agent if one has the sense, or subjective feeling, of having
intentional actions.
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experience figures the self as a subject of experience; as a thing in a sense that has been
explained; as something that’s mentally propertied, that has mental being; and as
something that’s single — a unity — at least during the lived present of experience.
(Strawson 2011, p.204)
[N]one of the other three remaining proposed elements of ordinary human SELFexperienceȹAGENT, PERSISTING, and PERSONALITY - survive either. (Ibid., p.182)

Strawson asserts that there are various grades and types of physical unity. He proposes
three types of unity and suggests that a concrete object essentially has at least one type
of unity. He maintains that some candidates for objecthood are stronger than others,
where the subject of experience is the best candidate for objecthood. He does not say
what unity is. There are questions such as whether it is something that unites things,
or whether it is a feature p such that the Xs having p grounds (or metaphysically
explains) the Xs composing an object. Strawson expresses that “a concrete object is a
certain kind of physical unity” (Strawson 2011, p. 297) and “to be an object is simply
to be a ‘strong unity’” (Strawson 2011, p. 298). It seems that unity, for Strawson, is
regarded as identical to the entity that is unified. According to him, the first type of
unity is genuine metaphysical unity, which is the strongest among the three. It is the
logical unity for metaphysically simple entities. There is also the concretely actualized
unity. A concrete object possesses concretely actualized unity if and only if it is united
by physical (which includes chemical and biological) force(s) of bonding. One easy
example is an organism such as a bird. This type of unity, however, does not require
the entity to be composed of the same stuff or substance over time. The third is
functional unity, the force of which is the weakest among the three. The object is so
called because of the unity of its functions, and there may not be any significant
physical force of bonding between various parts of a functionally unified object. A
computer, for example, is regarded as a physical entity, but its parts, such as the mouse,
the keyboard, and the screen, are spread over different locations.
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According to Strawson, the synchronic identity conditions of subjects can be
settled in an entirely general manner. The synchronic identity of a subject is inferable
from the metaphysical unity it possesses at any moment. He argues that subjects of
experience, considered synchronically in the living moment of experience, are strong
unities that possess the first type of metaphysical unity. He does not say explicitly that
entities with metaphysical unity are also mereologically simple entities, but it is highly
plausible that he would endorse the idea that subjects are indivisible. For him, the unity
of thought presupposes the metaphysical unity of a subject. Subjects are therefore
exemplary candidates for being concrete entities. A subject is not the same thing as a
human being considered as a whole but has a part-whole relation with the whole human
being. Things such as chairs and tables are distinctly inferior candidates when taken
metaphysically seriously. In the paper “Fundamental Singleness,” he states the idea
eloquently:

Selves themselves are unities, in a certain strong sense, and indeed that they qualify for
the title ‘object’ in fundamental metaphysics – if any things do. (Strawson 2010, p.2)

Strawson defends a process metaphysics which entail a novel conception of object /
entity.25 He proposes that there is a real distinction between two things if and only if
one of them can concretely exist without the other. 26 Consider the properties
“triangularity” and “trilaterality” in a closed-plane rectilinear figure. There is a
conceptual distinction between them since they can be held apart in thought. However,
there is no real distinction between them because they cannot exist apart in concrete
reality. For instance, if there is a concrete triangle that exists from t1 to t2, both its

25

In his book “selves,” he does not explicitly state the distinction between substance, object, and thing.
It seems that he thinks substance has a stronger unity than objects.
26
Since the term “concrete” here means “existing in spacetime,” Strawson’s definition of real
distinction excludes abstract objects such as numbers.
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triangularity and its trilaterality are always co-instantiated. The identity relation
between them, if established, would be necessarily such that the two cannot be
separated in all possible worlds. By the same token, a concrete object cannot have any
real distinction from its properties because no concrete object can exist without having
all its properties. We can distinguish a concrete particular from its properties and can
make conceptual distinctions between the two, but there is no ontological
subordination of the object’s properties to the object itself. Our ordinary languages
assume the categorical differences between objects and properties. For Strawson, the
object-property discrimination is an enshrined linguistic habit. As philosophy aims to
say how things are in reality, it is possible that it conflicts with ordinary thought and
language.
In so doing, Strawson further proposes the Experience/Subject/Content Identity
Thesis (The [e=s=c] Thesis), the claim that the subject of experience (S), its experience
(E), and the content of experience (C) are conceptually distinct but metaphysically
identical.27 There is merely a conceptual distinction but not a real distinction between
the subject, its experience, and the content of the experience. For Strawson, experience
or thinking is an attribute, a fundamental or general property, while an experience such
as “seeing Paris” or “hoping it will rain” is a mode, a specific way of experience or
thinking. The fact that an attribute cannot possibly be instantiated without being
instantiated in a certain mode means that there is no more a real distinction between
the existences of an object considered at a given time and the existence of the particular
modes that its attributes exemplify at that time. If there is merely a conceptual
distinction but not a real distinction between the subject and its experience, there is no
need to propose a Cartesian soul-like entity as a non-reducible substance over and
above the experience.
27

For Strawson, content of experience is the information given in an experience.
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The [e=s=c] Thesis implies that an experience with a particular content couldn’t
have had a different subject. I cannot logically have your experience, nor can you have
mine. Suppose you and I are having qualitatively identical experiences because we are
both somehow related to the same type of brain activity. Even so, there are numerically
speaking two distinct occurrences of the same type of experiential content, whereas
one occurrence can exist without the other. But Strawson regards e, s, and c, as
particulars that are counterfactually invariable relative to each other:

I suspect that [e = s = c] is a deep truth. I think that the point that s and c stand in an
intensely intimate relation given which they can’t possibly exist apart—so that there is
(in my augmented Cartesian terms) at most a conceptual distinction and no real
distinction between them—is solid. As for the claim that if two concrete particulars aren’t
really distinct, and can’t possibly exist apart, then they must be numerically
identical…(Strawson 2011, p. 412)

In the current literature, a process is usually defined as a temporal period of event(s)
involving intrinsic or extrinsic changes. Typical examples of a process are a game of
chess and a football match. An object, in contrast, is usually defined as a bearer of
properties that possesses diachronic identity through changes. Paradigmatic examples
are a chess piece and a football. Objects and processes are basic metaphysical entities
that are not reducible to each other. Nevertheless, Strawson also holds that an object is
identical with the processes it undergoes. He proposes that the object/process/property
conceptual cluster is structured by the strongly demarcatory, ontologically separatist
habits of thought. They are highly natural, effective, and inevitable in everyday life but
are deeply misleading when taken to have implications for metaphysical truths.
Strawson provides two arguments for a process metaphysics. First, contemporary
physicists are increasingly content with the view that the ultimate stuff consists only
of the existence of fields of energy without individuation. If there is no ultimate simple,
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then it is appropriate for us to regard the world as a huge process of change with the
flow of energy. If this view is correct, our pre-theoretical conceptions of space, time
and matter would be largely wrong. Our ordinary conceptual scheme may not be
isomorphic to that of metaphysics. Second, a concrete object is necessarily a
spatiotemporal thing. We usually think of matter as spatially extended. Nevertheless,
we are told that space and time are ontologically interdependent. If an object is
extended in space, then necessarily, it is also extended in time, even for a very short
period. Also, if an object is essentially extended in time, then it is “essentially
changeful in time.” (Strawson 2011, p. 301)28 He says,

[M]atter is essentially dynamic, essentially in time, and essentially changeful in time.
(Ibid.)

For Strawson, the term “I” is used with the intention to refer to either a human being
considered as a whole or the subject of experience. We sometimes naturally use “I” to
refer to the subject of experience in the ordinary use of language despite the fact that
we also use “I” to refer to the human being. For instance, when I claim that “I am six
feet tall,” the “I” here probably refers to the whole human being. In contrast, when I
am thinking about my possibility of surviving death, the phrase “my possibility” as
used here refers to the possibility of the subject of experience, SESMET.

3.6

28

My Objections to Strawson’s View

Strawson does not provide an argument for the claim that an object with temporal extension is
necessarily an object that changes through time. It may be that what he means is that an object with
temporal extension is one “changeable” in time. Furthermore, there are different views about the
ontology of change, which is related to the discussion of the nature of time. For instance, there are the
Leibnizian Dynamic view and the Newtonian Block View of time which have different understandings
of what change is. Strawson’s understanding of objects presupposes that changes exist, but does not
have an implication of the nature of change.
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I generally take Strawson’s line of thought. I propose that we are essentially subjects
of experience. I also adopt his definition that subjects of experience are essentially
conscious. In Strawson’s Subject Thesis, the existence of a subject of experience
presupposes the existence of experience because a subject is a “subject of experience.”
Furthermore, experience is taken to be conscious experience - he does not regard
unconscious mental states as experience. His claim is dubbed “the essentiallyconscious-self thesis (ECS),” which admits that strictly speaking, I do not exist when
I fall into an unconscious sleep. Proponents of this view explain common expressions
such as “I am in the room during my unconscious sleep” with the idea that the “I” in
some contexts refer not to the subject, but to the human being as a whole. The two uses
of “I” explains why we get confused about our own nature - we sometimes talk about
the self as a physical organism, whereas sometimes we refer to ourselves as the subject
of experience.
The idea that we are essentially subjects of experience is what I think closest to
the truth. First, it meets with our intuition that we persist as the post-person with only
minimal experience in late stages of the Alzheimer’s disease.29 Second, it explains
why we have the intuition that so long as there is continuity of our brain, we persist.
This intuition can be explained by our belief that the continuity of our brain supports
the sameness of subject of experience.30 Third, this view does not have the Problem
of the Remnant Person and the Problem of the Corpse. As I have discussed these in
previous chapters and will argue for my own Conscious Subject View in the next
chapter, I am not going to elaborate them here.
Nevertheless, I wish to point out that there are several dubious claims within
Strawson’s theory of minimal selves. In what follows, I raise several objections to

29

See my discussion of McMahan’s Embodied Mind View in chapter 3 for the definition of postpersons.
30
I will give an argument for this claim in chapter 4.
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Galen Strawson’s [e=s=c] Thesis. I argue that there are distinctions between a subject
and its process.

3.6.1

The Problem of Modality

Strawson thinks that an object, in general, is identical with the process it undergoes.
The [e=s=c] thesis is the view that the subject s is identical to the experience e and also
its experiential content c. My objection to the [e=s=c] thesis is twofold. I first offer a
counterexample to the assertion that if two things necessarily coexist in every possible
world, then they are identical. Second, I reveal several disadvantages of a process
metaphysics. My argument is mainly based on the idea that when one identifies a
subject with a process, some information on the subject is neglected. More specifically,
we may lose the information on modal properties such as essential properties.
To begin, Strawson’s claim is ambiguous - there are two methods of interpreting
the claim that two things necessarily co-exist. The first method is to read the [e=s=c]
thesis with the idea that the subject s at time t is numerically identical with its
experience e at time t, and it is also identical to the content c of the experience c at
time t. More specifically, the subject s at t1 is numerically identical with a particular
experience e it has at t1 and a particular content c of that particular experience at t1.
This idea can be expressed as follows:

Let a be the set of x’s properties
(Fixedsubject): If [necessarily (x exists if and only if a exists)], then x = a

If this understanding is correct, then after a second, say at t2, the subject certainly has
another experience ec with content different cc where eɽec and cɽcc, it automatically
follows that the subject sc at t2 is not the same subject s at t1.
Strawson can, of course, bite the bullet and admit that subjects are indeed as
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transient as a second. Indeed, he proposes that selves are transient. However, there is
still a problem with his claim. In general, every physical object in the actual world is
undergoing some changes. If every slightest change entails that the entity ceases to
exist, and another new entity comes into existence, this metaphysical view will result
in an overflow of entities. Every second we have infinitely many new physical objects,
and all of them are transient in the sense that the slightest change would destroy them.
For instance, the table at t2 is not the same one as that at t1 because one atom leaves
the table between t1 and t2. Metaphysically speaking, there is no such thing as a
persisting concrete object.
The second method of interpreting the claim that two things necessarily co-exist
is to admit that for any subject to exist at any time, there must be some experience at
that time, and the experience should have at least some content. It does not matter
whether the subject of experience s possesses this particular experience e with a
particular content c. Any experience with any content is sufficient for having the
subject of experience s. Since a subject necessarily coexists with some experience,
there is only a conceptual distinction between the subject s and the experience,
whatever it is, the subject has at any time. This idea can be expressed as follows:

(Variablesubject): If [necessarily (subject x exists if and only if the set of x’s properties
exists)], then x = x’s properties

The existence of the subject does not necessarily depend on that particular experience
e at time t1, but just that the subject necessarily has some experience, whatever it is, at
any time. The situation is analogous to that of a river. The river necessarily has some
water molecules that flow, but the existence of the river does not necessarily depend
on one particular aggregate of water molecules.
However, such a characterization of the [e=s=c] thesis is not without problems.
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There are cases in which two things cannot exist without the existence of the other, yet
they are distinct things. An obvious example is the action and reaction force. There
cannot be an action force if there isn’t a corresponding reaction force and vice versa.
However, there are indeed real distinctions between the two forces. These two forces
act on different bodies and are in opposite directions. Indeed, a reaction force R can be
triggered by different action forces. For instance, either my pushing the object with
force A or Peter pushing the object with force Ac both result in the reaction force R
with a particular magnitude from the object. The existence of a reaction force R may
not necessarily coexist with a particular action force A because Ac can do the same
thing too. But still, such a modal definition of necessary coexistence does not result in
the identity of the two forces. The action force and the reaction force act on different
bodies and they have vectors in opposite directions.
Some may challenge my worry by saying that the coexistence of the two forces
is merely nomologically necessary but not metaphysically necessary. The action and
reaction forces are, therefore, not appropriate to serve as a counterexample. In reply to
this, the natural idea is that if the conceptions of the two forces are defined in a way
that the action-reaction pair necessarily coexists, then the nomological necessity in this
physical law may also contribute to metaphysical necessity. More specifically, one can
define action and reaction forces with de dicto necessity as follows: necessarily, x is a
reaction force exerted by an object A if and only if there exists another force in the
opposite direction with equal magnitude with x, and it acts on A. Similarly, necessarily,
x is an action force exerted by an object A if and only if there exists a force in the
opposite direction with equal magnitude with x, and it acts on A:

(VariableReaction Force): [necessarily (reaction force x exists if and only if x’s action force
exists)]
(VariableAction Force): [necessarily (action force x exists if and only if x’s reaction force
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exists)]

Following this definition, there is hence no possible world in which there is an action
force without a reaction force, and vice versa.
Strawson (2011, 2013, 2017) characterizes identity in a broad sense. He accepts
and extends Descartes’s descriptions about “conceptual distinction” and “real
distinction,” and further articulates that A and B can be regarded as identical if there is
no real distinction between them. He writes:

Any actually existing case of triangularity is, I propose, literally identical to the case of
trilaterality that it can’t exist without. …The (concrete) being of the one is—is identical
to—the (concrete) being of the other. (Strawson 2011, 306)

The conception of identity in a broad sense not only entails many more identity
relations between geometrical entities; it poses a threat to physical entities and
properties in fundamental science. Another example is a cause and its effect. Although
there are various controversial theories of causation, most of them require a mutual
dependency of the cause and the effect. A cause and its effect mutually depend on the
other’s existence. We can define cause and effect as follows:

(VariableCause): [necessarily (cause x exists if and only if x’s effect exists)]
(VariableEffect): [necessarily (effect x exists if and only if x’s cause exists)]

Philosophers of causation undoubtedly acknowledge a real distinction between a cause
and its effect. The distinction suggests that the mutual dependency of existence of two
things is insufficient for showing that the two have no real distinctions or that they are
the same.
Let us return to the case of subjects and their experience proposed by Strawson.
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As mentioned, he takes it that experience is a concrete particular, an experience of
somebody. But even if experience is a particular, the subject is not merely those
experiences - we can still use the counterfactual conditions to discriminate between a
subject and its experience. An object and its process have different counterfactual
conditions. Suppose that you have a certain experience E from t1 to t2. Things could
have been different; there could have been a different experience Ec. In this case, that
would still be you, just that you would not experience E but Ec. These cases are clearly
possible. If your subject of experience could have a totally different experience, the
identity relation between the subject of experience and the experience breaks down.
There is a real difference between the subject S and its experience E because S survives
without the existence of E. As none of the entities could have existed without the
existence of itself, it is clear that the subject S is not numerically identical with its
experience E. Strawson has also thought about it, and he addresses this problem by
saying:

[1] there is no real distinction between an object considered at any given particular time
t and its propertiedness at t. (Ibid., p. 308)
We can perfectly well say that [18] O might not have had the properties it does now
have… (Ibid., p. 314)
It’s possible to read [1] in such a way that it’s challenged by [18]; but if one does,
one simply misses—chooses to ignore—the fundamental metaphysical truth expressed
by [1]. Some philosophers like to distinguish ‘compositional’ or ‘constitutive’ identity,
on the one hand, from plain identity on the other. This is a well-equipped philosophical
playground. But the truth and problem-dissolving power of [1] remain untouched. (Ibid.)

We can see that Strawson thinks that the difference in counterfactual situations
between an object and its properties does not render them distinct. The trivial claim [1]
is not affected by the truth of claim [18]. My strategy is to first argue against claim [1]
separately by providing a counterexample for the situation, namely, the action and
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reaction force. I then conclude that claim [18] is true, and there is a modal difference
between an object and its properties. Since the modal properties of an object and its
properties are different, we should also accept that the two are distinct things.

3.6.2

The Problem of Process Metaphysics

I now go on to discuss the disadvantages of process metaphysics. There are several
reasons raised by contemporary philosophers for discriminating a process from an
object. I believe that Strawson’s claim that an object is numerically identical with the
whole experiential process it undergoes is an undesirable option.
According to the process philosophers, processes are the only basic ontological
categories. In general, process ontology claims that there are no concrete static entities
and that all things that exist are dynamic. As mentioned, it is widely agreed among
philosophers in the Western tradition that a process is a temporal period of event(s)
involving intrinsic or extrinsic changes, whereas an object is a bearer of properties that
possesses diachronic identity through changes. There are two streams of process
ontologies, one continental, and one analytic. The main difference between the two
streams is that the latter emphasizes how process ontology could contribute to science
and technology, whereas the former places less emphasis on it.
There are discoveries in various streams of science that indicate a need for process
ontology. In the philosophy of biology, process ontology is highly praised because of
its usefulness in individuating biological entities. Ecological interdependence that
occurs within cell biology and multicellular organism involve different classes of
entities, and these phenomena do not fit well into any substance ontology. There is a
complex network of interactions occurring within and between organisms, such that it
is hard for us to regard them as independent and discrete individual substances.
Because of these, philosophers of biology tend to believe that the identity through time
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of any entity X is sufficiently determined by the continuous connection of the physical
or mental states of X over time. The Genidentity View is proposed and discussed
among philosophers of science, such as David L. Hull (1992), Boniolo & Carrara
(2004), Pradeu & Carosella (2006), and Guay & Pradeu (2016, 2016b). According to
the Genidentity Theory, the persistence of a biological entity is determined by
continuous states of affairs. In “A Matter of Individuality,” Hull (1978) expresses the
view that the continuity of internal organization is what determines the persistence of
biological entities. He denies that there are essential properties of human beings.
Instead, he proposes that there is no characteristic that could determine an entity to be
a human being. The reason for proposing such a view, for Hull, is that there are many
plants, fungi, and microbes that we find difficult to individuate via common sense.
These organisms usually undergo significant changes such that no original substance
remains after the dramatic changes occur. Moreover, there is no resemblance regarding
shape, volume, or functions after such changes. In these cases, it seems that the only
criterion for the persistence of these biological entities is the continuity throughout
these changes. Only when the internal organization of the entity is heavily disrupted
would it be a case in which a new entity emerges.
Thomas Pradeu (2016) comments on Hull’s (1992) idea by saying that it is hard
to understand what an internal organization means. There is not a clear definition of
internal organization throughout Hull’s delineation. Pradeu further provides a criterion
of individuation for difficult cases via immunological interactions. According to this
view, an organism is a functionally unified entity constituted by heterogeneous but yet
interconnected biochemical interactions and controlled by immune activities. One
does not need to start with the individuation of an organism. Instead, one may study
the biochemical and immunological interactions to investigate further how one should
individuate an organism. In other words, an organism is in principle reducible to its
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interactions and processes.

3.6.3

Objections to Process Ontology

Many philosophers believe that processes and entities are fundamentally different
kinds of things and one cannot be reducible to the other. One Classical philosopher
who objects to process ontology is Leibniz. He proposes substantialism, according to
which there should be the individuation of an entity at a certain time. He also thinks
that continuity is not sufficient for determining the persistence of objects over time:

By itself continuity no more constitutes substance than does multitude or number . . .
Something is necessary to be numbered, repeated and continued (Leibniz 1916 [1765],
p. 169).

One standard objection to process ontology in the contemporary literature is by Peter
F. Strawson (1959). He proposes descriptive metaphysics, according to which our
language and our conceptual scheme determine our metaphysics. His argument against
process metaphysics can be briefly delineated as follows. First, we have perceptions
of physical, objective particulars that are not identical to other co-existing entities, and
that they are re-identifiable over time. Second, we need concepts of objective
particulars re-identifiable and distinguishable from other things for communication.
Third, we also need a framework for these entities to have their uniqueness,
individuation, and conditions for the possibility of their persistence. Finally,
spatiotemporal location is a framework that allows objective particulars to have their
uniqueness, individuation, and persistence. If it is the case, then objective particulars
should be three-dimensional entities with particular locations at any time, and they
should persist through time with spatiotemporal continuity as a necessary condition.
Given our conceptual scheme, those three-dimensional objective particulars should be
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the basic things that exist. He writes:

“That is to say they must be three-dimensional objects with some endurance through
time … They must collectively have enough diversity, richness, stability, and endurance
to make possible just that conception of a single unitary [space-time] framework which
we possess” (Strawson 1959, p. 39).

3.6.4

On Galen Strawson’s Process Ontology

There is an obvious drawback for proposing that the subject of experience is a process.
As mentioned by philosophers of biology such as Hull and Pradeu, only objects (as
substances) would have modal properties such as essential properties of existence. A
process carries information such as the time in which the process occurs, the total time
the process lasts, and the smaller events involved in the process, but there are no
essential properties for a process. Process ontology allows that a biological entity, such
as a caterpillar, undergoes dramatic changes throughout its lifetime to become a
butterfly, during which there is a total change of its constituting substance, structure,
size, and appearance.
Philosophers of biology claim that processes are categorically basic entities that
do not have essential properties. If one adopts their conception of process, it would
render Strawson’s theory inconsistent. To recall, as mentioned by Strawson, there are
several essential properties of the subject without which the subject would not exist.
Strawson proposes several essential properties of the subject of experience. For
instance, the essential properties of a SESMET is the property of “being conscious”
and “being a unified mental thing.” However, if we adopt the view of process
metaphysics proposed by the philosophers of biology and regard this unified mental
thing as a process, some information would be lost. For instance, we cannot describe
the process as essentially synchronically unified, as it is generally considered to be.
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Second, as argued by philosophers of biology, modal properties such as essential
properties no longer apply when an object is regarded as a process; we lose some
important information that characterizes the object.
There is still another problem regarding process ontology when considering
Strawson’s theory of subjects of experience. Strawson’s conception of subject of
experience should conceptually allow that one single object has two or more
discontinuous phases of experience throughout its existence. It is possible that we go
out of existence when we sleep, then come back into existence. However, this isn’t
how processes work. Contemporary views of process metaphysics, such as those
proposed by philosophers of biology, assert that continuity of interactions between a
system and its environment is necessary for the persistence of a process. This, I believe,
is one significant drawback for a Strawsonian process theory of subjects.
Let us follow Strawson’s definition and assume that all the asterisked pronouns
refer to the subject of experience, SESMET, of that being. (Strawson 2011, p.76) For
instance, the term “I*” refers to my subject of experience but not the human being as
a whole, whereas the term “you*” refers to your subject of experience but not your
human being. Now you ask yourself a question, ‘will I* experience tomorrow, after a
deep unconscious sleep?’ I call this question Q1. There are three possible answers to
Q1. If the subject now having an experience is the same as the subject having the
experience tomorrow, then the answer is positive. If there is another subject of
experience tomorrow, then the answer is negative. Another alternative is to say that
this question makes no sense. There is no answer to a pseudo-question, either because
there is a grammatical mistake or a conceptual mistake in the question. For instance,
it may be that the question asks nonsense because it asks for the persistence of a nonexistent or intentional object. It is like asking whether the dagger you dreamt yesterday
is the same as the one you dreamt last month. It is a misuse of language because there
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is no such concrete thing as the dagger you dreamt.
Does Strawson think that the subject of experience is an intentional object? His
answer is clearly no. For him, the subject of experience necessarily coexists with
certain experience even if the subject is not explicitly self-aware of its own existence.
We do not create the subject out of our imagination or intention. To recall, his “subject
thesis” is the view that there exists a subject of experience if and only if there is an
experience. The idea of existence here is not deflationary at all because subjects of
experience should be regarded as the best candidate for objecthood. The subject of
experience certainly exists, and it is not an intentional object.
For Strawson, the subject of experience is not an intentional object. It is
reasonable for us to ask whether I* will experience tomorrow. An example would help
- suppose there are two pills in front of you. If you take the red pill, that will be you*
tomorrow. If you take the blue pill, there will be another subject of experience
tomorrow, and it will not be you*. Whether it will be you* tomorrow is a significant
fact for you. It matters a lot for you* whether the one who wakes up tomorrow is you*
or not. The significant difference between the two facts results in an asymmetric
decision you will make between which pill to take. You strongly prefer taking the red
pill and continue enjoying your life, I suppose. Taking the blue pill is tantamount to
committing suicide in a private way such that your relatives and friends will not be sad
since they do not realize that your subject of experience is gone.
Our intuition is that every totally unconscious deep sleep may result in a new
subject, but there may also be the same subject as the previous one. It seems to us that
both are possible. On the face value, we should not deny the metaphysical possibility
of the occurrence of the same subject after a phenomenal unconscious break. However,
strictly speaking, the subject does not exist during a phenomenal break. As defined by
Strawson, a subject of experience is essentially conscious, and there is no such thing
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as a subject of experience when I have an unconscious sleep. Both our intuitions allow
the same subject to have two or more phenomenally separate experiences.
On the other hand, if a subject of experience is a process, then the question “Is it
still me* tomorrow?” can be firmly answered negatively. According to the definition
of a process, discontinuity of existence is not allowed. However, if we follow
Strawson’s definition of subjects of experience, subjects may in principle survive
discontinuous phases. A subject thus should not be a process in which persistence is
partially determined by the continuity of interactions between itself and its
environment.
Strawson’s [e=s=c] Thesis circumvents the diachronic identity condition of
subjects of experience. In endorsing such a claim, we lost some important modal
properties of the object such as its essential properties. It seems that there is some truth
in the linguistic habit; we should treat the object-process discrimination seriously.
To sum up, I argue that the existence of objects is necessary for our ontology.
Furthermore, a subject of experience is an object, not a process because it has modal
properties such as essential properties.
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4

My Conscious Subject View

One of the main claims of my Conscious Subject View is that I am a subject of
experience, which is essentially conscious.
I am inclined to substance dualism of the mental and physical. Substance dualism
is the view that the mental entities and physical entities are two fundamentally different
things. If substance dualism is true, and that I am a subject of experience which is a
purely mental entity, then I am not a physical entity. If a human animal is a physical
entity, then I am not a human animal.
Substance dualism faces criticisms such as the Causal Closure of the Physical
which states that every physical event has a physical explanation. In this case, if the
mental entity also has causal powers, then the physical effects bring out by an
intentional action would be overdetermined by both physical and mental events. This
causes causal overdetermination, a claim that many philosophers are reluctant to
accept.
Second, there is also a heated debate on reductionism, which investigates how the
success of scientific explanation could be extended to explain consciousness.
According to the dualists in general, any mental property is not reducible to physical
property. Many philosophers think that if A is reducible to B, then necessarily, “A is in
a sense prior to B, is more basic than B, is such that A fully depends upon, or is
constituted by, B.31 Saying that x reduces to y typically implies that x is nothing more
than y or nothing over and above y. If one is committed to substance dualism, one may
have to answer why consciousness is unique in the sense that many other streams of
sciences can in principle have a reductive explanation about its laws, whereas
conscious is sui generis – it is non-reducible to any physical properties in a lower-level.

31

See (van Riel, Raphael and Van Gulick, 2018).
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These are all important and basic ontological questions of the nature of the mind.
However, since the thesis is primarily concerned with our essential properties but not
the relation between the mind and the body, due to time constraint, I am not going to
deal with the objections to dualism in my thesis. I point out, however, that a subject of
experience has haecceity, and is therefore not reducible to its mental properties. Also,
the subject is not reducible to the physical properties of its possessed body.
In what follows, I argue for the claim that I am essentially a subject of experience,
I persist as a subject of experience. My view is different from McMahan’s Embedded
Mind View and Strawson’s Conscious Subject View. First, I propose that (1) the
subject is a mental thing, not identical to its experience or process, which is different
from what Strawson proposes. Second, I argue that (2) its persistence conditions are
not determined by any psychological continuity in whatever sense. This is what makes
a difference in McMahan’s view.

4.1

We are Essentially Subjects

Now I propose that we are essentially subjects of experience, such that necessarily,
when we exist, we are subjects of experience. My argument is basically as follows. I
first define egoistic concern to be such that necessarily, I can only be egoistically
concerned with entities that are numerically identical to me. I then argue that
necessarily, I can be egoistically concerned with an entity E if and only if E is
numerically identical with my subject of experience. If we follow the common
definition of essential properties according to which s is the essential property of entity
e if and only if e has s so long as e exists, then we are essentially subjects of experience:

The Essentiality Argument
1.

Necessarily, my concern about X can be egoistic if and only if I exist and persist as
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X.
2.

Necessarily, if my subject of experience is numerically identical with E at t, then
my concern with an entity E at time t can be egoistic.

3.

Necessarily, if my subject of experience is not E at t, then my concern with an entity
E at time t cannot be egoistic.

______________
C.

Necessarily, when I exist, I am a subject of experience.

The conclusion is to say that I am essentially a subject of experience. All the premises
in the Essentiality Argument are yet to be argued. I now argue for premise one, namely,
the claim that our egoistic concern necessarily aligns well with our existence. To begin,
let us review the recent literature on the egoistic concern.

4.1.1

Premise 1

There are two theories about what matters to us. The classical idea is that identity is
what matters to us, and my concern with an individual can be egoistic only when I am
going to persist as that individual. The idea has its recent descendants such as Ernest
Sosa (1990) and Peter Unger (1991). There is also a voice in the recent debate saying
that identity is not what matters, and there is something else that matters for our
survival. One prominent approach within this view is to say that psychological
connectedness is what matters. The representative philosophers who propose the
psychological approach to egoistic concern are Derek Parfit (1984) and Jeff McMahan
(2002).

4.1.2

Identity Matters

Peter Unger (1991) is one of the representative philosophers who believe that identity
is what matters. He argues that physical continuity determines our persistence and the
rational obligation for egoistic concern. For Unger, an individual’s core psychology,
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such as the capacity for conscious experience and rationalist at the most basic level, is
supported by the same physical realizer. In cases regarding our survival, the physical
realizer would most probably be the brain, but there can be other physical realizers in
other worlds responsible for being the realizer. Bernard Williams (1970) proposes a
similar view by pointing out that we have strong intuitions from a first-person
perspective to think that we are going to persist as an individual that has no
psychological continuity but only physical continuity with us. Williams’s reason for
supporting the necessity of physical continuity is based on the fact that when we
consider the phenomenal qualities of the future being from a first-person perspective,
the fear of future pain alerts us that there is a deeper sense of identity over and above
the continuity of psychological traits and memories.
There is also Ernest Sosa (1990), who proposes that identity is what matters in
survival. He thinks that there are two types of survival, namely, survival in the strict
sense which involves the persistence of one’s identity, and survival in a loose sense,
according to which there is an extension of life. Sosa thinks that survival in a loose
sense should not support our egoistic concern because there would be a slippery slope
in the claim. His argument is basically that if survival in a loose sense supports egoistic
concern, an individual should, in principle, be egoistically concerned with the future
of 100 replications who are psychologically continuous with her. But we are not.
Although one might think that the main threat for such a scenario is our fear that those
beings would compete with each other for food, shelter, and intimate relationships, it
is not what hinders us from enjoying a highly productive fission, as we would still not
be interested in having multiple fission even if the resulting entities are put in separate,
but predictable and controllable, environments.

4.1.3

Identity does not Matter
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Derek Parfit (1984) thinks that identity is not what we ought to care about. He argues
for a psychological connectedness account of what matters in survival, according to
which one should instead be egoistically concerned with future individuals who are
psychologically connected with us. The argument is briefly that there are cases in
which there is no answer to the question of personal identity over time, but we are still
rational to have an egoistic concern with future persons that are not identical to us. He
proposes a thought experiment of the brain-splitting operation, according to which
Brainy’s left brain is transplanted into a new body to form an individual called Lefty,
and Brainy’s right brain is transplanted into a new body to form another individual
called Righty. Suppose both resulting entities are fully psychologically continuous to
Brainy. Normally, we think that there are three possibilities: (1) Brainy becomes none
of them, (2) Brainy becomes one of them and that (3) Brainy becomes both of them.
For Parfit, (1) is problematic because in the case of a person having a surgery with half
of her brain removed, we still believe that the person survives the operation given that
the resultant person is psychologically continuous with the original person. It should
be that one could survive if half of one’s brain were successfully transplanted. Since a
double success should not be a failure, (1) should not be right. The second alternative
is also problematic since we have assumed that each half of Brainy’s brain is
qualitatively the same. There is no reason for us to say that Brainy is, say, Lefty but
not Righty. The third possibility is that Brainy is both Lefty and Righty. However, this
description makes no sense after careful inspection. If we acknowledge that identity is
transitive, then the two statements, namely, “Lefty is Brainy” and “Brainy is Righty,”
automatically implies that Lefty is Righty. However, this simply cannot be right –
Lefty and Righty are two distinct individuals, and they may have totally different lives.
Parfit’s conclusion is that all possibilities are problematic, and the best strategy is to
admit that Brainy survives as two different people without saying anything about their
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identity relations. He writes:

The alternative, for which I shall argue, is to give up the language of identity. We can
suggest that I survive as two different people without implying that I am these people.
(Parfit 1971, p. 8)

Parfit defines survival as a relation with a matter of degree – a person P survives as P′
if and only if there is at least P′ is a person who is alive and is psychologically
connected to P. For him, psychological connection is a direct relation held between
quasi-intentions and its intended action, or a quasi-memory and its corresponding
experience. “Quasi-memory” is a notion invented to vindicate the psychological
criterion of personal identity by saving it from circularity. There can also be quasiintentions, quasi-promises, quasi-responsibilities, etc. For Parfit, a person P1 quasiremembers having an experience of a person P2 if:

1.

P1 seems to remember having an experience, and

2.

Someone did have this experience, and

3.

P1’s apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of way, on P2’s past
experience. (Parfit 1984, p. 220)

Parfit (1971) maintains that survival is grounded in psychological connectedness and
/ or psychological continuity. 32 There are several differences between identity and
survival. First, identity is transitive, but since psychological connectedness is not a
transitive relation, nor is survival. For instance, if x survives as y, and y survives as z,

32

Parfit is actually changing his mind about what grounds survival. In Parfit (1984), he claims that “I
can claim that what matters is psychological connectedness and/or continuity, with any cause.” (Parfit
2007, p. 368) However, in Parfit (2007), he states something differently: “if any relation matters in
these ways, this relation is psychological continuity and connectedness, with any cause.” (Parfit 2007,
p. 27) I adopt his earliest version of the definition of survival because Parfit (1971) claims that we
should treat survival as a matter of degree: “I suggested that… what matters in survival can have
degrees.” (Parfit 1971, p. 19) If survival were to be grounded in psychological continuity, survival would
become a matter of all-or-nothing, and this is not what Parfit originally wants to propose.
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it is not necessary that x survives as z. The reason is simple – z is psychologically
connected with y, and so is y with x, but it is possible that z is not psychologically
connected with x. Also, survival is different from identity in the sense that it is not a
one to one relation – a person can survive as two. Moreover, most of what matters in
survival, such as quasi-memories, is of a matter of degree. For instance, a person x can
have more quasi-memories, and thus stronger psychological connections, with person
y than with person z. However, personal identity is not of a matter of degree: either
you are numerically identical with person P, or you are not. In the case of fission,
Brainy survives as both Lefty and Righty, but we should not say that Brainy is identical
to either of them or both of them. Similarly, one survives in both the single and double
transplants of the brain, whereas one should withdraw from talking about identity in
the case of double transplant with two resulting survivors.
Parfit goes on to propose that fission is at least as good as, and most of the time
better than, ordinary survival. His reasons are basically that both the survivors can
carry on the individual’s goals and projects. Also, there are two survivors to fulfill
one’s contradictory goals. Suppose Brainy is in love with two girls, A and B, but he
cannot marry both due to various reasons. If he has two survivors, then Righty can
marry A while Lefty marry B. Moreover, we can always answer questions of
responsibility, goals of life, and future self-regarding concerns by psychological
connectedness and continuity. We have the intuition that personal identity matters
merely because personal identity, in many cases, would imply psychological
connectedness and continuity. However, for Parfit, identity has no further practical
implications apart from those implied by psychological connectedness and
psychological continuity. Thus identity itself should not be of any significance for us.
If we are rational enough, we should give up identity as the justification of our egoistic
concern. In particular, if psychological continuity takes a branching form, we should
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abandon the language of identity and consider survival as what is sufficient to support
our egoistic concern. Parfit writes:

Certain important questions [regarding survival, memory, and responsibility] do
presuppose a question about PI (personal identity). But they can be freed of this
presupposition. And when they are, the question about identity has no importance. (Parfit
1984, p. 4)

There is a difference between Parfit’s and McMahan’s theory of egoistic concern.
McMahan thinks that we are justified to be egoistically concerned with the post-person
of Alzheimer’s disease. He thinks that there is a reason for one to have some egoistic
concern with the post-person because there are overlapping chains of weak
psychological connectedness. Second, one should expect personal identity, and the
justification of an egoistic concern to coincide in all cases except those involving
branching in which both resultant entities share the continuity of the properties that are
constitutive of personal identity. Similarly, the presence of justified egoistic concern
is sufficient for personal identity in all cases except in those branching situations.
McMahan thinks that we should seek an account of personal identity that is
closely aligned with the basis of egoistic concern. His reason is that it is not an accident
that we assume that personal identity is what matters. A robust account of personal
identity should be compatible with our intuition that we always find a basis for egoistic
concern in cases we encountered in our daily lives that involve reidentification of
ourselves. It is highly plausible that the relations that are constitutive of personal
identity are those that matter to us. In other words, McMahan believes that it is not
identity, but the relations that underlie identity, that matters.
Still, for McMahan, our belief that identity is what we concern with is a natural
mistake because all the actual cases that happen around us are cases in which identity
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always accompanies psychological continuity and connectedness. We always find
identity in the cases where we have an egoistic concern. However, when we face hard
cases such as brain splitting and tele-transportation, we discover that what matters is
not identity, but psychological continuity that underlies identity.
McMahan makes a cogent point here by pointing out that Parfit’s idea of egoistic
concern is not what we normally think of as our egoistic concern. He notices that
Parfit’s idea of egoistic concern is different from how other people understand it. For
most of us, the term “egoistic concern” already entails one’s concerns about oneself in
the future. In other words, one has an egoistic concern only with a future self that is
identical to the present self. For McMahan, we can understand Parfit’s idea of egoistic
concern in terms of a form of concern that is phenomenologically indistinguishable
from the concern for the same self in future, whereas the concern may extend to some
other individuals.
Along with this line, there is also Raymond Martin (1998), who defends the view
that identity is not what matters in survival. He thinks that one can have an egoistic
concern about someone else because one could, in principle, rationally anticipate
having experiences of somebody else. He thinks that even if I rationally anticipate
having some future experiences of individual A, it does not mean that I believe that I
would become A in the future. He also maintains that one’s anticipation of having
others’s experience would require that one identifies with others, but it does not require
the anticipator to regard the others as the same individual as oneself. For instance, fans
of a football team or a country identify themselves with the team or country, such that
they would feel proud when the team or their country wins. However, a fan of a team
would not regard the team as the same individual as herself.
Martin provides a thought experiment called “fission rejuvenation” to show that
identity is not what matters in survival. The thought experiment is basically that you
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are going to have a brain operation at the age of 30, in which your left brain is put into
a new physical body A, and your right brain in a new body B, each has a physical age
of 30. During the operation, there is a small device plugged into the hemisphere
transplanted to body B, such that the brain’s structure with all its capacities and
dispositions are synchronized with that of body A. Right after the operation, the bodyA-individual continues to live a happy and satisfactory life until death at 80, whereas
body-B-individual is frozen in a fridge and is kept unconscious until the day when
body-A-individual dies. At that very moment, body-B-individual is de-frozen, and it
starts to live another wonderful life of 50 years from a point which is psychologically
continuous with body-A-individual at its last moment.
Martin thinks that fission rejuvenation is a procedure in which personal identity
is lost. However, it remains an appealing option for most people. He also thinks that
most of us would also choose fission rejuvenation because it fulfills our egoistic
concern with there being continuers who have satisfactory and enjoyable lives, whose
experiences and actions we are justified to anticipate having and exercising rationally.
In this case, your anticipation of having body-A-individual’s and body-B-individual’s
experience is justified since you successfully identify yourself with them, but it does
not require you regard body-A-individual or body-B-individual as the same individual
as yourself. He thus concludes that fission rejuvenation is a thought experiment that
successfully shows that our persistence and thus personal identity are not what matters.

4.1.4

Two Types of Egoistic Concern

I argue along the lines of McMahan by saying that the Parfitian conception of egoistic
concern is indeed different from what we normally concern about our future selves.
By my lights, the psychological account of egoistic concern fails to provide an account
for the fact that we are actually egoistically concerned with the post-person, which is
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by definition neither psychologically connected with, nor psychologically continuous
with, the person. I further propose that necessarily, my concern about X can be egoistic
if and only if I exist and persist as X.
In cases such as tele-transportation, it is commonly agreed that if the person on
Earth continues to live, then the future entities generated on Mars are not identical to
the original individual. Although the future person on Mars would be psychologically
continuous with you in every aspect and would most probably enjoy a quality of life
similar to yours, it is still crystal clear that it would not be you who continues to enjoy
life on Mars. The entities on Mars are some other persons but not you who will enjoy
their own lives.
We are usually disappointed upon realizing that our lives are going to end soon
because we can no longer accomplish our goals and continue with our social
responsibilities. Indeed, the disappointment would be greatly alleviated if an
individual discovers that there will be a future person with the same psychological
traits, memories, and dispositions with herself, who promises to fulfill her goals,
continue with her social responsibilities and roles, and take care of her parents and
kids. Upon realizing this, she may even be so satisfied to the extent that she does not
care anymore about her death.
However, if she is asked, “are you going to enjoy the happiness of this future
person?” She would start mourning one’s death again - we all know that the answer is
no. It is worth noting that even Parfit and McMahan would agree the identity is lost in
cases involving reduplication, such as cases of tele-transportation. Although the future
person on Mars would be psychologically continuous with you in every aspect, and
would most probably enjoy a quality of life similar to yours, it is still crystal clear that
it would not be you who continues to enjoy life on Mars given that you continue your
life on Earth even for a very short period after the tele-transportation.
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Although it is reasonable to say that an individual very much concerns with the
future person because she knows that the future person is going to achieve her goal
and take her responsibilities, she would still be disappointed by the fact that it will not
be herself who enjoys the moment of reward, who attends her son’s and daughter’s
wedding ceremony, and who travels with her husband and enjoys the sunset on the
beach during summer holidays. If Parfit insists on calling the concern of a future
person in cases where identity is lost an “egoistic concern,” he should be aware that
there would be a significant difference between the two kinds of concern mentioned
above. More specifically, the latter will be accompanied by a disappointment (or relief)
given that the present individual knows that it would not be herself who experiences
and enjoys (or suffers from) the future moments.33
According to Parfit, it is possible that one is justified to have an egoistic concern
with a future individual that is not oneself, and it is also possible that one is not justified
to have any egoistic concern with one’s future self. I believe that this approach can

33

Derek Parfit (1984, 2007) proposes the Moderate View, according to which a being B has reason for
special concern about any future entity x if and only if there is psychological continuity between B and
x. In his 2007 essay, he discusses that the idea of anticipatory concern, which seems to threaten the
Moderate View. An anticipatory concern is a concern about one’s own experience to which one can
look forward and anticipate. Even if B is identical to x, x may not be psychologically continuous with B.
Since one cannot anticipate pain of an individual x if one is not identical to x, one should not have
special concern about the future entity x. This contradicts the Moderate View. In reply to this, Parfit
proposes “quasi-anticipation,” an anticipation of future experience without presupposing identity of
the future entity. As we can quasi-remember past experiences from the inside without being identical
with the individual who had those experiences, we can also quasi-anticipate future experience with
being identical with the future individual who will have those experience. He endorses Bernard
Williams’s claim that there is a significant difference between imagining being someone else and
imagining ourselves being someone else. The former does not require one’s identity to enter into the
content of the imagination, whereas the latter would have this requirement. Analogously, one can
anticipate having some future experience without anticipating oneself having those future experience.
However, Parfit also spots a problem with this view. The idea of quasi-anticipation is too wide that we
can in principle quasi-anticipate future experience of any future individual, whether they are
psychologically continuous with us or not. This conclusion, again, is incompatible with Parfit’s
Moderate claim. Eventually, Parfit admits that the problem of anticipatory concern is indeed a difficulty
faced by the Moderate claim, “I do not know whether Moderates could defend such claims. Perhaps
anticipatory concern presupposes a belief in identity, and in more than a trivial analytic way. If we
believe that our Replica will not be us, there may be no coherent and relevant sense in which we could
quasi-anticipate our Replica’s pain. If that is so, this may threaten the Moderates’ claim that
psychological continuity gives us reason for anticipatory concern.” (Parfit 2007, p. 23)
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only work when one adopts Parfit’s idea that egoistic concern necessarily aligns with,
and only with, psychological connectedness, which I think is not at all identical to
what we think as an egoistic concern in the original sense. By the same token,
McMahan’s claim that identity is sufficient but not necessary for justifying an egoistic
concern is also based on the modified Parfitian definition of egoistic concern, which I
would regard as an inappropriate use of the very conception of egoistic concern.
McMahan is right in pointing out that there is certain kind of egoistically oriented
concern with a future person who is similar to you in many aspects and will carry on
with your goals and social responsibilities in future. However, one should also notice
that there is a fundamental and unbridgeable difference between (1) an egoistic
concern, a concern about one’s experience from a first-person perspective and (2) an
egoistically oriented concern, a concern that does not involve the fear of future pain
or anticipation of future joy. An egoistic concern is a concern about the future
experience of oneself from a first-person perspective. Although our persistence is not
a necessary condition for having an egoistically oriented concern, only our existence
and persistence guarantees that we can have an egoistic concern that includes the fear
of pain from a first-person perspective.
My definition of egoistic concern is that necessarily, one can have a egoistic
concern with a future entity E if and only if one exists and persists as E. In other words,
since I define egoistic concern such that identity is both necessary and sufficient for
being capable of having an egoistic concern, necessarily, identity with X aligns well
with being capable of having an egoistic concern with X.
One point worth noting is that it is not necessary for an individual to be
egoistically concerned with a future individual – the target can also be the present
individual. For instance, I can be egoistically concerned with my present self because
I detect something abnormal happening that disturbs my mood. I am concerned with
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this present self, and I hope it could get rid of the discomfort. Moreover, when one
exists or persists as an entity and will have what this entity experiences from a firstperson perspective, one can be egoistically concerned with this entity – one can be
concerned about the entity’s experience from a first-person perspective.
In summary, I propose that there are two kinds of concerns, the egoistic concern,
and the egoistically oriented concern. Necessarily, my concern about X can be egoistic
if and only if I exist and persist as X. This completes my argument for premise one of
the Essentiality Argument.

4.1.5

Premise Two

Premise two is the claim that necessarily, if my subject of experience is numerically
identical with E at t, then my concern with an entity E at time t can be egoistic. In what
follows, I argue for this by first illustrating that I can be egoistically concerned with
the post-person as a minimal subject of experience at the late stage of Alzheimer's
disease, given that the subject of experience persists. Then I generalize this to all cases
in which my subject of experience is present.
I generally agree with McMahan’s proposal that we persist as the post-persons in
the late stage of Alzheimer’s disease. However, premise two is different from saying
that we persist as the post-persons – it is about whether we can have an egoistic concern
with the post-persons. I believe so. To recall, I define an egoistic concern as one about
one’s future experience from a first-person perspective. Let us imagine, from a firstperson perspective, whether we can be egoistically concerned with the post-person in
the late-stage of the Alzheimer’s disease, given that the subject of experience persists.
Imagine that I am thinking of my future, and I perceive of the possibility of myself
having the Alzheimer’s disease. Given that the subject of experience persists
throughout the disease, I can imagine my current subject of experience persist through
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time and forgetting things day by day until one morning the subject wakes up forgetting
my own name. My subject of experience during the late-stage of the disease has lonely,
isolated experiences because my personality will be completely changed due to the
disease. At that stage, my subject of experience can only enjoy very limited activities
such as eating, walking, and sleeping. The subject does not remember any relatives it
has. Still, when I am now thinking about all these, I wonder how long my subject will
survive in this stage, and whether it would still enjoy life after entering the late-stage
of the disease. I can foresee that my relatives and friends would no longer enjoy
communicating with the future individual since it would become a burden to them.
The subject would not be able to enjoy the physical and intellectual activities that it
once enjoys. As a result, my subject of experience at the late-stage would probably feel
useless, worthless, and depressed. Upon thinking about what my subject of experience
would encounter, I come to the conclusion that being a post-person is not worth living.
There would be more sufferings than joy for my subject of experience at that stage.
Realizing this, I plan to write in my will that I wish to have euthanasia after reaching
the late-stage of the disease. I am willing to pay for the euthanasia to avoid my future
sufferings.
Given that my subject of experience persists, I can foresee my suffering from the
deprivation of my psychological complexity. I also foresee my subject as having
negative experiences. Given that the subject of experience persists, it is reasonable to
replace “my subject of experience” with “myself” or “I” in the above context. If my
subject of experience will suffer, then I will suffer. If it is so, given that an egoistic
concern is one about one’s future experience from a first-person perspective, I can be
egoistically concerned with the future individual as a post-person in the late stage of
the Alzheimer’s disease.
This is how I come up with the claim that I can be egoistically concerned with
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my post-person as a minimal subject of experience at the late stage of the Alzheimer's
disease, given that the subject of experience persists. Otherwise, all the above
descriptions would not be rational thoughts for me, and there is no reason for me to
pay to have euthanasia to end the suffering. Moreover, if we consider other cases in
which there is my subject of experience at time t, given that an egoistic concern is one
about one’s future experience from a first-person perspective, necessarily, I can also
care about what my subject of experience is going to experience at time t. I anticipate
enjoyments and plan to avoid sufferings for my subject of experience at time t. If that
would be my subject that suffers, then necessarily, I can be concerned with this future
entity from a first-person perspective. The general claim that necessarily, I can be
egoistically concerned with an entity E at time t, given that my subject of experience
is numerically identical with E at t thus come along.
The subject of experience of the post-person in the late-stage of the Alzheimer’s
disease is a thin subject because it does not have personality, memories, selfconsciousness, and many other complexities that a normal person has. How thin can a
minimal experience be? To recall, for Strawson, the subject of experience can exist
without any memories, psychological traits and dispositions. We are subjects of
experience with an essential property of being conscious, and subjects of experience
are things that have experience, but they may not have memories, psychological traits,
dispositions, and even the ability of self-identification.

4.1.6

Premise Three

Premise three of the argument is the claim that necessarily, if my subject of experience
is not E at t, then my concern with an entity E at time t cannot be egoistic. I will first
take my human body as an example. I hereby show that we can only have an
egoistically oriented concern, but not an egoistic concern, with our human bodies, if
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we are not numerically identical with the human bodies. Then I generalize this to all
cases in which my subject of experience is absent. I define in the introduction of this
thesis the term “human body” as the physical body of the primate species Homo
Sapiens that persists after the human animal dies. Our human bodies have an intimate
relation to ourselves, but yet, we are not numerically identical with our human bodies.
I also take it that human bodies don’t think – what thinks is the subject of experience
that has intimate causal relation with the human body.
Let us consider a situation in which my subject of experience is to be transferred
into a pig’s body via the transformation of my brain at time t, which is supposed to be
responsible for the instantiation of my subject of experience. Suppose, also, that my
human body would still survive for a year after time t without the brain, given that the
body is supported by some advanced technologies. In this situation, I will still have a
certain concern about this human body after my subject of experience is transferred to
a pig’s body. This human body was once the physical container of my subject of
experience which accompanied me for many years. My concern about my human body
after time t should be classified as an egoistically oriented concern because I will not
care about how this human body experiences and perceives the world from a firstperson perspective. Given that my subject of experience does not own this human body
anymore, the experience I have will be independent of the conditions of this human
body, and there is no experience from a first-person perspective in this human body
for me to concern with.
Even if it happens to be that there is some conscious experience occurring in the
human body with an empty skull after the operation, and if I am sure that my subject
of experience has already been transferred to a pig’s body, it would be another subject
of experience that perceives the external world via my former human body – it would
not be my subject anymore. By my definition, an egoistic concern is a concern that
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involves concern about one’s future experience from a first-person perspective. As a
result, I simply cannot have an egoistic concern about my human body given that my
subject of experience does not perceive the external world via this human body at that
time. I can only have an egoistic concern with my subject of experience which
accidentally has an intimate causal relation with this particular human body at this
moment. Strictly speaking, I can only be egoistically concerned with the experiences
of my subject from a first-person perspective via this human body, but I can not be
egoistically concerned with the human body per se.
To generalize the above claim, one just needs to think about any entity E which
is not identical to one’s subject of experience. At that moment, necessarily, the subject,
call it H, cannot be egoistically concerned with E. Necessarily, the individual H no
longer cares about what E experiences from a first-person perspective, given that E’s
experience is not possessed by H (assuming that H is not identical to E). Therefore,
necessarily, I cannot be egoistically concerned with an entity E at time t, given that my
subject of experience is not E at t. This completes the reasons for supporting premise
three.
In summary, I give reasons for all the premises one to three. Following premises
two and three, we can come to the conclusion that I can be egoistically concerned with
an entity E if and only if my subject of experience is numerically identical with E.
Together with premises 1, I further conclude that necessarily, when I exist, I am a
subject of experience. That is to say; I am essentially subjects of experience. Also,
necessarily, I persist as a subject of experience.

4.2

We Persist as Subjects

I now provide another argument for the claim that we persist as subjects. A more formal
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expression for the claim that (1) we persist as subjects is that (1′) necessarily, for any
entity x, if x is among us, x persists as a future entity y if and only if y is the same
subject as x. For simplicity, I will treat the two above expressions (1) and (1′) as
equivalent in the whole thesis. I argue for it via a thought experiment.
Suppose Albert undergoes a brain operation during which the brain cells of his
cerebrum are replaced by silicon one-by-one. Suppose that the cerebrum is responsible
for one’s consciousness, memories and psychological traits. Unlike many other
operations, this very operation lasts a year. Albert enters the operation room for 15
minutes every day, during which a small number of his brain cells from his cerebrum
are replaced by silicon chips that maintain the same function as the original brain cells.
Albert’s memory and psychological traits are perfectly continuous throughout this
process.
Suppose Billy undertakes another brain operation that takes only a day. During
the few hours of operation, Billy’s original cerebrum is totally removed at once,
preserved in a tank with nutrients, such that it ceases to function when being in the
tank but does not deteriorate. After that, a full-blown silicon cerebrum with Billy’s
memory and psychological traits are implanted into Billy’s empty skull. Let us further
suppose that Billy’s brain is put in a vat with nutrients. It keeps functioning, and the
individual with this brain is able to communicate with others via some advanced
technology. This brain-individual is also fully psychologically continuous with Billy,
and he claims that he is Billy.
Both the resultant entities retain all the mental capacities the former entities have
after the operations. There is no difference in terms of psychological continuity
between the two operations. However, we intuitively think that there is a significant
difference regarding our persistence between the two cases. We believe that it is more
secure to undergo the operation in a gradual way. More specifically, many of us think
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that the same individual wakes up every time after the gradual operation, but we are
reluctant to admit that the individual who wakes up after the second operation is still
the original one given that the whole cerebrum is replaced all of a sudden. The intuition
becomes even stronger after we are told that Billy’s brain keeps functioning in a vat,
and the brain-individual is also psychologically continuous with Billy. In this case,
many of us would think that the Billy persists as the brain in the vat instead of
persisting as the individual with a new brain and Billy’s original body.
Our intuition is that there should be some physical continuity, such as the gradual
replacement of brain cells, to guarantee our persistence. What does continuous
replacement of brain cells guarantee us? There is already psychological continuity
between the resultant entities and the original person in both cases with gradual and
sudden replacement of brain. It is not psychological continuity that we are concerned
with when dealing with the persistence of individuals. What does the continuous
replacement of brain cells support?
We should find an account such that something, call it “x,” is maintained if the
brain is gradually replaced, whereas x is not preserved in a sudden replacement of the
brain. Furthermore, this account should admit that x is what determines our persistence.
The possible candidates of x I can think of are (1) the continuity of spatiotemporal
location of the whole human body, (2) the right causal chain for psychological
continuity; and (3) the sameness of subject of experience supported by the continuity
of the brain. I discuss each of them and propose that the first two proposals cannot
fully explain our intuition. I go on to argue that the sameness of subject of experience
can be regarded as the best candidate that underlies our intuition.
Let us consider the first candidate. It is prima facie reasonable to suppose that the
continuity of the spatiotemporal location of the human body is what determines our
persistence. One might think that the brain is an important part of human body, and
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since the continuity of spatiotemporal location of human body determines our
persistence over time, the spatiotemporal continuity of the brain is also necessary. The
gradual replacement of the brain thus guarantees our persistence, but a sudden
replacement of the whole brain does not. For one thing, one can individuate a human
animal by its unique spatiotemporal location because every human animal is a physical
being that occupies a particular location. Furthermore, a common thought is that a set
of mental properties acquires particularity because the thoughts are owned by a subject
embedded in a physical body with a unique spatiotemporal location. If each of us has
a unique spatiotemporal location, it seems quite reasonable to conclude that the
continuity of the spatiotemporal location of the human body also determines our
persistence over time.
Unfortunately, there are some drawbacks to this proposal. There are many bodily
parts that we think are not crucial regarding our persistence. For example, we can
receive a pair of donated lungs and heart and donate a kidney and a great proportion
of liver but still continue to persist. Furthermore, it seems that the continuity of the
brain, and only the brain, is crucial for our persistence. If the brain is removed from a
human body and is transplanted to another body, our persistence goes with the brain,
and spatiotemporal continuity of the human body goes with the body. It seems that the
spatiotemporal continuity of the human body is not a necessary condition for our
persistence.
The second possibility is to say that the right causal chain for psychological
continuity determines our persistence. The gradual replacement of brain ensures the
right causal chain for psychological continuity, but the sudden replacement of brain
does not. There is also the idea of memory trace, which is related to the idea of the
right causal chain. Philosophers who accept the causal model for memory (and
psychological continuity in general) would most probably also believe in the existence
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of memory trace, which is the structural analogue that stores or traces a person’s
experience, psychological disposition, and memory. For the sake of simplicity, I will
only concentrate on the causal model of memory but not that of other psychological
traits. I believe that my following discussion of the causal model of memory could also
be applied to the causal model of psychological traits in general.
Many philosophers assumed that for a memory state to have a causal chain, there
should at least be some memory trace. For instance, Sven Bernecker (2001) believes
that the idea of memory causation must rely on the idea of memory traces. If there is
memory, then there must be memory traces. The relation between memory and the
corresponding memory trace is like music and the groove in a gramophone record.
Science nowadays does not provide a definitive answer to what a memory trace is and
how it works, but philosophers have given various proposals. For instance, Bertrand
Russell (1995) believes that it is plausible that future neuroscience provides us with a
one-to-one correlation between memory states and neuron states. On the other hand,
there are David Rumelhart and Donald Norman (1981) who propose that memory is
information stored everywhere in the brain but not in a particular part of the brain.
Similarly, Sven Bernecker (2001) believes that memory traces could plausibly be
structural modifications at synapses, where synapses are structures that permit neurons
to pass electrical or chemical signals to other neurons. For him, there are three elements
that constitute a right causal process of memory: encoding, storage, and retrieval.
Encoding is a process during which experiences creates memory traces. During storage,
the information is transferred from trace to trace. When the person retrieves the
information, there is the memory state brought out by the trace.
It is intuitive for us to regard memory trace as neuronic. Nevertheless, there are
defenders of the view that memory trace for memory may not be neuronic. For instance,
C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher (1966) believes that for a person to remember an
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event, the person should have experienced the event and that her experience of it must
have been operative in producing successive states in her that is operative in producing
the memory representation. However, they assert that continuity of brain or parts of
the brain should not be strictly necessary for the right causal chain for memory. They
propose that it is problematic to say that there must be a neuronic memory trace which
serves as the operation condition for a right causal chain of memory. Their reason is
that this criterion neglects some intuitive cases of memory. For instance, we can
conceive of other beings that can remember, and they remember through not their
bodies, brains, neurons, but some external devices.
In the example they give, each of the Martians carry a metal box with them
throughout their lives. The boxes are external devices given to them at birth. The
Martians remember things only in virtue of having the metal boxes – their metal boxes
serve as memory storage devices such that they experience themselves remembering
things in the same way just as we experience ourselves remember things. In this
example, C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher hold that it is intuitive that they have
memory with the right causal chain, but it is not the case that their memory trace is
neuronic.
Let us return to my thought experiments of gradual and sudden brain transplant.
First of all, both brain transplant operations have causal chains that originate from the
person’s direct experience. Therefore, the person’s original experience is operative in
producing through successive causal chain the memory the person now has. Second,
we can propose that the replaced silicon cells participate in serving as part of the
memory trace that stores and traces a person’s experience and memory. We can surely
think of situations where the individual’s psychological information is copied and
mapped into the newly produced silicon brain or silicon cells by advanced technology
to ensure a continuous causal chain in both cases of gradual and sudden replacement.
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The psychological information carried by this new silicon brain or the new silicon cells
is the effect, and the psychological information carried by the original brain is the cause.
Both cases involve non-neuronic structural analogue of the memory trace. The
difference between a sudden replacement and a gradual replacement seems not to be
about the difference in kind between the causal chain.
Suppose after the entire operation is done, Albert and Billy are asked whether
they remember an event that happened to them before their operations. Their memories
would rely on some non-neuronic (silicon-based) memory trace. If we take Martin’s,
Deutscher’s, and Malcolm’s stance and presuppose that the memory trace for memory
may not be neuronic, it follows that both Albert and Billy can be regarded as having
the right causal chain for memory. There is no reason to say that sudden replacement
of the brain does not constitute the right causal chain, whereas gradual replacement of
the brain guarantees the right causal chain for memory.
If one wants to make a difference between the two cases, further explanation is
needed to provide a reason for the claim that the sudden information mapping process
should not be regarded as the right causal chain for psychological continuity, but the
gradual information mapping process constitutes the right causal chain. Furthermore,
if one thinks that our persistence is determined by memory with the right causal chain,
then one may also think that the right causal chain that supports psychological
continuity is what matters. However, I have already argued that psychological
continuity of any kind is not necessary nor sufficient for determining our persistence.
A better candidate should be continuity of brain. Continuity of brain is maintained
if the brain is gradually replaced, whereas continuity of the brain is not preserved in a
sudden replacement of the brain. Furthermore, this account should admit that
continuity of brain is what determines our persistence. There are two alternatives: (1)
the continuity of brain per se determines our persistence; and (2) continuity of the brain
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supports the sameness of subject of experience, and we persist as subjects. These two
alternatives have the same explanatory power – they are both successful in explaining
our intuition of the thought experiment. I argue that we should prefer (2). I first discuss
the alternative (1) and show that this alternative has pitfalls. I then argue that (2) is
better.
The first drawback of alternative (1) is that continuity of the brain seems to
determine our persistence if there is no branching; but if there is one, then this criterion
again fails. In cases such as brain splitting, for example, both resultant entities have
part of the original brain, and both the left-hemisphere and the right hemisphere have
a certain degree of physical continuity with the original brain. If both parts are regarded
as having some physical continuity with the original brain, then this criterion fails to
give a unique answer to our persistence. Even if continuity of the brain may be one
necessary condition for the sameness of person over time; it is definitely not sufficient
to determine our persistence.
Furthermore, it is hard to define what it means by the continuity of brain. Consider
a case in which a patient with a brain disease has an operation with half of the cerebrum
removed in one go. In this situation, it is uncertain whether there is a sufficient degree
of continuity of the brain to support our persistence. If continuity of brain is regarded
as the criterion of our persistence, then our persistence may come in a matter of degree,
and this may render our persistence indeterminate in some cases. We may need to allow
expressions such as “I partially exist” and “my current existence will be indeterminate
after time t.” I believe most of us are unwilling to assert such weird statements.
Continuity of the brain is not a precise criterion for determining our persistence and
thus is undesirable.
I suggest that (2) is a better alternative. Our intuition that a certain degree of brain
continuity is needed for our persistence may come from another deeper intuition that
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the sameness of subject is supported by the continuity of brain, and we persist if and
only if our subjects of experience persist. I define a subject of experience as a mental
entity, a thing that has conscious experience and mental properties. We think we persist
as the same subject of experience, and we are reluctant to accept a sudden replacement
of the whole brain because we have the intuition that after replacing the whole brain
in one go, even if the resultant entity is fully psychologically continuous with me, the
being that wakes up afterward would be another subject and it won’t be me anymore.
We tend to believe that gradual replacement of brain guarantees the sameness of
subject since the continuity of brain components is the only candidate in a scientific or
natural sense that supports sameness of subject of experience. There is a common
belief that the sameness of subject is supported by the continuity of brain components
before we die.
Recall the very alternative we have just considered, namely, that our persistence
is determined by the continuity of brain. I have argued that since there is not a clear
definition of what it means by the continuity of brain, the claim is undesirable because
it requires that our existence is indeterminate. In contrast, the claim that we persist as
subjects is safe from having such a pitfall. Given that you are a subject of experience
whose essential property is being conscious, if we assume that it is not a matter of
degree whether there is conscious experience or not, then it is not a matter of degree
whether you exist or not. If the existence of subject of experience is determinate, the
Conscious Subject View would have to say that your existence should be determinate
too - either you persist, or you do not.34
This proposal has no obligation to provide a clear definition of what it means by

34

I presuppose that consciousness is determinate. Whether consciousness is determinate is a heated
debate nowadays. Neuroscientists such as Claire Sergent and Stanislas Dehaene (2004) argue that Is
consciousness is not a gradual phenomenon. They give evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation
between consciousness and unconsciousness during the attentional blink of subjects.
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the continuity of brain. So long as my subject is preserved, no matter how many of my
brain cells continue to live, I persist. On the other hand, we can simply acknowledge
that there is continuity of brain only if the sameness of the subject is maintained. The
strategy is to step back to examine what the underlying beliefs we have about our
persistence when searching for a clear definition of what it means by the continuity of
brain.
It is not to say that necessarily, we persist only when there is continuity of brain.
I believe that it is metaphysically possible that we persist without the continuity of the
brain. Alternative (2) is the best choice for us to explain our intuition that we persist
only when there is the gradual replacement of the brain is to understand our persistence
via the persistence of subjects of experience. After we realize that we persist if and
only if our subjects persist, it follows that when we are asked whether we persist in a
situation where our subjects persist but not our brains, our answer would still be
positive.
By abductive reasoning, I now propose that the best candidate for supporting our
intuition about the thought experiment is that I persist as a subject of experience. My
argument is as follows:

Argument of Persistence
1.

We have the intuition that we persist only when there is the gradual replacement of
the brain.

2.

The best candidate to explain this intuition is that we persist as subjects of
experience.

____________
C.

We persist as subjects of experience.

These are my two arguments (the Argument of Persistence and the Essentiality
Argument) for my Conscious Subject View, according to which (1) we are essentially
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subjects of experience, and that (2) we persist as subjects of experience.

4.3

Embedded Experience

Many philosophers believe that conscious experience is always an experience of being
embodied. I call this idea “the Theory of Embodied Experience.” The Theory of
Embodied Experience describes the structure of the phenomenal realm. It is different
from the metaphysical claim, according to which the self cannot exist without having
a possessed body. I call this metaphysical claim “the Theory of the Embodied Self.” It
is possible that the Theory of Embodied Experience is true, whereas the Theory of the
Embodied Self is false, and vice versa. I am not going to deal with the Theory of the
Embodied Self in this chapter.
I believe that the Theory of Embodied Experience is incorrect. I propose that
conscious experiences are not necessarily experiences of being embodied. There can
be a subject of experience without having the sense of being embodied. In what follows,
I introduce the Theory of Embodied Experience and argue against it.
There are two representative views about Embodied Experience in the literature
- the traditional view and the nativist view. The traditional view is one in which the
sense of being embodied is learned and developed through experience. It basically
stems from Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) whose philosophy is heavily influenced by
research in developmental psychology. Merleau-Ponty believes that the sense of being
embodied is acquired through experience. There are similar ideas in the works of
William James (1890), Jean Piaget (1954), and Paul Guillaume (1943). These
philosophers believe that children’s development of the sense of being embodied is a
gradual process which can only be formed after the repeated perceptual experience of
one’s own body. Before the process is completed and the corresponding psychological
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mechanism fully developed, there is conscious experience without the sense of being
embodied. The process is similar to our acquisition of many habits through practice
and repeated experience. We learn how to control our bodies through repeated
practices of movements. Newborns’s consciousness should then be disorganized,
primitive, and not structured or shaped by the embodiment. They have no sense of
being embodied.
On the other hand, philosophers such as Aron Gurwitsch (1964) and Maxine
Sheets-Johnstone (1998) hold that there is always an awareness of one’s body
whenever one has movements and cognitive activities. Recently, Shaun Gallagher
(2005) proposes that there is always a marginal awareness about one’s own body in
any experience, and this awareness constitutes a structural feature of phenomenal
consciousness. For him, all kinds of conscious mental states, such as perception,
memory, imagination belief, judgment, etc., are shaped by the sense of being embodied.
We always have conscious experience as being embodied. Although the degree of
awareness may vary among individuals, such as that some people are more aware of
their bodies and some are only peripherally aware of their bodies, there should at least
be some awareness of the body in any conscious experience.
Shaun Gallagher (2005) proposes that the sense of being embodied is innate. He
studies research findings in psychology and neuroscience and maintains that there is
evidence from developmental psychology that shows that body schema is innate. A
body schema, for him, is a system of sensory-motor processes that constantly regulate
posture and movement and a collection of sensory-motor interactions that individually
define a specific movement or posture. He describes it as “a system of sensory-motor
capacities that functions without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring.”
(Gallagher 2005, p. 24) Even if I am conscious of some aspects of my posture and
movement, my body schema unconsciously functions and supports my movements
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and body balance. He defines innateness as this: X is innate if and only if X “exists
prior to birth.” (Gallagher 2005, p. 72) and holds that if body schema is innate, then
the sense of being embodied is also innate. Since body schema is innate, therefore, the
sense of being embodied is innate.
Gallagher also proposes that there is a primary sense of is proprioceptive
awareness (PA), a self-referential and pre-reflective awareness of one’s body, that
occurs from birth. This conscious awareness is governed by and produced out of the
unconscious proprioceptive information, which he calls physiological information (PI),
which informs the bodily motor system about one’s postures and movements.
Gallagher believes that the two aspects of proprioception, PA and PI, is fully
developed at birth, and is sufficient for the sense of being embodied.
Gallagher interprets the experimental result of developmental psychologists such
as Andrew Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore (1983, 1994) and concludes that some motor
behaviors were present in neonates. These psychologists studied the imitation
behaviors of neonates and argued that their body schema is already fully developed
during birth. In the test, a mouth-opening gesture is shown to forty neonates from one
hour old to several days old. The image was presented to the infants over a period of
4 minutes with alternations in 20-second intervals between the mouth-opening gesture
and the passive facial appearance. The same experimental process is repeated with a
tongue protrusion gesture. The result shows that the most infants, including the
youngest one which is only forty minutes old, imitate the gestures of both mouth
opening and tongue protrusion. Psychologists concluded that neonates of less than one
hour old could imitate facial gestures.
Gallagher believes that these research findings show that body schemas already
exist at birth to allow for the imitation at infancy, and consciousness from birth is
already structured by the embodiment. He interprets the results as one in which the
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infants’s stimuli, namely, the gestures they observe, are transformed into PA of their
own body parts, and PI equips her to move the parts such that PA matches their stimuli.
A neonate is thus able to imitate others and to correct movements. Moreover, this
interpretation implies that the infants can recognize the difference between their own
gestures and the others’s gesture, which presupposes a sense of dichotomy between
self and non-self. In addition, there is PA at birth. Given that PA is a form of selfawareness, there is already some primitive sense of being embodied at birth. Gallagher,
therefore, concludes that there is a primary sense of oneself being embodied with the
experience of body postures and motor control at birth. He goes on to declare that
whenever one experiences, one always also experiences oneself as embodied.
In contrast, the traditional view proposed by Piaget et al. would imply that it is
impossible for an infant to imitate the gestures appearing on others’s face because this
behavior requires a fully developed body schema. These theorists thus fail to explain
why such imitations are impossible before an infant reaches 8-12 months of age. The
traditional view is, therefore, inconsistent with the recent discoveries in contemporary
psychology.

4.3.1

My Objections to Gallagher’s Theory

I believe that there is a problem with Gallagher’s theory. He falsely believes that his
theory draws the conclusion that it is impossible for the body schema and the sense of
being embodied to be absent in one’s conscious experience. His argument fails to
demonstrate that this conclusion is true. First, Gallagher defines that X is innate if and
only if X exists prior to birth. According to this definition, innateness does not imply
necessity. Even if Gallagher’s analysis on the research in developmental psychology
is true that the psychological mechanism that produces the experience of being
embodied is innate, there is still no reason for us to believe in the metaphysical claim
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that necessarily, there is an experience of being embodied in one’s conscious
experience. In other words, it can well be that there is conscious experience without
the experience of being embodied even if the body schema is innate. Whether body
schema is innate is not a metaphysical question of the prevalence of the embodied
experience and is not relevant to whether the experience of being embodied is an
essential component for conscious experience.
I argued in chapter two that an individual could have a robust first-person
perspective without having a rudimentary first-person perspective. Now I propose that
an individual can have conscious experience without having the experience of being
embodied by similar reasons. To begin, one can conceive of oneself being put in a
sensory deprivation tank, a scenario discussed by G. E. M. Anscombe (1975). During
that period, one lacks the experience of having a body because one lacks the five senses
when being put in the tank, whereas the experience of being embodied at a certain time
t1 necessarily entails that at least one of the five senses, such as touch, is present at t1.
However, during the period in the tank, one may still think about oneself. For instance,
one may ask oneself, “what happens to me? It seems that I have lost my body. That is
terrible!” The individual in the tank has conscious thoughts, but she does not have the
experience of being embodied.
There are other discussions by philosophers of mind about this. For instance,
Barry Dainton (2016) proposes that if there is a conscious computer, it can be
conscious without having the experience of being embodied. More specifically, if one
does not design the computer program such that it is able to detect it’s (the machine’s)
surroundings, even if it is designed to have experience and thoughts, it can never have
the experience of being “embodied” with physical parts. This, of course, is a farfetched scenario, but the case is to show that the conception of subject of experience
does not logically entail the idea of experiencing oneself as embodied. There are no
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obvious reasons for us to believe that body schema and the experience of being
embodied is essential for the existence of a subject of experience.

4.4

Two Uses of “I”

According to many philosophers, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), Galen
Strawson (2011), and Derek Parfit (2012), there are two uses of the term “I.” The
Wittgensteinian approach is that there is use of “I” as an object and use of “I” as a
subject. For Strawson, the term “I” is used with the intention to refer to either a human
being considered as a whole or the subject of experience. For instance, when I claim
that “I am six feet tall,” the “I” here probably refers to the whole human being. In
contrast, when I am thinking about my possibility of surviving death, the phrase “my
possibility” as used here refers to the possibility of the subject of experience. Similarly,
Parfit thinks that there are the Inner-I and the Outer-I which refers to the thinking
person and the human animal respectively. He believes that the Inner-I thinks nonderivatively and the Outer-I thinks derivatively in virtue of having the Inner-I that
thinks.
I am along with Strawson’s and Parfit’s proposal of the two uses of “I.” I argue
that one can regard one use of “I” as proper use and the other uses of “I” as improper
uses. In what follows, I first briefly introduce Strawson’s idea of the two uses of “I.” I
will then further argue for my theory about the proper and the improper uses of “I.”
Galen Strawson (2011) holds that sometimes the term “I” is naturally used to refer
to the subject of experience and to the human being as a whole in different contexts.
For example, when I claim that “I am hungry now,” the “I” here probably refers to the
whole human being. On the other hand, if I am thinking about my possibility of going
to heaven, my possibility here refers to the possibility of the subject of experience. As
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stated, he regards the subject of experience as part of the human being as a whole.
Strawson argues for the two uses of “I” by several means. First, he claims that it
is appropriate for us to assert statements such as “I am completely detached from my
body” in cases like near death experience. Even if the presence of these experiences
does not logically imply that it is possible for there to be a subject of experience
without a possessed body, the intended referent of “I” in these descriptions is not the
whole human being but the subject of experience. Second, Strawson points out that
some psychological research reveals that most of us realize that we are focused on
inner events without any direct awareness of outside events. When the subjects in the
psychological experiment are randomly alerted by an activating beeper they carry
during their daily lives, they report having thoughts without being aware of what is
happening out there. (Baars 1996; Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007) Strawson
interprets these experiments as showing that our ordinary experience is rich and
complex. It does not only reflect what is happening in the external world. In contrast,
our experience is full of abstract thoughts, plans, and reflections.

4.3.3

My Two Uses of “I”

I am along with Strawson’s line of thought – I believe that that there is indeed more
than one use of “I.” Moreover, I believe that some uses of “I” do not reveal the essential
properties of ourselves. I discuss how people use the term “I” in our daily lives and
further examine whether the different uses of “I” have metaphysical implications that
are incoherent with each other. I propose that some uses of “I” are not useful in
revealing the metaphysics of selves. Nevertheless, there are still hints on what we are
in some appropriate uses of the term “I.”
I introduce the idea of the proper uses of “I” and the improper uses of “I.” A
proper use of “I” is a use of “I” that is consistent with the essential properties or the
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persistence conditions of the self, whereas is an improper use of “I” is a use of “I” that
is inconsistent with the essential properties or the persistence conditions of the self,
but yet it is a common and effective usage in ordinary language. In my opinion, when
we use “I” to refer to the subject of experience, there is a proper use of “I.” On the
other hand, if we use “I” to refer to the human body or the corpse after we die, then
these usages of the term “I” are improper uses of “I.”
When we assert sentences such as “bury me under this tree after I pass away,” the
“I” dos not refer to the subject of experience but to the human body. Sentences like
“please bury me under this tree after I pass away” indicate that we persist as a corpse
but this is a wrong metaphysical implication because we do not persist as corpses.
Moreover, if there can be a subject without the experience of being embodied, as I
have argued in the preceding section, then the subject would be using “I” to refer to
the subject of experience per se, as this individual may not know whether she has a
physical body or not.
If we fix “I” to be referring to the subject of experience, the above usage of “I”
referring to the corpse should be incorrect. Still, people may use the word “I” in some
occasions, such as saying that “I will be buried under this tree,” which is not a
proposition but a statement tantamount to “the sun is rising,” which should not be
regarded as a true proposition – the sun does not rise, it is the rotation of the earth
which produces the effect.
When we use “I” to refer to the human body, it is an improper use of the term “I.”
It is a conventional way of expression which does not correctly reflect the essential
properties or the persistence conditions of ourselves.
I proposed previously that there are two kinds of self-oriented concerns: the
egoistic concern and the egoistically oriented concern. Now I further propose that
necessarily, we can have an egoistic concern about a thing that is the referent of “I” if
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and only if the use of “I” in this case is proper use. On the other hand, necessarily, we
cannot have an egoistic concern about a thing that is the referent of “I” if and only if
the use of “I” in this case is improper use. For instance, the use of “I” that refers to
one’s corpse is an improper use because one has only egoistically oriented concern but
not egoistic concern about one’s corpse. We can have an egoistically oriented concern
about our corpses – for instance, many people have the desire that their bodies be
buried in their favorite places. However, we never care about how the corpse feels,
experiences, and perceives the external world from a first-person perspective.
Moreover, if one was told that one’s subject of experience would be realized by
something else apart from this human body P after time t, then my egoistic concern
after t will only be about the subject but not P. What is left is at most an egoistically
oriented concern about P that has accompanied the individual for such a long time. We
cannot have an egoistic concern with the corpse.
What about the human animal? If I use “I” to refer to my human animal, and we
adopt a physical theory of human animal, is it a proper use of “I”? My answer is no.
When I say, “I am five feet tall” or “I weight 45kg,” the “I” in this sentence refers to
the human animal, and the human animal is a physical entity, not identical to the
subject of experience, which is a mental entity. These examples are, therefore,
improper uses of “I.” On the other hand, if we adopt a hybrid theory of human animal,
according to which the human animal is the sum of a mental substance and a physical
substance, then the sentence “I am five feet tall” should also be incorrect. I am the
mental part of the human animal. I am not five feet tall, being a purely mental
substance. It should be that the physical part of the human animal that bears intimate
causal relation to me is five feet tall.
There is one point worth nothing though. Although proper use of “I” entails the
presence of a subject of experience who has the ability to make self-reference; the term
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“I” refers to the subject of experience who may not have the ability to refer to itself.
To take an example, I may use “I” to refer to the post-person in the final stage who
does not have the ability to self-refer. Still, I believe that I persist at the final stage of
the post-person, given that the post-person is conscious and is able to experience pain
and joy. Proper uses of “I” entail the presence of a conscious being with the ability to
self-refer, but the referent of “I” is a subject of experience who may not have the ability
to self-refer.
In summary, I have argued that although we have expressions in daily life that
uses “I” to refer to the human body, these uses of the word “I” are improper uses of
“I.” When there is a proper use of “I,” “I” refers to the subject of experience.

4.5

Advantages of My View

There are several theoretical advantages of the Conscious Subject View. First, a
Conscious Subject View also explains why we have the intuition that a person has an
egoistic concern with the post-person as a minimal subject in the late stage of
Alzheimer’s disease even if the post-person is not psychologically continuous with her
at all. The underlying reason for this intuition is fairly straightforward - we believe that
we persist so long as there is the same subject of experience, and this does not entail
psychological continuity. My view also explains why we have the intuition that we
persist only when there is a gradual replacement of brain cells. The intuition is
grounded in the fact that we think that we are subjects of experience, and we also have
the intuition that in the actual world, before we die, our subjects persist only when it
is supported by the continuity of brain.
Another advantage of the Conscious Subject View is that it can provide a
satisfactory solution to the case of brain-splitting, whereas the Embedded Brain View
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cannot do so. If I am essentially a brain, then I can be split because a brain can be split.
In other words, the Embedded Brain View fails to indicate how we could determine
the identity relations between the resultant entities, call them Lefty and Righty, and the
original one (call him Brainy) when the brain splits into two. The Embedded Person
View faces similar problems; as Lefty or Righty both have equally good physical and
psychological continuity, all relevant physical and psychological facts fall short of
providing helpful information for determining identity relations. As such,
contemporary philosophers such as Robert Nozick (1991) and Derek Parfit (1984)
stopped here and withdrew from taking identity seriously. According to Robert
Nozick’s closest continuer theory and Derek Parfit’s famous claim “identity is not
what matters,” personal identity is just a convention but not anything ontologically
significant. According to their theories, there is not an identity relation between Brainy,
Lefty, and Righty. This answer is not satisfactory in the sense that it does not explain
why the identity relation is eliminated when the brain is split. Moreover, if one
endorses the Only-x-and-y principle defended by Harold W. Noonan (1985), according
to which whether identity holds between two entities only depend on facts and
relations about the two entities in question, then the fact that the creation of an extra
entity, say, Righty, throughout the splitting process should not affect the identity
condition between Brainy and Lefty. It would be unacceptable that the existence of
Righty after the operation “cancels” the identity relation between Brainy and Lefty.
My Conscious Subject View is a view that takes our persistence as a metaphysical
but not conventional claim. It also takes the first-person perspective seriously by
emphasizing our egoistic concern and our intuitions regarding our persistence
conditions from a first-person perspective. If we take the first-person perspective
seriously, the case of brain-splitting indicates that there is something over and above
the observable physical and psychological facts that determine our persistence. In the
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next chapter, I will argue that subjects of experience are mental entities that have
haecceities. Haecceity provides an explanation to our intuition in the case of brainsplitting and reduplication from a first-person perspective, whereas both the Embedded
Person View and the Embedded Brain View fail to do so. There is a lot to do to work
out the argument, and I will elaborate more on these ideas in the next chapter.
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5
5.1

Haecceitism
General Haecceitism

Haecceity is a term introduced by John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) that refers to a nonqualitative property responsible for uniqueness and identity. Haecceity explains how a
substance is distinct from the other substances. I formulate it as an object O has
haecceity H if and only if H is what makes O a different object from other objects even
if they are qualitatively identical with O. Based on this definition, necessarily, for all
x and y, x equals y if x has haecceity p and y also has haecceity p. That means if I have
my haecceity, then no one else has my haecceity. Also, if an object O is the kind of
thing that has haecceity, then whenever O exists, its haecceity, call it H, is also
instantiated.
Haecceity is also called “thisness” or “individual essences.” Typically,
philosophers who believe in haecceities think that the necessary and sufficient
condition for instantiating haecceity is for the relevant individual to exist. For instance,
if Socrates exists, then necessarily, there is one and only one entity that instantiates
Socrates’s haecceity. In contrast, if Socrates does not exist, there is no such entity that
instantiates Socrates’s haecceity. David Lewis (1986), though does not say that he
believes in the existence of haecceities, describes haecceities as “properties that are in
no way qualitatively delineated, and some of these are haecceities of this- and otherworldly individuals. A unit set of an individual is one especially stringent haecceity.
Also, for any individual and any counterpart relation, there is the set of that individual
together with all its counterparts, and this is a less strict sort of haecceity.” (Lewis
1986, p. 225) It is generally agreed that haecceities are not multiply instantiable. There
can only be one existing object that instantiates Plato’s haecceity. Based on this, some
philosophers, such as Richard Swinburne (2012), are reluctant to regard haecceity as
a property. However, some thinkers such as Sam Cowling (2016) are happy with the
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idea that haecceity is a property that is not multiply instantiable. My definition of
haecceity is compatible with the idea that haecceity is a property so long as we
understand haecceity as in principle not multi-instantiable.
Apart from haecceity, there are also qualitative properties and non-qualitative
properties. These concepts play a crucial role in my discussion. There is no clear
definition of what a non-qualitative property is, but the distinction between qualitative
and non-qualitative properties are usually illustrated by paradigmatic examples. Some
examples of non-qualitative properties are those that share haecceities’ dependence
upon specific individuals, such as “standing five feet in front of Plato,” “being the
sister of Socrates,” and “being a friend of Wittgenstein.” The differences in
haecceitistic distribution also lead to differences in non-qualitative properties. For
example, if Plato exists and his haecceity is instantiated, there are also non-qualitative
properties such as “standing in front of Plato.” Haecceities are not multiply instantiable,
but many non-qualitative properties are multiply instantiable. “Standing in front of
Plato” is one easy example. Non-qualitative properties are also called “identity
properties” or “impure properties.”
Apart from non-qualitative properties, there are also qualitative properties.
Typical examples of qualitative properties are color, shape, mass, and volume, such as
those of “having a certain mass,” “being red,” and “being located five feet away from
a tree.”
There is an interesting relation between the theories of haecceities and
essentialism. There are several versions of essentialism. The strongest version of
essentialism is called “hyperessentialism,” a view that every individual necessarily has
all the properties it actually has, such that the entity must be what it now is. Another
strong version of essentialism called “origin essentialism” claims that any individual,
such as Jenny Hung, necessarily has her actual biological origins – Joseph Hung and
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Cindy Cho, in any possible world in which Jenny Hung exists. A weaker version of
essentialism requires that all entities instantiate certain non-discriminable properties
such as “being identical to itself” and “being such that 1+1 = 2.” Hyperessentialism
and some strong forms of essentialism may rule out the possibility of individuals
swapping qualitative roles. If it is impossible for you to have different properties, it
follows that you cannot “occupy” the qualitative role of Plato or that of your friends.
Similarly, origin essentialism precludes the idea that there can be haecceitistic
differences without qualitative differences. For instance, you cannot swap qualitative
roles with Wittgenstein because you necessarily have a different biological origin with
him.
Haecceitism may endorse weak versions of essentialism. If I am essentially a
human being, then there can be one version of haecceitism that allows swapping of
qualitative roles between two human beings but not swapping of qualitative roles
between a human being and a cat. The weakest form of essentialism, if it is still
considered as essentialism, (note that some philosophers do not regard it as a version
of essentialism) is extreme haecceitism, according to which the only essential
properties of an individual are its haecceity and general properties such as “being
identical to itself.” Extreme haecceitism allows that the world could have been
qualitatively the same while Plato could have been a poached egg - Plato and the
poached egg swap their qualitative roles. This view is most permissive in terms of the
de re modality of any individual. It is also dubbed “anti-essentialism” because of its
ruling out the distinctive essences of various kinds of things.
There are different versions of haecceitism. Some might only accept that two
twins swap qualitative roles while denying that you could swap your qualitative role
with your friend. Other versions of haecceitism allow swapping qualitative roles
between two human beings but reject the idea that we can swap our qualitative roles
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with inanimate objects or abstract entities such as numbers.

5.2

Haecceitism of Souls

In what follows, I examine the argument for haecceities of souls by a representative
contemporary philosopher, Richard Swinburne (2012). For Swinburne, we are
essentially souls, and souls have haecceities. He proposes the simple view of our
persistence, a view saying that our persistence over time is ultimately not analyzable.
In this view, you may not remember anything experienced by your soul in the past.
Your present soul may have distinct bodies and brains with that of your soul in the
past. This theory allows for a person to persist under radical changes of mental life and
bodily constitution.
Swinburne proposes a thought experiment to argue for the simple view of our
persistence. Suppose I have a brain disease that affects the functioning of the right
hemisphere, and that part of my brain is cloned and is replaced by a clone without the
disease. The clone contains all my memories and character traits. Suppose also that the
disease spreads to the left hemisphere, and this part is later replaced by another clone
of it. My psychology is kept continuous throughout these operations. In this situation,
Swinburne is not sure whether the resulting person would still be me. It seems that it
is both possible that I continued to exist or ceased to exist. He concludes that if both
cases are indeed possible, then our survival should not require physical or
psychological continuities.

Informative Designator
Richard Swinburne (2012) introduces the idea of “informative designators” to discuss
the relation between logically possible sentences and metaphysically possible
sentences.
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He adopts Saul Kripke’s (1980) definition that a rigid designator is a word which
“in every possible world, designates the same object.” (Kripke 1980, p. 48) He reads
object here as “things” in general, including substance, property, time, or event. He
further suggests that there are two types of rigid designators: informative rigid
designators and uninformative rigid designators. This is Swinburne’s definition of
informative designator: necessarily, for any term t, t is an informative rigid designator
if and only if (1) a competent language user fully knows the characteristics of the
property, substance, time, or event, and that (2) the term always picks out the same
property, substance, time, or event. Some examples of properties being informative
designators are such as “having the length of 1m,” “being round,” etc. Examples of
substances being informative designators are “H2O” and “electron.” Swinburne writes:

This means understanding by the ‘canonical description’ of an event a description in
terms of the substances, properties, and times involved in it by words such that a
competent language user would thereby know fully which property, which substance,
and which time the event involved. These will be words which always pick out the same
property and so on, and tell us fully which property that is; such words I shall call
‘informative [rigid] designators.’ (Swinburne 2017, p. 12)

On the other hand, there are also uninformative rigid designators that refer to
substances such that the speaker does not know the nature of that entity. He takes
Hilary Putnam’s (1975) example to explicate this idea. As the term “water” was used
in the eighteenth century as a designator of the colorless and watery stuff without
knowing its chemical essence, the people only picked out something watery and
colorless in virtue of its superficial (and even contingent) properties of water. It follows
that these people are unable to know or declare whether the stuff they pick out was
water or not.
For Swinburne, if there is a logically possible sentence in which all the substances
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and properties involved are designated by informative designators, then this sentence
is metaphysically possible. For instance, a qualitative description of “I” in the sentence,
such as “I continue to exist without any continuity of my brain, physical body,
memories, or psychological traits.” is logically possible, and all the substances and
properties described in this sentence are designated by informative designators.
Therefore, the sentence is also metaphysically possible. Swinburne writes:

If all the substances, properties, and so on, in a logically possible sentence, are designated
by informative designators, then that sentence will also be metaphysically possible.
(Swinburne 2013, p. 54)


According to Swinburne, the term “I” is an informative designator because I know
how to use this term, and it is not subject to illusion. More specifically, I cannot be
mistaken about its application when I am applying the term “I” to refer to the subject
of present experience. He writes:

What sort of designators are ‘I’ or ‘Richard Swinburne’ as used by me? These seem to
be informative designators. If I know how to use these words, then—when favourably
positioned, with faculties in working order, and not subject to illusion—I can’t be
mistaken about when to apply them; and when I am considering applying these words to
a person in virtue of that person being the subject of a present experience, no mistake at
all is possible. (Swinburne 2013, p. 158)
My knowledge of how to use ‘I,’ like my knowledge of how to use ‘green’ and
‘square,’ means that I know the nature of what I am talking about when I use the word.
(Ibid.)

Our knowledge of the use of “I” is like that of “H20.” One cannot be mistaken about
the application of such a term. Swinburne states that the use of these terms is not
subject to an illusion - the use of the term “I” is always immune to error through
misidentification. Since the sentence “I continue to exist without any continuity of my
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brain, physical body, memories, or psychological traits.” is logically possible, and all
the substances and properties described in this sentence are designated by informative
designators. Therefore, the sentence is also metaphysically possible. We are, therefore,
things that can continue to exist without any continuity of our brains, physical bodies,
memories, or psychological traits.
What, then, are we? Swinburne thinks that we are souls. He maintains that there
is an urge for us to propose the existence of souls. He defines a soul as follows:
necessarily, for any entity x, x is a soul if and only if x is a mental entity capable of
being conscious. For him, necessarily, we exist if and only if our souls exist. In other
words, we are essentially souls. Also, I persist only when my soul persists. Our having
physical bodies are contingent properties of our existence.
He provides a thought experiment to argue for the claims that (1) we are souls,
and (2) souls have haecceities. Suppose that there is a possible world W2 which is
qualitatively the same as our world W1. There is the same number of persons, each
having the exactly similar mental states as those in W1. Still, Swinburne thinks that the
two worlds can be very different in terms of your own existence. The person in W2
who looks exactly the same as you who thinks the same thoughts and has the same
actions as you is not you. A full description of a world regarding its physical,
psychological, and qualitative aspects does not provide any information about your
existence. Since there is no difference in terms of the qualitative, physical and
psychological properties of the two worlds, there should be something else that makes
the difference. Swinburne thinks that it is the existence of your soul makes the
difference. Your soul is there in world W1, whereas your soul does not exist in world
W2. The presence of, say, your soul, does not contribute to a qualitative difference
because there is not any qualitative, psychological, or physical difference between the
situations in which (1) your soul has mental state M1 and (2) somebody else’s soul has
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M1. For Swinburne, the difference between situations (1) and (2) is non-qualitative,
thus is haecceitistic. Therefore, (1) each person has a unique soul for her existence and
persistence, and (2) necessarily, for any entity x, x is a soul only if x has haecceity.

5.2.1

My Objections to Swinburne’s Haecceitism of Souls

In what follows, I argue that Swinburne’s argument that “I” am a soul that has
haecceity is problematic. To recall, his argument is briefly that:

1.

Sentence A: “I continue to exist without any continuity of my brain, physical body,
memories, or psychological traits.” is logically possible.

2.

Necessarily, if all the substances and properties in a logically possible sentence are
designated by informative designators, then that sentence will also be
metaphysically possible.

3.

All the substances and properties in sentence A are designated by informative
designators.

__________
C.

Sentence A is metaphysically possible. It is metaphysically possible that I continue
to exist without any continuity of my brain, physical body, memories, or
psychological traits.

In my opinion, premise three of the above argument is dubious. My basic stance is that
if “I” refers to the subject of experience, then “I” is an informative designator; however,
if it refers the soul, a mental thing that is capable of being conscious but is not
essentially conscious, then “I” is not an informative designator. We should, therefore,
be very careful about how we use the term “soul” and how we understand the
conception of I.
According to Swinburne, a soul is a thing that has a capacity to be conscious. He
writes:

[T]he only essential properties necessary for a person to exist are the essential
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properties of any soul, which – I suggest – are simply the one property of having
(in some sense) a capacity to be conscious. (Swinburne 2012, p. 122)

Swinburne states that an informative designator is a concept such that we can fully
understand the essence of the properties of the entity we are referring to. A thing that
is capable of being conscious is not necessarily a thing that is essentially conscious. It
may sometimes be unconscious. Such a thing is only potentially conscious; it is not a
requirement from Swinburne’s very definition of a soul that it is essentially conscious.
If “I” refers to a thing that is merely capable of being conscious, now I may ask, what
is the nature of the thing that is sometimes not conscious, but yet it sometimes
instantiates my consciousness? Modern science tells us that it is the brain. However,
for Swinburne, it should not be the brain because our brains are physical, and
Swinburne has already put forward an argument against the view that souls are
physical. Instead, he thinks that the soul is an immaterial substance. What is the nature
of such an immaterial substance that is potentially but not essentially conscious?
Some people would think that the essential property of a soul is the property of
the capacity to be conscious. Since we know the essential property of a soul, we know
the nature or essence of a soul. However, I doubt whether the essence (or essential
property) of a substance can be dispositional. In what follows, I briefly introduce the
idea of dispositions and provide my reasons for the claim that if the term “I” refers to
the soul, it should not be an informative designator because we do not know what kind
of entity we are referring to when we use the word.
First, the capacity to be conscious is a disposition property. A disposition, briefly
speaking, is a tendency, or a capacity, of having an actual status in certain conditions.
For instance, we say that glass has the disposition to shatter when struck, or that a
person has the disposition to get angry. When we assert these, it does not mean that the
glass has already shattered, or that the person is now angry. A dispositional property is
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one that is usually expressed in words such as “ability,” “potency,” “capability,”
“tendency,” “potentiality,” “proclivity,” “capacity,” and so forth. Locke once uses the
term “power” to describe such a property, whereas Aristotle adopts the conception
“dunamis” to elaborate a similar conception. Rudolf Carnap (1928), for instance,
introduces the idea of material conditionals to describe a dispositional expression.
According to him, an object x has a dispositional property of “being soluble” if it
fulfills the material conditional that “if x is put into water, it dissolves.”
Contemporary discussions on functions in philosophy of science, in particular,
biomedical science, have discussed the idea of dispositions. Philosophers such as
Robert Arp and Barry Smith (2008) discuss the classification of entities widely used
in biomedical research. They contribute to the revision of an ontological system called
the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), a framework for organizing and integrating
biomedical information. BFO is now used by frontier research organizations such as
National Cancer Institute in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and
the Science Commons – a renowned platform for sharing of scientific information.
According to BFO, there are two basic entities: continuants and occurrents. The
former denotes entities that persist through time, whereas the latter refers to events in
which continuants participate. There are two types of continuants: the independent and
dependent continuants. Independent continuants are bearers or carriers of dependent
continuants such as qualities. The existence of dependent continuants, on the other
hand, depends on the existence of some other independent continuant to serve as its
bearer. An example of the former is the property of being soft, and the latter is the brain
which serves as the bearer of the property. A disposition is classified as a continuant.
They are realizable entities – a realizable entity is a dependent continuant which can
be instantiated in associated processes in which the bearer participates. Some
realizable entities, such as the function of a uterus to store and nourish the fetus, may
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only be manifested once in the lifetime. Other realizable entities, such as the function
of the lung to breath and intake oxygen, is realized in every single moment when the
organism is alive. A disposition is an internally-grounded realizable entity that
supervenes on the physical make-up of the independent continuant. If the disposition
ceases to exist, it must be that its bearer’s physical make-up has changed. In the
situation that there is a non-functioning lung, the function of breathing does not exist
because some physical make-up of the lung has changed, such as its having a serious
infection.
I take it that the disposition, “the capacity of being conscious,” is a dependent
continuant that depends on the existence of some other independent continuant to serve
as its bearer. As there should be something, such as the brain, that serves as the bearer
of the property “being soft,” similarly, there should also be a bearer of the property of
“capable of being conscious.”
Unfortunately, we are not informed what the bearer of this property is, and what
its nature is. We have no idea about what the kind of thing that is capable of being
consciousness is. There could in principle be more than one kind of thing that
instantiates the capacity of being conscious. When one uses the term “I” to refer to the
soul, one actually does not know what kind of thing one is referring to. Take “being
fragile” as an example. There are many kinds of entity that possess that dispositional
property of being fragile - it is plausible that their being fragile are grounded in
different physical structures or lower-level physical properties in virtue of which an
entity is fragile. Glass is fragile because of the molecular structure of glass, and a piece
of biscuit is also fragile because it is crispy with air filled in between crumbs of it. One
has a molecular explanation of fragileness, and the other has macrophysical reasons
for being fragile. Similarly, there can be two or more substance in virtue of which the
dispositional property of capable of being conscious is instantiated. We do not know
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what kind of thing it is even if we know that it is a thing that has the capacity to be
conscious. In this case, if the term “I” refers to the soul, it should not be an informative
designator because we do not know what kind of entity we are referring to when we
use the word.
For “I” to be an informative designator, one would need a feature of the referent
of “I” such that we can easily refer to such that kind of entity with that very feature. I
believe that this feature is the phenomenal character of our consciousness. Such a
feature explains why when we use “I” to refer to a conscious subject, we are always
successful in doing so. More specifically, we are always capable of referring to the
mental thing that owns the current experience via being aware of our conscious
experience from a first-person perspective.
However, if the only property that characterizes the soul is dispositional (such as
the capacity of being conscious), then the existence of one’s soul would be independent
of any feature in virtue of which one is capable of detecting from a first-person or a
third-person perspective. In particular, when my soul is not conscious, nobody
(including myself) can tell whether my soul exists or not. This renders the existence of
the soul in principle unverifiable from both first-person and third-person perspectives,
and thus it violates Swinburne’s idea that the soul is an informative designator.
Some philosophers of the soul view, such as Descartes, believe that the soul is
essentially conscious. One might be tempted to believe that necessarily, if an entity A
is capable of being conscious, A is essentially conscious. However, prima facie, the
former does not logically entail the latter. More arguments are needed for such a view
to hold, and the burden will not be on my side.
On the other hand, if “I” refers to a subject of experience, and if we adopt a
Strawsonian definition of subjects of experience, then necessarily, “I” the subject of
experience exists if and only if there is conscious experience. That said, the essential
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property, or the essence, of a subject of experience is to be conscious. The property of
being conscious is not dispositional, and there is a clear feature with having this
property that allows us to tell whether the entity exists or not from a first-person
perspective. We can, therefore, say that we know the essence (or essential properties)
of a subject of experience. If we know the essential properties of “I,” we can also say
that we know the essence of the entity “I” that we are referring to, and thus “I” can be
an informative designator.
My conclusion is that if we were to admit that the concept “I” is an informative
designator, “I” simply cannot be a soul that is merely capable of being conscious and
not essentially conscious. In contrast, it must be a mental thing that is essentially
conscious. A conscious subject of experience is the owner of conscious experiences,
and we have experiences directly in virtue of being a subject. Following my definition
that subjects of experiences are essentially conscious and not just potentially conscious,
a subject is an informative designator. When we propose that “I” refer to a subject of
experience, we can confidently claim that we know the essence of the reference of “I.”
I thus recommend revising Swinburne’s proposal of the haecceitism of the potentially
conscious souls to the haecceitism of essentially conscious subjects of experience.

5.3

Haecceitism of First-person Perspectives

There is still another contemporary analytic philosopher who proposes that we have
haecceities. As mentioned in chapter three, Lynne Rudder Baker (2000, 2007, 2013)
proposes Constitutionalism of persons, a view saying that you are not numerically
identical with an animal but are constituted by an animal. In addition, Baker proposes
a view according to which a person has haecceitistic implications because of the
haecceitistic implications of a first-person perspective.
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Haecceity, according to Baker, is “a state of affairs of someone exemplifying the
dispositional property expressed by “a first-person perspective.” (Baker 2013, p. 180)
For instance, my haecceity is my exemplifying my first-person perspective essentially,
and your haecceity is your exemplifying your first-person perspective essentially.35
Following this, if there is a person A at time t1 who has x’s first-person perspective,
and there is a person B at time t2 who also has x’s first-person perspective, then it must
be the case that A=B. For her, having x’s haecceity, or, x’s first-person perspective, is
the necessary and sufficient condition for the diachronic identity of person x. Baker
stresses the particularity of a spatiotemporal location, and the origin of her perceptual
field, from which the subject perceives the environment. She also proposes that
persons have haecceities in virtue of having a first-person perspective. Although she
uses a different definition of haecceity that Swinburne uses, both Baker’s and
Swinburne’s definition avoids multiple instantiations of a single haecceity at the same
time by two different entities. Second, both admit that haecceity is a non-qualitative
fact that determines the uniqueness, identity, existence, and persistence of an entity
that has haecceity.
In my opinion, Baker’s view is flawed in the sense that a subject does not
necessarily have a unique first-person perspective. In what follows, I aim to argue that
if it is possible for (1) one single spatiotemporal location (or viewpoint) to be possessed
by two or more perceivers at the same time, and for (2) one perceiver to have two or
more spatiotemporal locations (or viewpoints) at the same time, it follows that the
haecceities of a first-person perspective are questionable.

35

Baker writes: “Let F be the dispositional property expressed by “a first-person perspective. …the
notion of an haecceity as a property to take an haecceity to be the state of affairs of someone’s
exemplifying a property. So, my haecceity is my-exemplifying-F-essentially. Your haecceity is yourexemplifying-F-essentially. Necessarily, person x and person y have the same haecceity if and only if x
= y. So, necessarily, I have my haecceity and no one else does.” (Baker 2013, pp. 179 - 180)
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Baker proposes that a first-person perspective carries haecceities, such that the
sameness of a person is determined by the sameness of the first-person perspective.
There are two stages of the first-person perspectives: the rudimentary and the robust
one. The robust FPP is an ability to use first-person pronouns and to think of oneself
as oneself. However, our ability to conceive of oneself as oneself as the subject of
thoughts develops gradually, and the strength of our abilities may differ throughout
our lives. It does not make any sense for us to say that our persistence is determined
by the sameness of one of our abilities. Moreover, abilities are multiply instantiable,
and it should not be the case that the robust first-person perspective determines the
sameness of a person over time. If my ability to think of myself as myself has declined
recently, it does not make sense to say that I do not persist in this case.
Assuming that Baker’s theory is true, it should be the rudimentary first-person
perspective that has haecceitistic implications. What exactly does it mean by saying
that a rudimentary first-person perspective has haecceity and determines one’s
uniqueness and persistence conditions? Let us reveal some features of a rudimentary
FPP proposed by Baker:

1. To have a perspective is to be disposed to perceive the world from a particular
spatiotemporal location.
2. [I]t is simply the default location of the conscious subject, the origin of her
perceptual field, the location from which the subject perceives the environment
that she interacts with. (Baker 2013, pp. 40-41, my Italics)

For Baker, what makes a rudimentary first-person perspective unique is the unique
spatiotemporal location of the perspective from which one perceives. Let us assume
that this is what renders a first-person perspective haecceitistic. Since we all have the
ability to perceive the world from a certain spatiotemporal perspective, what makes a
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first-person perspective unique should not be the ability to perceive, but the
spatiotemporal location from which one perceives. Arguably, there are two types of
spatiotemporal locations when we perceive: (1) the spatiotemporal viewpoint from
which one perceives the world, and (2) the spatiotemporal location of the physical
entity (should be the brain in our case) responsible for producing the perception. An
example will clarify. Suppose a person goes into an experience machine in Hong Kong
such that she has experiences of herself at a beach in Hawaii. She does not have any
bodily sensations or perceptions of being in that machine in Hong Kong. Her
spatiotemporal viewpoint should be a certain spatiotemporal perspective on the beach
in Hawaii, whereas the spatiotemporal location of the physical entity responsible for
producing the perception is located inside the experience machine in Hong Kong.
What about defining the spatiotemporal location of the physical entity responsible
for the perception to be the element in the first-person perspective that has haecceity?
Unfortunately, this proposal would render Baker’s theory inconsistent. If the
spatiotemporal location of any physical entity that realizes higher-order properties
determines the uniqueness and individuation of that entity, then many physical entities,
conscious or unconscious, would have haecceities. This is not what Baker wants to see
– she wants to argue that persons are special in the sense that they carry haecceitistic
implications by virtue of having a unique first-person perspective.
The other choice for Baker is to claim that the spatiotemporal viewpoint from
which we perceive the external world is haecceitistic. My proposal is that the
spatiotemporal viewpoint from which we perceive the world is still not an indicator of
our uniqueness. As a spatiotemporal property is descriptive, in principle, it can be
doubly instantiated by two distinct beings of the same kind simultaneously. It is
possible that different subjects may experience the same spatiotemporal viewpoint. For
instance, there can be more than two persons going into the experience machine, and
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their spatiotemporal viewpoints are all the same: a certain spatiotemporal perspective
on the beach in Hawaii. In this case, each person’s spatiotemporal viewpoint is not
unique anymore. If there can be two or more individuals sharing the same first-person
perspective, then the first-person perspective does not correspond to the uniqueness
and identity of individuals. As a result, the first-person perspective should not be
haecceitistic.
Second, it is not hard for us to seek advice from the rapidly growing
biotechnology and artificial intelligence that one day we can sense and control a
physical part that is spatiotemporally separated from our physical body, which can “see”
and “sense” things in a way as direct as using our limbs. For instance, we already have
decent enough technologies that allow amputated patients to control over and have
various sensations about an artificial limb or leg. It is not difficult to imagine that this
artificial limb is sometimes not in direct physical connection with the main human
body. The consequence of accepting the possibility for some of our effective bodily
parts to be in separated places at the same time is that there can be many spatiotemporal
viewpoints from which I perceive the world. Perhaps one day we all have artificial
eyes in addition to our natural eyes. These artificial eyes can be separated from our
human bodies and can “see” things from a different perspective. If it is so, the
spatiotemporal viewpoint from which one perceives the world would not be one but
many, and it would then fail to determine our uniqueness. The idea that a conscious
subject necessarily having one single spatiotemporal viewpoint is thus problematic. If
I can have two or more spatiotemporal perspectives from which I perceive the world,
there can be two different locations eligible for being “my first-person perspective” at
the same time.
As my first-person perspective can be multiply instantiable at two different places
at the same time, the first-person perspective does not carry haecceity. Haecceity is
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defined such that it determines the uniqueness, existence, and identity of an object, and
thus is in principle not multiply instantiable. Consider a situation in which (1)
necessarily, I exist if and only if A exists, and (2) necessarily, I exist if and only if B
exists. However, given that AɽB and they do not necessarily coexist, then either (1)
is false or (2) is false. Similarly, if I have two spatiotemporal perspectives from which
I perceive the world and they do not necessarily coexist, then my first-person
perspective(s) are not what determine(s) my uniqueness. First-person perspectives
should not carry haecceity.

5.4

Haecceitism of Subjects

I will now argue that subjects of experience have haecceities. Before I lay out my
arguments, let me first introduce some terminologies and definitions.
I differentiate in this discussion two important concepts: (1) subjects and (2)
human beings. As stated in the preceding chapter, I define a subject as a conscious
thing that essentially has experience, and a human being (or human animal) a physical
organism. My notion of “subject” is different from Baker’s conception of person in
the sense that my idea of subject is very thin - so long as there is a conscious stream
of experience, a subject exists. Under this picture, many other animals such as worms
and spiders also have subjects of experience, even though they are not persons. I will
extensively use the concept subject instead of person. I propose, instead, that it is the
subject (but not the first-person perspective) which carries haecceitistic implications.
I define haecceitism as the claim that the world could differ (change) nonqualitatively without differing (changing) qualitatively. I adopt a common
understanding of the conception of non-qualitative properties via exemplars such as
“standing in front of Plato,” and I understand qualitative properties via paradigm cases
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such as “having a certain mass,” “being red,” and “being located five feet away from
a tree.” I define haecceity as follows. An object O has haecceity H if and only if H is
what makes O a different object from other objects that are qualitatively the same with
O. There are two claims regarding haecceitism: Haecceitism of the Conscious and
Haecceitism of the Unconscious. Haecceitism of the Conscious is the claim according
to which for any world W with at least one conscious being, W could differ nonqualitatively without differing qualitatively. Haecceitism of the Unconscious is the
view that for any world W with only unconscious beings, W could differ nonqualitatively without differing qualitatively.
I propose that (1) Subjects have haecceities, and (2) Haecceitism of the conscious
is true. My arguments are modified from Robert Merrihew Adams (1979). Here is the
first step of my argument. Suppose a great physicist suddenly announces a terrible but
significant discovery - we are living in a universe with two symmetrical space-time
regions - call this world the “symmetrical universe.” There are two sides in this world,
each having exactly the same states of affairs with the other side at all times. In addition,
each person has a mirror-person with the same mental properties at all times during
one’s lifetime, and the environment she encounters is exactly the same as that of the
other side. In this thought experiment, I define a person as a mental entity, a subject of
experience that has certain psychological complexity such as memories, psychological
traits, and personality.

36

More specifically, my mirror person has the same

psychological properties with me from the beginning of the world to time t1. Suppose
physicists tell us that the symmetry will be broken, and things in the two sides will
behave differently after t1 due to charge differences. More specifically, physics predicts
that the individual on the side with more positive charges after t1, call it “side A,” feels

36

I do not assume substance dualism here in this thought experiment. However, if one is a substance
dualist, one can assume that each person is intimately causally related to one and only one human
being in this thought experiment.
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itchy and laughs during t1-t2, whereas the individual on the side with more negative
charges after t1, call it “side B,” has intense pain and cries during t1–t2. I aim to show
that there can be two scenarios:

Two scenarios in the Symmetrical Universe:
I.

I am at side A.

II.

I am at side B.37

I propose that there are three ways to argue for the haecceities of subjects of experience.
They are: (1) the Chalmersian approach, (2) the Swinburnean approach, and (3) the
Nida-Rümelinean approach. These approaches are not proposed by these philosophers
although their names are mentioned here. David Chalmers does not propose
haecceitism of anything; Richard Swinburne (2013) adopts a different argument for
the haecceities of souls, and Martine Nida-Rümelin (2016) does not mention
haecceitism in her theory. I adopt some of their ideas in the three approaches of my
arguments of haecceitism of subjects.
The Chalmersian approach is to say that the two propositions, namely, “I am at
side A” and “I am at side B,” are all ideally positively conceivable and are thus
metaphysically possible. Since there should be something non-qualitative that
determines which I am. If “I” refers to the subject of experience, then haecceitism of
subjects thus come along. The Swinburnean approach is to argue that the two
propositions involve the term “I,” which is an informative designator. These sentences
are logically possible sentences in which all the substances and properties involved are
designated by informative designators. It follows that these propositions are
metaphysically possible. Since there should be something non-qualitative that

37

Again, I do not assume substance dualism here. However, if substance dualism is true, one can
understand the sentence “I am at side A” to mean that I am intimately causally related to the human
being at side A.
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determines which I am, subjects of experience have haecceities. The third (NidaRümelinean) approach is to argue that there is a factual difference between the four
situations. Given that there are no differences in qualitative (psychological, physical,
or spatiotemporal) properties between the two individuals in that world, and yet these
propositions correspond to different facts, it follows that the answer to the question
“who am I?” is a non-qualitative further fact over and above all the observable,
qualitative properties and state of affairs in the world. Haecceities of subjects of
experience thus comes along.
I think all these approaches are effective. I am more inclined to the first two, and
I have some doubt about some implications of Nida-Rümelin’s idea. In what follows,
I will delineate the arguments of the three approaches one by one and further comment
on them.

5.4.1

The Chalmersian Approach

Let us start with the Chalmersian approach. There are three steps to argue for the
haecceitism of subjects. In the first step, I argue for the metaphysical possibility of
some propositions in the thought experiment. In the second step, I argue that there is
something non-qualitative that determines my existence. In the third step, I argue that
subjects have haecceities.
I now delineate how the situations in a thought experiment are ideally positively
conceivable. Recall that the two individuals in that symmetrical universe I have just
mentioned have all the same psychological properties before t1. The person in one side
of the two symmetrical sides of that world feels itchy and laughs right after t1 (call this
person A), whereas the mirror person in another side of the world suffers from intense
pain and cries starting from time t1 (call this person B). Suppose you are told that you
are living in a symmetrical universe, and there is a mirror person who has the same
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qualitative psychological properties with you from the beginning of the universe to
t1.38 Now you are thinking about the question of which side of the universe I am in.
The question of whether you are A or B is a real question, a fact that greatly affects
you. Either you will suffer from great pain after t1, or you will not. It certainly matters
whether you are going to suffer or not, and you are egoistically concerned with whether
you will be A or B. Your being B is greatly different from your being A because you
will suffer in the former situation but not the latter. The things that happen after t1 can
be clearly imagined, and we have a clear and a positive understanding of the feature
of the two propositions above. We can also successfully imagine the details clearly and
distinctly – you can even imagine that you are waiting for t1 to come, and you anticipate
seeing whether you will feel pain or itchy. We can say a lot further about the details of
those statements and can even write a short story about your being in the symmetrical
universe. We can perceptually imagine what would happen to us in a way that verifies
that it is true, and the imaginative scenario does not reveal a contradiction.39 These
situations are ideally positively conceivable and belong to the type of conceivability
that has the strongest evidence for metaphysical possibility according to Chalmers’s
classification.40 If ideally, positively conceivable propositions are those such that any

38

I presuppose some kind of internalism about mental states. Internalism is the view that the content
of our mental states is determined by our intrinsic properties. Briefly speaking, I presuppose that the
phenomenal quality and the representational content of the mental states of the mirror persons are
the same. The mental states of the mirror persons are the qualitatively identical in virtue of the
sameness of representational content and phenomenal content of the mental states. For instance, the
mirror persons think that “A cat is on the mat.” The “mirror” mental states had by the mirror persons
have qualitatively the same phenomenal content, the same phenomenal quality of “what it’s likeness.”
Furthermore, their representational contents can be expressed by the same proposition. Hence, I
would say that the mirror-mental states are qualitatively identical (they may not be numerically
identical).
39
According to Chalmers, some imaginations are perceptual (call them perceptual imaginations). In
these perceptual imaginations, the subject has a perceptual image of the scenario she imagines. For
instance, a subject conceives of a pig playing the guitar by imagining the visual image of a it. For more
classifications of imagination and conceivability, see the introduction of this thesis.
40
For more descriptions of different types of conceivable situations, refer to the introduction of this
thesis.
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ideal reasoners can perceptually imagine it and can verify the truth of it without any
contradiction involved, the two propositions (I and II) in my thought experiment are
ideally positively conceivable, and thus are metaphysically possible. Here is the first
step of my series of arguments:

Step 1: The Chalmersian Argument for Metaphysical Possibility
1.

We can ideally positively conceive of I- II.

2.

All ideally positively conceivable propositions are metaphysically possible.

___________
C.

I-II are metaphysically possible.41

This argument is followed by the argument for non-qualitativity. The argument is
briefly as follows. The two propositions are metaphysically possible, namely, that it is
metaphysically possible for me to be A or B. Nevertheless, there is no qualitative
difference between my being A and my being B. There should be something nonqualitative that determines whether I am A or B. In other words, the difference between
I and II is grounded in something non-qualitative. Here is the second step:

Step 2: An Argument for Non-qualitativity
1. Propositions I-II are metaphysically possible.
2. There is something that grounds the difference between two metaphysically possible
propositions, whether qualitative or non-qualitative.
3. There is not any qualitative difference between I-II.
____________
C.

41

The difference between I and II is grounded in something non-qualitative.

I am grateful to Prof. Dan Marshall in pointing out that the necessity of identity is a possible threat
to the conclusion of the Chalmersian Argument for Metaphysical Possibility. The necessity of identity
is a claim that if two objects, a and b, are numerically identical with each other, then it is necessary
that a is numerically identical to b. It is thus not metaphysically possible that I am A given that I am B,
and vice versa. However, there are contemporary philosophers, such as Wolfgang Schwarz
(forthcoming), who rejects the controversial claim of the necessity of identity. I would take it that it is
metaphysically possible that I am A, and it is also metaphysically possible that I am B. Both scenarios
are metaphysically possible because both are ideally positively conceivable.
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I have already argued for premise 1 in the first step. I now argue for premise two. From
the above discussions, we can see that the two situations in which we can ideally
positively conceive are very different. For instance, situation (I) is for me to feel itchy
and to laugh, which is quite a pleasurable experience, whereas situation (II) is for me
to feel great pain and to cry, which is obviously undesirable for me. These situations
correspond to different facts with which I am egoistically concerned; I have a strong
preference for one but not the other. The two propositions direct two distinct facts. I
assume in premise two that the differences between metaphysically possible
descriptions should be grounded in at least some way, whether qualitative or nonqualitative. 42 I assume premise three in my thought experiment that there is no
qualitative difference between propositions I and II. Therefore, there should be
something non-qualitative that makes I-II different; namely, there should be something
non-qualitative that determines whether I am A or B.43
Here comes the final step of my series of arguments for the haecceitism of
subjects:

Step 3: An Argument for the Haecceitism of Subjects
1.

There is something non-qualitative that grounds the difference between I (I am A)
and II (I am B).

2.

There is something non-qualitative that makes “I” the subject of experience a
different object from other objects even if they are qualitatively identical with it.

42
Philosophers such as Theodore Sider (2018) propose that there are fundamental and nonfundamental facts. Fundamental facts are ungrounded. I regard the fact that I am individual A but not
B in the thought experiment as a non-fundamental fact grounded in the fact that individual A has my
haecceity H, but individual B does not.
43
Some philosophers may think that the causal-historical-relational properties of the individuals in I
and II are different, and this is sufficient to ground the distinctness of I and II. My reply is that the
causal-historical-relational properties of the mirror persons in the two sides of the symmetrical
universe are set to be qualitatively the same in this thought experiment. Second, some may want to
claim that the relational properties of the mirror persons are different, such as the A instantiates “being
two miles from B” and B instantiates “being two miles from A,” etc. The distinctness of these properties
grounds the distinctness of I and II. My reply is that these properties can at most be the ground to the
distinctness of the two mirror persons but not the distinctness of the facts that “I am A” and “I am B.”
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3.

Necessarily, an object O has haecceity H if and only if H is what makes O a different
object from other objects even if they are qualitatively identical with it. (My
definition of haecceity)

____________
C.

“I” the subject of experience has haecceity.

The first premise is what I have just argued for in the second step. For the second
premise, both (I am A) and (I am B) are identity statements. There is only one thing in
each sentence, namely, the entity that is that referent of “I.” The term “I” in this thought
experiment refers to the subject of experience in these two descriptions because “I”
refers to an entity with conscious experience such as pain and itchiness from the firstperson perspective in these descriptions. The ideal positive conceivability of the above
scenarios stems from the fact that the concept “I” refers to the subject of experience in
the above situations. The third premise is my definition of haecceity.
This is how I come up with the conclusion that “I” the subject of experience has
haecceity. There is one thing worth mentioning though. The diachronic identity
conditions of subjects of experience in any possible world should be the same even
when it is not yet t1. Even if you are one of the subjects in that symmetrical universe,
and it is not yet t1, the metaphysical fact of identity regarding “who you are” is still
there. The difference in psychology between the two individuals during t1-t2 does not
change the metaphysical facts regarding the identity of the subjects. The test is just a
means for us to understand more about the conditions of our existence. You may still
wonder which one you are. Your question is a real metaphysical question, just that you
are not able to know the answer before t1.

5.4.2

The Swinburnean Approach

Now, let us go on to discuss my second approach: the Swinburnean approach to the
haecceitism of subjects. In the previous section, I have argued that “I” is an informative
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designator when “I” refers to the subject of experience, which is different from
Swinburne’s claim that “I” is an informative designator that refers to the soul. We
know the essential properties of a subject of experience. “I” is an informative
designator referring to a subject of experience, the essential property of which is to be
conscious. If we take Swinburne’s idea that any logically possible sentence in which
all the substances and properties involved are designated by informative designators,
and that “I” is an informative designator when referring to the subject of experience in
this thought experiment, then it follows that the posited situations I and II in the above
thought experiment are metaphysically possible. Here is step one of my Swinburnean
argument:

Step 1: The Swinburnean Argument for Metaphysical Possibility
1. Propositions I- II are logically possible.
2. Necessarily, if there is a logically possible proposition in which all the substances
and properties involved are designated by informative designators, then this
proposition is metaphysically possible.
3. “I” is an informative designator when referring to the subject of experience.
4. All the substances and properties involved are designated by informative
designators in both I, “I am A,” and II, “I am B.”
___________
C.

Propositions I-II are metaphysically possible.

After that, the second and third steps are exactly the same as that of the Chalmersian
approach. We can plug in step 2: An Argument for Non-qualitativity, and step 3: An
Argument for the Haecceitism of Subjects. Based on the assumption that propositions
I-II are metaphysically possible, one can eventually come to the conclusion that
subjects of experience have haecceities.

5.4.3

The Nida-Rümelinean Approach
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There is a third method to argue for the claim that subjects have haecceities. NidaRümelin’s theory of propositional content captures the differences in meaning. For her,
propositions 1 and 2 have different factual contents if and only if there is a feature
which would render 1 true and 2 false. Also, there is a factual difference between
propositions 1 and 2 if and only if they have different factual content. She claims:

There is a factual difference between two alleged possibilities in the relevant sense if and
only if there is a difference in factual content between the sentences expressing them.
(Nida-Rümelin 2013, p. 709)

And also,

The sentences “C1 and C2” and “C1 and C3” have different factual content if and only if
there is an objective feature which, if satisfied in a given situation in addition to what
renders C1 true, would make that situation one ‘where’ “C1 and C2” is true and “C1 and
C3” is false (and vice versa). (Ibid.)

For Nida-Rümelin, the factual content of a sentence refers to the fact described by a
sentence. There is a difference between the factual contents of two sentences if and
only if there is a factual difference between sentences. Step 1 of the Nida-Rümelinean
Argument is as follows:

Step 1: The Nida-Rümelinean Argument for the Haecceitism of Subjects
1. There is a factual difference between propositions I (I am A) and II (I am B) when I
use “I” to refer to the subject of experience.
2. There is not any qualitative difference between I-II.
3. There should be something non-qualitative that makes I-II different.
____________
C.

There should be something non-qualitative that “I” the subject of experience

possesses, that makes I-II different.
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After that, one can directly take step 3, the argument for haecceitism of subjects. The
Nida-Rümelinean approach merges steps 1 and 2 of the Chalmersian approach.

5.4.4

A Comparison of Different Approaches

I believe that all three arguments are sound. Both the Chalmersian and the
Swinburnean approach have the same implication – the two scenarios are
metaphysically possible. On the other hand, the Nida-Rümelinean approach does not
mention whether the sentences with the difference in factual context correspond to
different possible worlds. Although we may not need to talk about metaphysical
possibility in the argument for the haecceitism of subjects, it is crucial for us to know
whether the two situations “I am A” and “I am B” are metaphysically possible.
Nida-Rümelin is reluctant to accept that conceivable situations, in any case, imply
metaphysical possibility. I disagree with her proposal. In what follows, I briefly
introduce her notion of “non-descriptive individual nature.” I argue that the two
situations, I and II, should be metaphysically possible.
Nida-Rümelin thinks that conscious beings are special in the sense that they have
non-descriptive individual nature. Unconscious entities such as chairs, trees, and books,
on the other hand, do not have non-descriptive individual nature. More specifically, an
entity possesses a non-descriptive individual nature if and only if “the constitutional
basis for its existence is non-descriptive.” (Nida-Rümelin, 2012, p. 160) One may use
a rigid designator to refer to that individual in any counterfactual situation and may
say that the description “D has property P” or simply that “D exists” and these
statements trivially endorses the view that D exists. However, there is no way to
describe in a non-trivial manner what guarantees the existence of a thing. For her, “the
constitutional basis of a thing’s existence is non-descriptive if and only if there is in
principle no way to say in a noncircular manner what constitutes the existence of that
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particular thing.” (Ibid.) If the individual has a non-descriptive individual nature, one
can only have a trivial statement, such as that of including its existence, for the
condition of the existence of an entity. One may also say that an entity X has a nondescriptive individual nature if and only if “the constitutional basis of its existence can
only be described using a rigid designator which refers to X.” (Ibid., p. 161) It indicates
that the non-descriptive individual nature is a non-qualitative property that is uniquely
possessed by an entity.
Nida-Rümelin goes on to argue that conscious beings are very different from nonconscious entities in the sense that we have a positive conception of an additional
feature apart from the qualitative facts regarding the conditions of our existence from
a first-person perspective, but it is in principle impossible that we perceive of an
additional feature apart from the qualitative facts regarding the existence of an
unconscious entity from a first-person perspective. On the other hand, it makes perfect
sense to say that there is a perfect counterpart to you and yet she is not you. More
specifically, we understand very well what it means by saying that “the perfect
counterpart is you” (call this option 1) and “your perfect counterpart is not you.” (call
this option 2) The first sentence describes a case in which you “wake up” discovering
that you have the counterpart’s body and her experiences, and you live her life. The
second sentence describes the situation in which you do not wake up, and do not
experience anything – you simply cease to exist. To conceive of the difference, one
has to think in a first-personal way from one’s own perspective. There is a genuine
factual difference between the two options. Nida-Rümelin thinks that we have a clear
and positive understanding of the difference between the two. Given that all the
descriptions about the psychological and physical facts in situations I and II are the
same, these qualitative facts fail to guarantee your existence. Every condition that
guarantees your existence requires a rigid reference to you. It follows that you have a
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non-descriptive individual nature.
Nida-Rümelin believes that to have a clear and positive understanding of the
difference between the two options does not imply that there is a feature that
constitutes the difference between their metaphysical possibilities. More specifically,
even if one of the options is metaphysically impossible, there is still a clear positive
understanding for us regarding the two situations, and there would still be a factual
difference between the two options. For Nida-Rümelin, even if the second option,
namely, you do not exist, is metaphysically impossible, there is still a clear positive
understanding for us regarding the two situations. There would still be a factual
difference between them.
I believe that there is a problem with Nida-Rümelin’s theory. I argue that if option
2 in the above scenario is impossible, then the non-descriptive nature should not coexist with a conscious object. However, Nida-Rümelin wants to claim that there exists
my non-descriptive nature F,” such that necessarily, I exist if and only if F exists. She
would then have to admit that option 2 is metaphysically possible.
Recall the two situations that she thinks we can conceive of. Suppose there is a
perfect counterpart of you with your psychological traits and memories. Nida-Rümelin
thinks that we understand clearly what it means by saying that there is a perfect
counterpart of you and yet she is not you. Let us assume that this option is
metaphysically impossible, as Nida-Rümelin suggests. That said, it is metaphysically
impossible that a person has the same qualitative properties as me and yet she is not
me. If it is true, then it follows that necessarily, my existence is sufficiently determined
by my set of qualitative properties and nothing else. In other words, necessarily, if my
set of qualitative properties exists, then I exist. Now, let us suppose that there is a nondescriptive nature F that I uniquely have. Given that the psychological and physical
facts sufficiently determine my existence, the proposal that “there exists a non194

descriptive nature F, such that necessarily, I exist if and only if F exists” would be
incorrect. The structure of my argument is as follows:

1.

It is metaphysically impossible for the perfect counterpart of me not to be me.
(Nida-Rümelin’s assumption A)

2.

Necessarily, I exist if my set of qualitative properties exist. (1)

3.

There exists something non-qualitative, call it “my-non-descriptive nature F,” such
that necessarily, I exist if and only if F exists. (Nida-Rümelin’s assumption B)

4.

If necessarily, I exist if my set of qualitative properties exist, then possibly, I exist
even if there does not exist a non-qualitative non-descriptive nature F.

5.

I exist even if my-non-descriptive nature F does not exist. Contradiction.

_____________
C.

Either A or B is incorrect. Either it is not the case that (A) it is metaphysically
impossible for the perfect counterpart of me not to be me, or it is not the case that
(B) there is something non-qualitative, call it “my-non-descriptive nature F,” such
that necessarily, I exist if and only if F exists.

Nida-Rümelin is not willing to accept the conclusion that it is not the case that there is
something non-qualitative, call it “my-non-descriptive nature F,” such that necessarily,
I exist if and only if F exists. The claim that conscious beings have non-descriptive
nature is her basic claim. She would then need to admit that premise (1) is false. It is
not the case that it is metaphysically impossible for the perfect counterpart of you not
to be you.44
In summary, I believe that all the three approaches of arguing for haecceitism of
subjects of experience are sound and cogent. I prefer the first two approaches, namely,
the Chalmersian and the Swinburnean approach. The reason is that I disagree with
Nida-Rümelin about her claim that the two scenarios discussed above are
metaphysically impossible.
44

One possible objection to my argument is to say that the non-qualitative further fact supervenes on
a particular set of qualitative facts. However, Nida-Rümelin’s proposal of non-descriptive individual
nature would then be redundant. It is tantamount to saying that the non-descriptive individual nature
is in fact describable in terms of a particular set of qualitative facts.
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5.4.5

On Our Persistence Conditions

I have argued in the previous chapter that we are essentially subjects of experience.
Necessarily, when we exist, we are subjects. I have also argued that subjects of
experience have haecceities, such that the persistence of any subject S is determined
by the sameness of its haecceity, call it H, of that subject. The presence of H is the
necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of S. Since haecceity is nonqualitative, we can in principle know and tell nothing about our persistence conditions.
Our persistence should then be an unanalyzable fact. My view of our persistence can
also be regarded as a modified simple view which is not directly simple but ultimately
simple, according to which there are two steps toward simplicity: step one is the claim
that our persistence conditions are just the diachronic identity conditions of subjects
of experience. Step two is to show that subjects have haecceities, and its persistence
conditions are not analyzable any further. I still regard my view as a version of the
simple view because our persistence is, ultimately speaking, not analyzable.

5.4.6

Some Implications

In what follows, I talk about some implications of the haecceitism of subjects. Recall
the thought experiment proposed by Sydney Shoemaker (1984) and Derek Parfit
(1984), in which an individual Brainy’s brain is split into two and put into two newly
made bodies, Lefty and Righty. As Lefty or Righty both have equally good physical
and psychological continuity with Brainy, all relevant physical and psychological facts
fall short of providing useful information for determining the identity relations
between the two resulting entities and the original person. As such, many
contemporary philosophers stopped here and withdrew from taking the diachronic
identity of persons seriously. For instance, Robert Nozick’s (1981) closest continuer
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theory and Derek Parfit’s (1984) idea that “identity is not what matters” assert
similarly that personal identity is just a convention. After all, we are capable of
knowing all the observable facts regarding the splitting process. At face value, personal
identity is just one among many kinds of identities of things - if we treat the identity
condition of physical objects in a conventional way, then we should also treat the
identity condition of persons in the same way.
If we accept haecceitism of subjects, it cannot be the case that both Lefty and
Righty get Brainy’s subject afterward. Either one of the resultant subjects is the same
as Brainy’s subject, or none of them is Brainy’s subject. The haecceity of one’s subject
of experience is a unique further fact for each of us, which is not describable in terms
of qualitative properties.
If one endorses the haecceitism of subjects of experience and believe that there is
a non-qualitative further fact about our existence disclosed by the first-person
perspective, one would also admit that observations from a third-person perspective
are limited – it does not provide us with information of our own existence. Only when
one examines one’s life from a first-person perspective can one understand one’s
existence.
The first-person perspective reveals a further fact of regarding my existence as a
subject of experience, which observations from a third-person perspective is not
capable of verifying. Since the further fact revealed by the first-person perspective
regarding my existence is not to be revealed by all the qualitative properties, such as
physical and psychological properties of the individual in question, the further fact
regarding my existence is a non-qualitative fact.

5.5

Objections and Replies
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5.5.1

Objection 1: Haecceitism and Common Sense

Haecceity is non-qualitative. It would imply that my haecceity exists independently of
all physical/qualitative facts. It is tantamount to saying that “being Jenny” existed and
could have existed before Jenny was born and the qualitative facts of Jenny’s body had
existed. This is totally absurd. Are Haecceitists of subjects of experience committed to
such claims?

5.5.2

My Reply

My reply is no – the haecceities of subjects of experience do not exist when there is
no conscious experience. It is incorrect to say that my haecceity exists independently
of all physical/qualitative facts. In fact, my haecceity exists only when there is my
conscious subject of experience exists. Even if my haecceity is a further fact over and
above the mental properties I have, its existence depends on the existence of my
conscious experience.
Although the existence of my haecceity is a further fact over and above the
qualitative facts of the world, it does not mean that my haecceity exists permanently,
or it can exist with having any qualitative property. To recall, the essential qualitative
property of a subject is “being conscious.” A subject cannot exist without the
qualitative property of being conscious.

5.5.3

Objection 2: Haecceitism and Moral Responsibility

Personal ontology sometimes has implications for moral responsibility, agency, etc.
The claims that I am a subject, and I persist if and only if my haecceity persists is a
non-starter because there can be a subject of experience that persists without
psychological continuity. It is entirely unconvincing to say that such I persist without
psychological continuity because it does not match our intuition about the strong
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correlation between our persistence and our moral responsibilities. Also, if I am merely
a subject, and a subject may not have any psychological complexities such as
personality, memories, and psychological traits, then I may not have moral or social
responsibilities. This is weird.

5.5.4

My Reply

I would choose to bite the bullet here. I hope that my theory could be persuasive for
those in search of a metaphysical theory of our existence and persistence. It is not to
say that moral responsibility is insignificant, but it is arguable that the metaphysical
inquiries of personal ontology are in principle separable from the ethical inquiries of
our moral or social responsibility. For instance, Immanuel Kant famously asserts that
we cannot in principle know the metaphysical truth regarding the nature and the
persistence conditions of the immanent self as a substance. There is a limit to our pure
reasoning that we cannot surpass. However, this fact does not hinder the development
of a workable theory regarding moral responsibility via our practical reasoning.
Haecceitism of subjects is a theory that has similar implications to that of Kant
regarding the relation between the metaphysical and the ethical. There is no guarantee
that there is psychological continuity when a subject of experience persists and vice
versa. Nevertheless, any theory that claims that moral responsibility is grounded in
psychological continuity is in principle compatible with haecceitism of subjects.
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Summary
I did three things in chapter one. First, I argued that weak Animalism is not what we
want, as it is not a fundamental theory that answers the question of “what we are.”
Second, I argued that a traditional Cartesian substance dualist would reject either
premise one or premise two of The Thinking Animal Argument. Third, I objected to
Snowdon’s proposal, I pointed out that his argument only applies to Classical
Animalism but not weak Animalism. Furthermore, I argued that he only focuses on the
representational unity of consciousness, which is one kind of unity among the many
kinds of unity of consciousness. I suggested that we may adopt a Phenomenal Unity
Theory of Consciousness, a theory modified by Tim Bayne, according to which a
subject of experience always has mental states that are phenomenally unified.
In chapter two, I argued against Baker’s constitutionalism or person. I pointed out
that since one can have a robust first-person perspective without having a rudimentary
first-person perspective, and vice versa, the two are not different stages of the same
property but are totally different properties. Furthermore, I argued that my essential
property is not a robust first-person perspective. I also proposed that a rudimentary
first-person perspective is not essential for our existence. I thus concluded that neither
the rudimentary nor the robust first-person perspective is essential for our existence.
I have four objections to Sydney Shoemaker’s theory of personhood. I proposed
that I can exist as two distinct persons at different times, even when there is no
psychological connectedness between them. Second, I argued that the waterfall
illusion is an example showing that the representational contents of the mental states
of a normal person are not necessarily unified. Third, Shoemaker explicitly claims that
mental states are functional states. This proposal is problematic in the sense that the
phenomenal aspects of our lives are totally neglected. Finally, I argued that we are not
persons that are functions because we are not dispositions that are multiply instantiable.
200

In chapter three, I point out that Jeff McMahan’s (2002) Embedded Mind View
is flawed. His claim that broad psychological continuity is necessary for the
persistence of the individual is redundant. Given that a sufficient amount of the same
brain already determines the same mind, there is no need to propose broad
psychological continuity as the criterion of the sameness of mind. I then argued that
Galen Strawson’s (2011) claim that subjects are identical to its experiences it
problematic. I provided some counterexamples, such as the action and reaction forces
and a cause and its effect, to argue that things that necessarily co-exist may not be
identical. I also revealed the disadvantages of a process metaphysics. His Conscious
Subject View would be inconsistent if he endorses the view that subjects are processes,
and processes are categorically basic entities that do not have essential properties.
When one identifies a subject with a process, we lose the information of modal
properties such as the essential properties of an object. However, given that there is an
answer to the question, ‘will I* experience tomorrow?’ it follows that me* the subject
of experience is a concrete object that has persistence conditions.
In chapter four, I defended my own Conscious Subject View, according to which
we exist and persist as subjects of experience, whose essential property is to be
conscious. I provide two arguments for this claim. The Essentiality Argument is
basically as follows. I first define egoistic concern such that necessarily, my concern
about X can be egoistic if and only if I exist and persist as X. Furthermore, I argue that
necessarily, I can be egoistically concerned with an entity E if and only if E is
numerically identical with my subject of experience. I, therefore, conclude that we are
essentially subjects of experience. My second argument, which I call the Argument of
Persistence, is briefly that we have the intuition that we persist only when there is the
gradual replacement of the brain. The best candidate to explain this intuition is that we
persist as subjects of experience.
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I also argued that there is a fundamental and unbridgeable difference between (1)
an egoistic concern that involves concern about one’s future experience from a firstperson perspective and (2) an egoistically oriented concern that does not involve the
fear of future pain or anticipation of future joy. I also propose that there are two uses
of “I”: the improper and the proper uses of “I.” The proper use of “I” is when “I” refers
to the subject of experience, and the improper use of “I” is when “I” refers to the human
animal or the human body.
In chapter five, I argued that Swinburne’s claim that if “I” refers to the soul, then
“I” is an informative designator is dubious since we have no idea about what the
essence of the soul that is capable of being conscious is. If we were to admit that “I”
is an informative designator, “I” simply cannot be a mental thing which is merely
capable of being conscious but not essentially conscious. Instead, it must be a mental
thing that is essentially conscious. I thus recommended modifying haecceitism of souls
to become haecceitism of subjects of experience. I also argued that Baker’s view is
flawed because a subject does not necessarily have a unique spatiotemporal viewpoint.
If it is possible for one to have two or more spatiotemporal locations from which one
perceives at the same time, the haecceitistic implications of a first-person perspective
would be questionable.
Finally, I provided my own series of arguments for the haecceitism of subjects of
experience. Suppose a physicist suddenly announces a discovery that our actual world
is a symmetrical universe. We can ideally positively conceive of these: (1) I am in side
A of this symmetrical universe, (2) I am in side B. Given that there are no differences
in the qualitative properties between the two individuals, and yet these are genuine
metaphysical possibilities corresponding to different facts, the answer to “who am I?”
is a non-qualitative further fact over and above all qualitative properties. There is thus
haecceities of subjects of experience.
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